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1 Introduction
1.1 Relevance and Motivation
Throughout the last decades researchers, newspapers as well as economic players
showed tremendous interest in finding out if managerial and personal traits have
an impact on corporate decisions in any way, including the firm performance, firm
policies or corporate governance. A large body of literature has developed linking
the manager’s personality and his attributes to the firm in its various aspects. The
following examples give a small glimpse of the global interest in its numerous facets.
First, research deals with traits in many forms. For instance, Bennedsen et al.
(2007) ask themselves whether ”CEOs matter”. They put the question of managerial
talent as well as other traits to the center of their research and find that managerial
talent is a crucial benefit for firm performance. In the same context, Johnson et al.
(1985) determine the manager’s value as it is perceived by the shareholders and also
try to evaluate his ability.
Furthermore, Bamber et al. (2010) answer the question whether manager traits
impact voluntary financial disclosures significantly. They investigate the birth cohort,
military experience, career tracks as well as many other traits related to the personal
background of a manager. They provide evidence that those executive who gained
war experience show more conservative behavior.
No only research but also media shows a strong interest in this line questions.
For example, HindustianTimes (2012) identifies seven personal traits a manager
should possess to work successfully. For this purpose, they interview employees of
a company to point out what they consider to be the most important managerial
attributes. Among those are employee protection, problem solving or contact mak-
1
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ing capabilities. Similarly, Garlick (2007) presents the result of a study of Maritz
Research Forum on Hospitalitynet.com investigating the impact of a manager’s
personality on the employee’s performance. They stress the importance of a good
manager-employee relationship.
In Forbes Magazine, Faktor (2012) identifies nine corporate personality types and
associates them with their tendency to take risks and develop their career etc.
In another example from Forbes Magazine, Adams (2012) proposes that overconfident
managers may turn out to be good innovators and even better than their competitors.
They name Steve Jobs as a great example of a successful innovator and at the same
time rather overconfident manager. In 1999, The New York Times takes a look back
onto the economic crash of 1929 and traces its causes back to a common confidence
within the population and players of the economy (Norris (1999)).
In a last instance from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Reinhold (2006) claims that,
in a highly contested environment, former army officers seem to perform better than
their competitors.
These few but keenly varying examples show, that researchers, press, and other
groups of individuals are interested in explaining how characteristics affect corporate
decisions and whether this happens to be negatively or positively. We thoroughly
review current research later. However, one aspect has been rarely examined in prior
studies, namely how shareholders perceive the personality and managerial attributes
of their manager or in other words how the market value of the firm (henceforth: firm
value) is affected by their managers. The market constantly adapts its perception of
an executive (Pan et al. (2013)) and incorporates new information on the executive
into the stock price. Hence, the market evaluates each executive according to its
perception. The question arises: How do shareholders perceive and, in turn, evaluate
personal and managerial characteristics? Answers to the above and similar questions
as well as suitable explanations, for which attributes have positive or negative impact
especially why and when they do, have not been examined thoroughly in prior
studies.
These questions commonly attract the public attention and are highly relevant and
numerous are still unanswered in this fields of corporate governance and thus, a good
reason to start investigating.
2
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1.2 Target, Contribution and Outline
In this thesis, we dedicate ourselves to examine the question how the market evaluates
personal as well as managerial traits and to provide proper evidence. We investigate
the net effect of personal and managerial traits on firm value. Some of the research
questions we will focus on are as follows: What is the value of single personal and
managerial traits? Which personal or managerial traits destroy value and which
create firm value? Under which circumstances do they increase or destroy value? E.g.
Does managerial overconfidence destroy firm value and if so, in what kind of firms is
this effect stronger and is the effect different if the manager is also very powerful?
In particular, we take a closer look at unexpected and sudden changes in corporate
governance and investigate how shareholders react to the announcement of those
events. Furthermore, we answer the same questions that arose not only for executives
in their own company but also for the firms where they hold outside directorships.
Unlike prior studies, we examine these questions by approaching the market’s per-
ception and valuation of a manager and his attributes. As mentioned before, this
approach has rarely been used by existing literature.
Two major reasons for this are of statistical nature. The likelihood of an executive’s
termination and his hiring are endogenously related to his personal and managerial
attributes (Glaser et al. (2007)). Furthermore, for researchers it is hard to know when
shareholders realize suboptimal levels of personal attributes and their expectations
as well as implications for the manager’s value (Campbell et al. (2011)). Within the
scope of our research we also address the endogeneity problem being predominant in
prior literature.
To provide evidence on all this and to solve or circumvent the mentioned issues, we
investigate exogenous shocks to the company and the shareholder reaction to these
shocks. More precisely, we exploit the sudden death of managers and examine the
stock price reaction to these events. We run Event Studies to compute the abnormal
stock return. By doing so, we directly observe the value of an executive and can,
in great detail, determine the value of his personal and managerial traits as they
are perceived by the market. We also investigate the correctness of some theoretical
underpinning that can be assumed, namely the efficient market hypothesis. The
3
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summarized research questions above can be answered properly by exploiting these
sudden death events. We will discuss them and our contribution to current research
more thoroughly in the following.
In a first step, we provide a broad analysis on the effect of personal and man-
agerial characteristics and obtain evidence which traits have positive impact on firm
value or negative impact respectively. In particular, we answer the questions why the
market perceives some traits to be value destroying and some to be value enhancing
and at least why it does not react to certain traits at all.
We also will deal with the questions under which circumstances certain traits are
particularly distinctive. This extends from firms with certain characteristics to firms
with certain governance. For example, we investigate if overconfidence has higher
occurrence in young and risky firms and if then in those firms the impact may
even be positive. This line of questions will be answered thoroughly for many firm
characteristics. But not only do we restrict our sample along firm characteristics but
also along managerial traits. E.g. Is overconfidence more distinctive if the manager
is very powerful within his own firm and if so, is the effect stronger?
Lastly in this part, as we do not restrict ourselves to the examinations of CEOs only,
we also deal with the chairman and president positions within a firm.1 Consequently,
we will try to answer all above questions subsampled by the position held within
the company. That is, do characteristics of managers show different effects if the
executive is CEO or chairman?
This first part of our study contributes to the existing literature on characteristics
and firm value. We exploit sudden manager deaths and the stock price reaction to
these events as a natural experiment to find the impact of managerial and personal
characteristics on firm value.
Executives’ attributes are important determinants for their decisions and public
perception of them. The issue, how traits impact corporate decisions has thoroughly
been investigated. However, the question on the value of traits is the object of our
1A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is defined as the highest ranking executive in a company. A
Chairman is defined as an executive elected by a company’s board of directors that is responsible
for presiding over board or committee meetings. A President is often considered to be the leader
of a company but subordinated to the CEO position and overseeing the various Vice Presidents.
For thorough definitions, see Appendix tables 76 77.
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examination and has barely been focused on in prior studies. To the best of our
knowledge, the sudden death method to examine these issues brought forward by
Johnson et al. (1985) has not been employed to study the value of personal and
and managerial characteristics. Only Salas (2010), who investigated the effect of
managerial entrenchment on firm value, Johnson et al. (1985), Bennedsen et al.
(2007) and Hayes and Schaefer (1999), who dealt with the impact of managerial
talent on firm value, as well as Falato et al. (2013), who provides evidence for director
busyness and firm value, exploit sudden executive deaths to (partially) investigate
the effect of any managerial traits on firm value.
We are also one of the first to distinguish between different positions within the firm
and to analyze the impact of the different traits as well as to differentiate subsamples
of firms with certain attributes. Only Worrell et al. (1986) distinguish between the
positions of chairman and CEO and examine the value of the two positions, but do
not examine any traits.
Furthermore, by employing the sudden death method we are able to solve the
issue of endogeneity, which is inherited by the questions, we answer. We dive into
this in more detail in later chapters.
In the second step, not only do we deal with the shareholders’ perception of a
manager but also how they accept and perceive his successor after the sudden death.
We will discuss the questions if firms replace their managers with the same attributes
even though the reaction to the manager was value destroying or if they tend to
change the profile of their leader. Later, we give indication if the shareholders’
reaction to sudden death events is driven by the choice of the successor or by not
nominating any replacement at all at the time of the death announcement to fully
rule out the possibility of endogeneity.
To the best best of our knowledge we are one of the first to not only link the
stock price reaction to the sudden death of an executive, but also to consider the
successors in this position. Hence, existing research widely ignores the inherent
valuation of any successor. Only Borokhovich et al. (2006) takes successors into
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consideration when investigating sudden death events. Furthermore, Salas (2010)
uses a control dummy in his analysis to check for the value of the successor, but does
not dive deeper into this issue.
Thereby, we broadly extend the research of an important issue and provide an over-
all picture of the psychology of stock price reactions to sudden and unexpected events.
Lastly, we answer the above questions around the value of personal and managerial
traits for companies where the deceased holds outside directorships at the time of
his death, that is companies the deceased does not hold any other non-board related
position and we provide evidence whether characteristics play any role for board
members. We are one of the first to also link personal and managerial traits to
outside directors. Literature investigating the impact of (outside) director traits
on firm value is very sparse. We are the first to provide a broad overview of most
characteristics and their effects. Falato et al. (2013) investigate busyness, but focus
on a different aspect as we will see.
The theoretical underpinning we will be following here and try to provide evidence
for or against is the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) as it is used by Fama (1970).
In particular, we seek to provide evidence in favor or against the semi-strong form of
efficiency which assumes that all publicly available information is incorporated into
the stock price at the present and no investor can can predict future changes from
current information (Shleifer (2000)). Furthermore, we will also deal with another
assumption of the EMH requiring that no (relevant) information causes no reaction.
Finally, we briefly look into the assumption that the market has to incorporate new
information ”quickly” and ”correctly”. Among the sudden death literature, we are
one of the first to properly focus on the EMH. The EMH will help us explaining
certain results, which we obtain. On the other hand, our results might be understood
as evidence either supportive or against the EMH.
Hence, we contribute to current research in many ways and in addition our re-
sults provide indication for companies to how to choose their management under
certain circumstances and tells them how to assign them with attributes eventually.
We also contribute to the great conflict of EMH as well as Behavioral Finance and
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try to shed light on the robustness of the EMH.
This thesis is arranged as follows. In chapter 2, we review the studies employ-
ing sudden death and review literature of different personal and managerial traits
that we seek to analyze within the scope of our examination.
Chapter 3 provides a brief introduction of the methodology which we apply to obtain
suitable results. We further describe the sample which we generate and provide some
descriptive statistics.
Chapter 4 recalls the important efficient market hypothesis in its many facets, its
supportive findings throughout research history as well as critique on it. We also
link the EMH to our research and provide explanation why applying the EMH in
this context makes the most sense.
In the fifth chapter, we develop the first hypotheses for our investigations and in-
troduce the proxies and measures for our analyses. We obtain most of the variables
from existing literature. Few of them are slightly modified to fit our sample more
accurately and some are constructed by us for the first time. Furthermore, we discuss
the exact regression analysis as well as the control variables for the multivariate
model.
Chapter 6 through 8 present the findings of our research. Starting with the sixth
chapter, we show the effects of personal and managerial traits on shareholder value in
the whole sample first, then in some subsample considerations. Lastly, we thoroughly
prove our results for robustness. Chapter 7 answers the same questions asked before
in the preceding chapter, this time for successors of suddenly departed executives.
In Chapter 8, we answer these question for those companies where the deceased
executive holds an outside directorship.
Finally in chapter 9, we conclude our findings and provide implications for corporate
governance.
7
2 Literature
2.1 Literature Review on Sudden Death Studies
The strand of literature employing sudden death events is straightforward. Johnson
et al. (1985) being the first to apply the method of sudden death as a natural
experiment investigate the executives’ continued employment exploiting the stock
price reaction to the sudden deaths of 53 senior corporate executives. They find
that the reactions strongly depend on the deceased’s status as founder, his past
performance as well as his talent. They find positive stock price reactions for founders
and negative ones for professional CEOs. Deducing from the shareholders’ reac-
tion to the sudden death of their manager they further find differences between
the shareholders’ expectation of the deceased’s net benefits and those of his successor.
Slovin and Sushka (1993) analyze the effect of inside block ownership on firm
value by exploiting sudden death of an insider. Their investigations indicate negative
effects of inside block holders on firm value. With regard to ownership, Nguyen and
Nielsen (2013) find strong positive impact for small inside ownership. This beneficial
effect decreases as managerial ownership increases and leads to negative impact for
large managerial ownership. They further show that large outside ownerships impact
the firm value positively.
Worrell et al. (1986) split the price reaction to the death into different key ex-
ecutives such as Chairman and CEO as they find no strong impact of the deceaseds
together. However, once they distinguish they find this evidence. In particular, they
obtain significantly negative shareholder reactions for the sudden death of CEOs.
Moreover, they provide negative abnormal returns with suddenness of the death.
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Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001) as well as Faccio and Parsley (2009) focus on politi-
cians’ connections and politically connected CEOs by exploiting sudden death events
or bad health rumors. Thereby, Roberts (1990)’s findings imply that the seniority-
benefit relationship exists. This relationship refers to benefits companies achieve,
profiting from the length of service (seniority) of a congress member. The author
analyzes the stock market reactions of diverse interests to the sudden death of Senator
Henry Jackson and his successor Sam Nunn. Fisman (2001) uses health rumors
around Indonesia’s former president Suharto to show how those rumors impact firms
in Indonesia that are politically connected with the government. His findings show
that politically connected firms provide significantly lower return than independent
or less-dependent firms. Finally, Faccio and Parsley (2009) also analyze sudden death
of politicians and find significant value loss of 1,7% of firms that were headquartered
in the hometown of the politician and were therefore politically connected.
Hutton et al. (2013) instead focus on political party preferences and how these affects
firm policies. In fact, their investigations indicate Republican managers to be more
conservative, meaning lower R&D expenses, lower debt level, less risky investments
and higher profitability. They use exogenous shocks such as the attacks of september
11 as well as CEO deaths and find that if CEOs are replaced by more conservative
CEOs, the firm will be affected accordingly.
Salas (2010) focuses on how managerial entrenchment impacts the firm value by
proposing that losing an entrenched manager should cause a positive stock price
reaction to his sudden death whereas high quality managers should be negatively
correlated to the stock price reaction. Within his work he revisits existing entrench-
ment measures and checks for their effectiveness to actually measure entrenchment.
He provides evidence that age and tenure only have slight effects on firm value while
an interaction term of tenure and past performance tends to capture the effect of
entrenchment far more precisely.
Borokhovich et al. (2006) investigate the board structure and the successors to
senior executives in consequence to their sudden death. They show that shareholders’
reaction is positively related to the outsider ratio of the boards of directors. Moreover,
they control for many board related aspects such as board size or blockholding. But
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it indicates that the strongest impact is accounted by board independence. It turns
out to be even more important when a successor cannot be named directly. Their
results are in line with existing literature showing that independent boards are averse
to discipline and to efficiently monitor bad managers, but at the same time they are
willing to improve the management’s quality.
Bennedsen et al. (2007) use sudden death of managers and a managers’ nuclear
family members to examine how managers can affect the firm performance and
whether managerial talent plays any role. Those deaths are positively correlated
with a decline of investment and sales growth. However, the effect is strongly related
to the industry and firm characteristics. Moreover, they conclude that CEOs are
essential to firm performance.
Hayes and Schaefer (1999) again examine the direct impact of sudden manager
deaths on firm value focusing on managerial ability. They compare managers that
resign voluntarily from their job in a firm with managers that die suddenly and pro-
pose that the ability of the managers resigning voluntarily is on average higher. They
find significant different shareholder reactions to those events. Loss of managers by
sudden deaths gains +3.82% abnormal return whereas the resignation of a manager
causes −1.51%.
Nguyen and Nielsen (2010a) find that executives are paid according to their con-
tribution to firm value, i.e. CEOs that impact firm value positively on average
receive higher pay than CEOs with only smaller positive or even negative impact
on firm value. But at the same time, 80% of the additional gain made by a CEO
is tied up with his salary. The authors investigate this link between executive pay
and his contribution to firm value by exploiting sudden death events. Furthermore,
their findings provide evidence on the efficiency of labor markets since more valuable
managers are paid better than managers with only low or negative effect on firm value.
Following the sudden death of an inside or gray director, no significant stock price
reaction can be observed by Nguyen and Nielsen (2010b). In contrast, outside
directors cause a 1% decrease in stock price. Although outside directors are valuable
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for firms, older outside directors or long tenure absorb this positive effect. Generally
spoken, inside directors provide a positive effect on firm value.
Falato et al. (2013) deal with a similar issue. They investigate busyness of board
of directors and their impact on firm value. The authors consider sudden director
deaths as ’attention shocks’ for the firm and provide indication that those events
are seen negatively. They furthermore show that board busyness destroys more
shareholder value if they suffer such an attention shock.
2.2 Personal and Managerial Traits Literature Review
When investigating a broad range of personal and managerial traits, it makes sense
to structure those traits with regard to their nature. We distinguish between two
groups of traits a person may possess in a company. First, there are Personal
Characteristics or Traits, that is those every individual can have. Basically, those
comprehend characteristics of a personality. It includes traits such as overconfidence,
narcissism, generosity etc. On the other hand, there are Managerial Characteristics
or Traits. These comprehend all those attributes a manager can show within his
company but that are not part of his personality. It includes e.g. power, reputa-
tion, entrenchment etc. These traits are directly linked to the company in which
the individual is at the helm. Table 1 gives an overview of all variables, of which
we develop proxies and of which we try to find evidence for their impact on firm value.
Most of these characteristics are used throughout literature and different findings
are made. We provide a thorough introduction to current research and summarize
the important literature on every trait. We start dealing with studies on personal
characteristics and thereafter continue with literature on managerial traits.
2.2.1 Related Literature and Implications for Personal Traits
Overconfidence
Individuals systematically deviate from rationality assumptions. Overconfidence - the
overestimation of one’s abilities or information - represents a commonly made error.
For example, when asked to rank their own driving ability, about 80% of individuals
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Personal Traits Managerial Traits
1 Overconfidence Power
2 Narcissism/Egotism Reputation
3 Generosity Entrenchment
4 Resilience/Capability of Bearing Sacrifices Busyness
5 Openmindedness/Tolerance Generalist/Specialist
6 Discipline Quality/Experience
7 Sympathy
Table 1: List of characteristics.
consider themselves to have better driving skills than the median driver (Svenson
(1981)). Similarly, MBA students have unrealistically positive expectations about
how many job offers they receive upon graduation and about how much they will
earn (Hoch (1985)). Ignorant of high prevalent divorce rates, almost all ‘Newlyweds’
assume a lifetime endurance of their marriage (Baker and Emery (1993)).
Overconfidence is a phenomenon that is not restricted to the personal life but is also
likely to play a role in corporate decision making. Deviations from rationality of
managers are likely to persist because potential remedies of behavioral biases are
unlikely to fully wipe out managerial irrationality (Heaton (2002)).
Overconfident CEOs undertake too many and poor acquisitions, invest too much
and choose too high debt levels. It is puzzling why one observes that there are
overconfident CEOs despite their value-destroying activities. There are at least two
not mutually exclusive explanations for this: 1. Corporate governance mechanisms
fail in firing overconfident CEOs or in educating them. 2. There are positive aspects
of overconfidence that outweigh negative aspects. An argument following this line of
reasoning is provided by Goel and Thakor (2008). Overconfident CEOs act less risk
averse because they perceive risk to be smaller than it actually is. Individuals that
take more risk produce better outcomes on average and are therefore more likely to
make a career. The authors further propose that CEO overconfidence impacts firm
value non-monotonically unlike low risk aversion. Instead, they show that overconfi-
dence destroys firm value at excessive levels of CEO diffidence and overconfidence
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but eventually enhances firm value at moderate levels of overconfidence.2
Campbell et al. (2011) theoretically analyze a situation where a risk-averse CEO
chooses investment levels. According to their model, optimism has positive and
negative welfare implications. On the one hand, optimism alleviates the underin-
vestment problem caused by risk-aversion. On the other hand, optimism leads to
overinvestment because the CEO overestimates the investment yield. Their model
predicts that forced CEO turnover is likely to be higher for low or extremely high
optimism, while a moderate form of CEO optimism maximizes shareholder value.
They find that CEO optimism affects forced takeovers in a way predicted by the model.
Malmendier et al. (2011) examine financial policies of overconfident managers and
establish empirical evidence for a significant impact of managerial traits. They find
that overconfident managers prefer to use internal funds and, conditional on the use
of external financing, issue less equity than their peers. Malmendier and Tate (2005)
find that overconfident managers invest more and that they exhibit higher free cash
flow-investment sensitivity, i.e., they invest more if there are more internal funds
available.
The study by Billet and Qian (2008) is concerned with the emergence of over-
confidence. To this end, they analyze series of mergers and acquisitions of individual
CEOs. More precisely, they find support for three empirical predictions of the
assumption that managers become overconfident by experience. (1) First deals
have nonnegative wealth effects but subsequent deals have negative wealth effects
due to emerging overconfidence. (2) Successful acquisition experience generates
overconfidence leading to more acquisitions. These additional acquisitions will have
poorer quality. (3) Increased overconfidence by experienced acquirers is reflected
in optimistic trading in own stock. Kolasinski and Li (2013) also provide empirical
evidence that overconfident CEOs undertake value destroying acquisitions. Moreover,
they find that the positive (negative) effect of overconfident CEOs on acquisition
frequency (quality) is alleviated if boards are small and dominated by independent
2A thorough theoretical analysis on overconfidence and implications for firm value can be found
in this study by Goel and Thakor (2008).
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directors.3
Narcissism/Egotism
The original meaning of narcissism stems from the mythological individual Narcissus,
who fell in love with his own reflection (Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007)). Like over-
confidence, narcissism is an issue that is dealt with in corporate finance, management
and other business related literature.
However, psychological literature highlights four aspects of narcissism: Exploitative-
ness, leadership or authority, arrogance, self-admiration (Chatterjee and Hambrick
(2007)). Jackson (2012) discusses in Forbes Magazine the value destroying aspects
of Narcissism and refers to Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). They measure CEO
narcissism in various ways accounting for those attributes above. They construct
proxies by investigating the size of CEO photographs in annual reports or analyzing
interviews by counting the number of first person singular personal pronouns. It
appears to have no significant impact on firm performance, but it influences firm’s
strategy in a way that narcissistic CEOs tend to favor extreme outcomes (large
profits or losses) as those results provide attention. Consequently, narcissism seems
to cause dynamism for corporate strategies.
Aktas et al. (2011) investigate the effects of managerial traits on details of a takeover,
in particular these are deal initiation, time and likelihood of completion. They focus
on the effects of CEO narcissism which is implemented through the frequency of
use of personal pronouns in CEO speeches. They find that more narcissistic CEOs
are more likely to be the initiator of the deal, complete the deal more likely, and
do so in a shorter time period as compared to their less narcissistic counterpart. In
addition, they find evidence that narcissistic acquisition behavior may be detrimental
to shareholder welfare: Bids are significantly higher and the market response to the
acquisition announcement is worse.
Ham et al. (2013) deduce the narcissistic character from the size of a CEO’s signature
and indicate that it is positively related to overinvestment. This, in turn, leads
3There is plenty more literature on overconfidence, which we do not present, e.g. Malmendier and
Tate (2008), Roll (1986), Glaser et al. (2007), Hackbarth (2008), Hackbarth (2009) etc.
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to lower revenues and sales growth in the near future. Other than Chatterjee and
Hambrick (2007), they also find worse performance for companies with narcissistic
CEOs.
Generosity
Glickman (2011) lists on the blog of the Harvard Business Review a bunch of reasons,
why generosity may be a booster for the career and identifies how one can behave
generously. She presents an ethical work behavior, improved communications skills
and a general willingness to work in a team as crucial consequences of generosity.
Even though generosity appears to be an important attribute to investigate, literature
on it is rather sparse.
A study by Dahl et al. (2012) deals with generous CEOs and shows that children
have strong impact on parent’s personality. Fatherhood impacts the CEO’s behavior
within his company and even effects employees’ salary. Therefore, fatherhood in
general leads the CEO to be less generous and to pay his employees less than CEOs
who do not become a father. In particular, the effects are stronger if the CEO
becomes father of a son. Salaries are impacted positively if the CEO gets a daughter
as first child and female employees are less affected in general. However, those CEOs,
in turn, tend to pay themselves more after fatherhood.
Resilience/Capability of bearing lingering sacrifices
Resilience is an issue that a lot of studies deal with, but often under different names.
We comprehend some literature, where studies capture the resilience attribute. Re-
silient individuals are emotionally more stable and more positive (Block and Kremen
(1996)). In turn, they are more able to recover from strong negative experience and
emotion or to bear lingering sacrifices (Masten (2001)).
Peterson et al. (2009) link traits such as hope, optimism and also resilience of
managers to their propensity for transformations. Therefore, those executives with
these attributes tend to be more successful in transformational leadership rankings.
The authors also point out resilience as the mediator between positive managerial
characteristics and performance.
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Malmendier and Nagel (2011) analyze the question whether macroeconomic shocks
an individual encounters has an impact on the long-term risk attitude of this individ-
ual. They find great differences in risk taking of people who experienced the great
depression in the 1930s as teenagers and later born children.
Bamber et al. (2010) focus on the questions which deal with the role of managers and
their impact on the firm’s voluntary disclosure choice. They find evidence that this
choice is strongly related to the individuals background. They indicate that managers
born before WWII that is those individuals who experienced lingering sacrifices show
more conservative behavior, whereas individuals with a finance background display
more precise disclosure styles.
Openmindedness
Even though openmindedness is an issue that is highly relevant for an individual’s
personality, it has not been of greater interest for prior studies and is only rarely
used as object of investigations in corporate governance literature.
Bloningen and Wooster (2003)’s study indicates that international CEOs, that is
those with a foreign background, invest more in foreign assets. They find strong
evidence, when a firm switches from a non-foreign backgrounded CEO to one with
this attribute. They are the first to find evidence in CEO turnovers.
Nadkarni and Herrmann (2010) investigate how CEO adaptability to environmental
and economic changes affects firm performance. They propose that adaptability or
flexibility of the CEO is the direct link of his personality to firm performance. Their
analysis suggests that the meaning of each CEO characteristic is more important
with stronger focus on adaptability. It further implies that with growing importance
of CEO adaptability, his traits turn out to be either drivers of firm performance or
absorbers.
Discipline/Authority
The latest corporate governance and behavioral finance research focuses on discipline
aspects by analyzing the military background of companies’ managers and its effects
on various aspects of the firm.
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Benmelech and Frydman (2013) are concerned with CEOs who served in military and,
therefore, learned honor, duty, selflessness, and in particular discipline and authority
throughout their time in military, are less prone to be involved in fraudulent activity
and at the same time perform better than their peers during economical downswings.
Military CEOs also tend to invest less.4
Moreover, Lin et al. (2011) find that firms with military CEOs pay higher premium
at acquisitions than their peers, but at the same time gain higher abnormal return
when announcing the acquisitions. This suggests an impact of CEOs with such
background on the corporate decisions making.
Law and Mills (2013) see military experience as a measure for integrity and discipline
and propose that managers without it tend to seek for tax avoidance. They are also
more likely to make use of tax shelters for material business operations. In particular,
firms without military CEOs pay one to two million dollars less tax per year. The
authors further discover higher likelihood for non-military CEOs to be sued or to
correct financial statements.
Sympathy
Woods (2011) claims on HRmagazine.co.uk, that a highly sympathetic management
is a good motivator for employees to ”go the extra mile”. A board’s major tasks are
to monitor and advise the management. Adams and Almeida (2007) indicate, that if
the CEO reveals his information to the board he will get better advise.
This shows, that the relationship between board and management is crucial for the
company’s performance. A good relation means better advise. But on the other hand
the monitoring may suffer. Hence, a good relation strongly relies on the sympathy of
the board and the executives. The CEO-board relationship has been investigated by
Shen (2003). He provides evidence that board of directors should better pay better
attention to leadership development for CEOs in early stages of his position and
later shift power towards him, once he proved himself valuable and capable.
Even though sympathetic managers can be essential for communication between staff
and management and in turn determining for the company, literature on sympathy
4In general, this also contributes to resilience, as an early-life experience, might impact decisions
of that person throughout their entire life as suggested by Bamber et al. (2010).
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directly is sparse.5
2.2.2 Related Literature and Implications for Managerial Traits
Power
Power is an issue that serves as object of research in a big strand of literature, simply
because CEOs impact firm strategy and the outcome stronger with their corporate
decisions when they are powerful. As a consequence, powerful CEOs lead firms to
stronger oscillation in firm performance as well as stronger volatility of stock prices
and consequently, managerial power inflates the importance of all other CEO traits
as their exposure impact the firm strongly (Adams et al. (2005)).
Nanda et al. (2013) propose that powerful CEOs are prone to receive less inde-
pendent monitoring and advice by boards on the one hand, but on the other hand
are able to make decisions more quickly and to react to changing environmental
conditions. Less advice might lead CEOs to gather less information for corporate
decisions which, in turn, lets suffer their decision quality. The authors show that
powerful CEOs perform worse than their peers during an industry related downswing.
Furthermore, it appears that power impacts firm value negatively as indicated
by Bebchuk et al. (2008). The authors find that power decreases the profitability and
stock return when announcing an acquisition. They also find evidence that powerful
CEOs are more likely to be rewarded for industry wide positive shocks than their
peers.
Reputation
Like with power, many studies focus on managerial and firm reputation and their
effects. The contracting hypothesis - associating reputation with positive wealth
effects - and the rent extraction hypothesis - predicting negative wealth effects -
are contrary. However, Jian and Lee (2011) show that the latter is dominated.
The authors further provide evidence that negative stock price reactions to capital
5We are not aware of any study dealing with this issue directly, but only focusing on the relation
between board and executive such as Shen (2003).
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investment announcements are subsequent to lower in high cash flow firms with high
reputable CEOs . Furthermore, they provide evidence that highly reputable CEOs
tend to show better performance on post-investment operations.
Francis et al. (2010) also focus on the contrary approaches of rent extraction hypoth-
esis and contracting hypothesis. They, in contrast, find a domination of the rent
extraction hypothesis, in particular their evidence suggests poorer earning quality
in firms with highly reputable CEOs than in firms with low reputable CEOs. They
explain this by assuming that firms with poor performance are in need of highly
talented managers and therefore, choose a highly reputed one.
However, reputation is not only an important issue for executives, but also within
board of directors. Cai et al. (2009) deal in their paper with the process of director
elections and find that shareholders vote depending on the current firm performance,
governance and their perceived director performance. They find that shareholders
do not penalize poor performance of directors, but only their meeting attendance. In
contrast, direct votes do not show any relation to firm performance or even director
reputation.
Few CEOs in the U.S. attract the major attention of media and public. Mal-
mendier and Tate (2009) find that those ”Superstar CEOs” suffer a significant
decrease of performance after winning an award for their leadership compared to
their prior performance. They suggest not only low performance but also an increase
of compensation thereafter as well as stronger focus on private activity. The authors
conclude that Superstar CEOs expose negative performance.
Busyness
It is obvious to assume that busy boards are weaker monitors than their nonbusy
peers and therefore can be linked to poor board performance. Fich and Shivdasani
(2006) provide evidence that firms with busy boards show lower Market-to-Book
ratios on average and are less profitable. Furthermore, busy boards consisting
by majority of independent directors do not make any difference to inside boards.
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However, when directors add another directorship and become busy, it results in a
negative abnormal stock price reaction and a company having a busy directors leave
experience positive abnormal returns.
In line with this, Falato et al. (2013) show firm value destroying aspects of busy
directors by investigating the sudden death of an outside director or the CEO of the
firm and the implications for the board of directors under the condition that the
board is busy.
Ahn et al. (2010) use acquisition announcements to indicate that companies with
busy boards are more prone to suffer negative abnormal announcement returns. This
result only holds onwards a certain threshold of the number of outside directorships.
They conclude that only too busy directors are no effective monitors anymore and
therefore accept value destroying acquisitions.
A CEO’s network plays an important role when it comes to information gath-
ering or just enhancing the influence on the company. Renneboog and Zhao (2011)
suggest that network building happens for either one of the reasons. The authors find
evidence that networks are positively related to compensation. They indicate that
highly connected boards - busy boards - tend to grant higher and non-performance
based compensation to their CEO since their monitoring quality is restricted. Fur-
thermore, the structure and quality of a network is also of high importance. Networks
can favor either one of the aspects of the beginning, whereas the influence enhancing
aspect can be harmful.
Generalists and Specialists
O’Connell (2013) claims on the Harvard Business Review Network Blog that even
though there is a chance for individuals specialized in a certain field to become CEO,
he proposes significantly lower compensation compared to CEOs that are educated
to be managers. In this article, he refers to a study of Custodio et al. (2012). This
study finds that CEOs who used to work in a wide range of firms and industries
earn 19% more than their peers without this experience. It further suggests that
those pay raises are particularly high when a company switches from a specialist to
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a generalist CEO.
Custodio et al. (2013) also deal with a CEO’s experience and claim higher R&D
expenses for more experienced CEOs. They further propose a higher number of
patent applications for firms with generalist CEOs compared to specialist CEOs.
Firms with generalist CEOs also obtain more diverse innovation portfolios. The
authors explain that more generalist CEOs are able to use their abilities across
many fields and are therefore able to compensate underperformance of innovative
investments.
Quality and Experience
High quality managements communicate the firm’s actual value more compellingly
to shareholders and outsiders so that large deviations in valuation of the firm stays
away (Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005)). This also leads to lower undervaluation and
bigger interest from investors. It also causes higher stock returns in the long term.
The authors also indicate that high quality firms choose NPV projects more wisely
and perform them more accurately.
Additionally, Pan et al. (2013) show that shareholders learn about their CEO’s
talent over time and adapt their perception accordingly, i.e. in the beginning of
a CEO’s tenure, the shareholders’ uncertainty about his ability drives the firm’s
volatility. Over the time the shareholders adjust their estimations. Therefore, his
ability impacts the firm’s volatility less. The study also suggests that shareholder
reactions to announcements made by the CEO decrease over time.
Experienced CEOs that formerly faced financial distress with their old firm tend to
hold more cash and act conservatively and, in turn, impact the financial policies of
the new firm (Dittmar and Duchin (2013)). As already mentioned, Bennedsen et al.
(2007) dealt with managerial talent and how it impacts the firm performance. They
find out that CEOs in general and in particular their talent is an important driver
for firm performance.
Jaffe et al. (2013) focus on CEO skills in the context of M&A activity. They suggest
that managerial skills play a crucial role when successfully acquiring another company.
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The authors find that companies that stick to their CEO after a successful acquisition
earn on average 1.02% more than companies that stick with their CEO after a failed
acquisition. That implies that a firm’s M&A activity’s success strongly depends on
the CEO’s skills.
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3 Methodology, Sample Data and
Event Study Results
According to Campbell et al. (2011), shareholders become aware of the CEO’s level
of overconfidence action by action and decision by decision made by their CEO. They
adapt their perception over time. The authors propose that to evaluate the CEO’s
overconfidence level, firm value should be an average of the current CEO’s value
and his successor. Therefore, as the authors have this problem of identifying the
market’s perception of the CEO, they deal with turnover rates and from that point
interpret their results for firm value since turnovers are binary-type events and easier
to handle statistically.
Moreover, Glaser et al. (2007) analyze the effect of CEO overconfidence on To-
bin’s Q. However, there are potential endogeneity issues. Analyzing the correlation
between proxies for firm value such as Tobin’s Q or the cumulated abnormal return
(CAR) does not seem appropriate in investigating our question as the choice to hire
an overconfident CEO is likely to be endogenous.
Reactions to CEO changes are likely to be impacted by the likelihood of finding an
appropriate replacement of the CEO. The change could be more negative because it
is difficult to find a CEO with the same attributes or someone with better attributes.
Also, the CEO’s likelihood of being terminated is endogenously related to his level
of overconfidence. To put this more precisely, since high levels of overconfidence
have strong negative impact on firm performance, it enhances the probability for
this CEO to be identified as value killer and to be terminated.
We provide this example as it illustrates the general problem that we have to
deal with and because it is directly mentioned in a prior study. The arising issue of
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directly measuring the effect of overconfidence on firm value described by Campbell
et al. (2011), can analogously be adapted to any other personal or managerial trait
and is not only restricted to the issue of overconfidence following the above argumen-
tation. As personal and managerial attributes can have an effect on firm value, those
characteristics are mostly endogenously related to the likelihood of an executive’s
termination. Moreover, the authors state that researchers have to face the problem
to not know the time of shareholders’ realization of certain CEO traits. That is, it is
difficult to determine the date at which the shareholders price in their perception of
the CEO’s personality in detail.
Even though, endogeneity is not necessarily a problem for managerial traits, the
method, we apply, is perfectly suitable to value these trait effects and to circumvent
both issues mentioned above.
Therefore, to resolve them, the empirical design of our investigations looks as follows.
We investigate sudden executive deaths as natural experiment and observe the stock
price reaction to the announcement of the manager’s sudden death. Consequently,
the advantages are that we can isolate confounding events and the market cannot
anticipate those events. Hence, we address the inherent endogeneity problem in the
relationship between managerial and personal characteristics and firm value.
From the stock price reaction to unexpected executive deaths we infer how managers’
characteristics and personal traits impact these reactions. Based on that, the exact
net effect of these traits as well as the condition under which CEOs destroy or increase
firm value can be observed. Sudden death events are exogenous and unexpected
shocks that allow us to identify the impact of managerial and personal characteristics
on firm value directly with this approach. Prior research undertakes intensive analysis
to circumvent endogeneity but does not resolve the problems entirely. Also, existing
studies often find evidence on how traits impact firm’s policy or cash flow investment
sensitivity or other corporate decisions, but we deal with the firm value by analyzing
the shareholders’ perception of their executive. That means, even though traits have
an impact on corporate decisions, it does not necessarily mean that shareholders
realize and evaluate them. In other words, we choose a firm value proxy that strictly
depends on the shareholders, that is the cumulated abnormal stock price return in
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consequence of a sudden death.
We run an event study to empirically indicate the valuation effect of personal and
managerial traits. Furthermore, we investigate how those effects differ by introducing
different managerial traits and by also including control variables. We run cross-
sectional regressions to identify those attributes. We closely follow the approach of
Nguyen and Nielsen (2013).
We measure the change in firm value (∆Vi) by cumulated abnormal return (CAR)
around sudden death which therefore serves as our proxy (Nguyen and Nielsen
(2010a)). Already Nguyen and Nielsen (2010a) (also Johnson et al. (1985), Hayes and
Schaefer (1999), Salas (2010), etc.) investigate the stock price reaction to sudden
deaths and derive abnormal stock returns.
We follow the intuition of Nguyen and Nielsen (2010b). If a manager suffers a
sudden death, vd would be the expected contribution of the deceased to firm value.
Let k be the search costs for his replacement. The change in firm value after his
sudden death is
∆Vi = vr − vd − k
where vr denotes the expected incremental value of the replacement. Hence, if search
costs converge towards zero, the stock price reaction as result to the manager’s
sudden death is a valuation of the deceased and his contribution to the firm vd
(vd = −∆Vi).6 If the firm has a succession plan, search costs are rather low and the
contributed value of the successor to announcement converges towards zero as well,
whereas if the firm does not have one and also does not put an interim manager
into power, search costs can be high. Thus, search costs and successor can drive the
shareholders’ reaction to the sudden death when they have an inherent expectation
on any successor or not. There are three possible actions a company can take after
the sudden death of their executive. Replacements can either be announced along
with the sudden death when succession plans exist, an interim replacement can be
6One can see here that a positive stock price reaction in consequence to sudden death means for
the company to have lost a value destroying manager whereas a negative reaction means to lose
a highly valuable executive.
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announced, no replacement is announced but shareholders expect a replacement to
be chosen from a known pool of possible candidates or, lastly, no anticipation can be
made and the succession is entirely unclear to the market participants.
Due to the above relationship we investigate the CAR as proxy for our firm value and
search costs are accounted for by the market. In chapter 6, we disregard the search
costs entirely as done so by sudden death literature and only reflect the shareholder
reaction to the deceased. In chapter 7, we will then show that this can be done, as
for shareholders the announcement of a suitable replacement does not seem to play
a big role and the successor’s value contribution can be disregarded.
To compute abnormal returns we follow the event study methodology. The data is
provided by the Center of Research and Security Prices (CRSP) and the event study
is run by Eventus.7 We follow the detailed approach of Salas (2010) and present the
event study methodology below. For an executive i dying on day t, there exists a
systematic risk by running the regular OLS over the time of 250 trading days, the
period T = [−270,−20]. This is the period that starts 270 days before the event
date and ends 20 days before it.
Ri,t = α + βRm,t + 
where Ri,t is the firm i return on day t. Rm,t is the market return on day t. Note,
that the CRSP Value Weighted Market Index serves as our proxy for the market.
Finally, α is the constant in the OLS and  the error term. In a first step we estimate
the systematic risk β. Secondly, we obtain the abnormal return by subtracting the
firm return from the actual return given as follows:
ARi,t = Ri,t − βˆRm,t
ARi,t being the abnormal return of firm i at time t (day) and βˆ being the estimated
systematic risk. Now we accumulate the calculated abnormal returns and compute
7The data from CRSP and the use of Eventus was obtained by the author from American University
of Beirut within the scope of a research stay in 2013
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the average
CAR(τ1, τ2) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
CARi(τ1, τ2)
where CARi(τ1, τ2) is cumulated buy and hold abnormal return for the interval
(τ1, τ2). Now, to investigate whether the CAR is significantly different from zero we
use the statistics J .
J =
CAR(τ1, τ2)
σ2(τ1, τ2)
∼a N0,1
where σ2(τ1, τ2) is estimated by
σ2(τ1, τ2) =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
[
CARi(τ1, τ2)− CAR(τ1, τ2)
]2
As we mentioned CARs can be either positive or negative depending on the contri-
bution of the manager and in particular on his characteristics (see Salas (2010)).
For our sample, we consider the time from January 1st, 1972 to June 30th, 2012.
We start with a sample provided by Salas (2010) comprehending 195 sudden death
events between 1972 and 2008. He obtained 52 sudden executive death events from
Etebari et al. (1987) for the time from 1972 until 1982. Thereafter he completed
his list of sudden death for the period 1983 to 2008. He employs a strategy for the
time 1988 until 2008 similarly to Nguyen and Nielsen (2010b) which we also use to
further extend the sample to the entire period and add seven missing events between
1997 and 2004 and another 14 for the time 2009 until 2012. Therefore, we search
LexisNexis8 using keyword search terms for executives (CEO, president, chairman,
managing director, etc.) and for death (passed away, died, deceased, etc.).
Unlike Johnson et al. (1985), our search terms do not only include keywords such as
‘sudden’, ‘untimely’ or ‘unexpected’ to capture the suddenness of the death because
sudden death announcements do not necessarily include those words, but may also
8The data from LexisNexis was obtained by the author within the scope of a scholarship with
e-fellows.net.
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come along with the cause of the death. Thus, additionally we run our search for
the cause. Consequently, we search for ‘heart attack’, ‘stroke’, ‘plane crash’, ‘car
accident’ and similar results.
As we have to make sure that the deaths happened suddenly, we always try to give
the medical definition if available. Natural sudden death causes comprehend strokes
and heart attacks as well as death with unknown cause but explicitly described as
sudden death. At the same time, we exclude natural death cases when any history of
prior medical treatment or declining health of the deceased was known. Unnatural
deaths include accidents such as plane or car crashs and traumatic deaths. However,
we exclude suicides and murders from the sample as they may be related to the
deceased’s situation within the firm or the firm itself.
We further excluded those death events that could be classified as ‘sudden’ but the
firm experienced any other essential firm-related events one day prior to the event
date until one day after (Nguyen and Nielsen (2010b)). This way we make sure, that
shareholder reaction to death is not driven by any confounding event.
We consider the earliest announcement date on LexisNexis as the one to be our
announcement date of the sudden death. Analogously, the earliest announcement
date of the successor serves as our event date for the successor analysis. At this
point we stress again that we do not restrict our sample to CEOs only but extend
the consideration to presidents and chairmen as well. We include the latter as
chairman/managing director is a key position within the firm and the major monitor
and advisor for the executives, in particular for the CEO. They hold a crucial position
within the firm. We include the president position for two reasons. Presidents usually
hold another executive position such as the COO or CFO role. Additionally, (in our
sample) presidents are the ones to get in charge of the company after the CEO drops
out. They are often considered to be the successors.
However, in total we collected 216 sudden death events of firms listed on AMEX,
NASDAQ or NYSE. Those were collected from over 10,000 newspaper articles and
over 2,000 SEC filings (Nguyen and Nielsen (2010b)). Table 2 gives a brief overview
of some descriptive company, executive and event statistics.
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A. Descriptives of the Executive
Mean Age 61.2 years
Executives 70 or older 19.8%
Executives 50 or younger 13.8%
Mean Tenure in Firm 14.6
B. Position within the Firm
CEO 61.0%
Chairman 70.6%
President 50.5%
Founder 28.2%
Executive’s Stock Ownership of the Firm 11.4%
C. Cause of Death
Heart Attack 51.2%
Other Natural Causes 7.9%
Unnatural Causes 17%
Unknown 26.0%
D. Cumulated Abnormal Returns
CAR[-1,0] -0.76%
CAR[-1,1] 0.18%
CAR[-1,2] -0.13%
CAR[0,1] 0.91%
E. Firm Characteristics
Firm Size (Assets in Million)-Median 230.9$
Firm Size (Assets in Million)-Mean 1562.2$
Boardsize 8.6 members
Table 2: Summary Statistics. The table provides descriptive statistics for various characteristics of
the 216 sudden executive deaths for the 1972-2012 period. Board size is the number of individuals
on the board of directors . Outsider ratio is the number of directors that is not employed by the
company in any other capacity over the number of all directors. CAR[-1,0] denotes the Cumulated
Abnormal Return for the period starting t-1 until t whereas the latter represents the event day.
Table 2 shows that, each death causes on average an increase of 0.91% when consid-
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ering the [0,1] interval, in terms of asset that means, that an executive destroys firm
value of approximately 14,059,800$.
Mostly, the announcement of the CEO death is at the event date (death date).
Few death events are announced one day later. In two cases the firm holds back with
the announcement far more than just 1 or 2 days. If the event date is a non-trading
day we roll forward to the next trading day. For instance, if the event day is a sunday
and its announcement monday we consider the announcement as t = 0. If the event
date is a trading-day and its announcement is the next day it is t = 1.
Figure 1 shows the mean abnormal returns for the entire sample, for those firms that
obtained a negative CAR and those that obtained a positive CAR. Note that we
obtain significant reactions for the abnormal returns on day t = 0 on a 10% level,
t = 1 on a 5% level. Note further, that returns for day t = −1 hold on a 15% level.
The significance for the latter weakens over the time as for early parts of the sample,
sudden death events are more likely to suffer a delay of announcing the death. In
other words for the early events, we might find significant effects for the day prior to
the announcement whereas for the more recent events, this is not the case.
Figure 1: Abnormal Returns on the interval [-10,20]. This figure shows 3 graphs, whereas the one
in the middle is the plotted mean abnormal returns of all sudden death events for the
time t-10 days before the event date till t+20 days after the event date. The upper
graph represents the mean abnormal returns for all positive stock price reactions and
the lower one all negative stock price reactions to sudden death events. The x axis
provides the day and the the y axis the abnormal return.
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As mentioned above, we obtain 216 sudden death events for the period from 1972
until 2012. Table 3 presents the number of sudden deaths events by year. We obtain
financial data from CRSP and Compustat.9 One can find a brief overview of the
data and variable definitions in the appendix.
Year #Sudden Deaths Year #Sudden Deaths
1972 8 1993 6
1973 3 1994 9
1974 6 1995 0
1975 1 1996 7
1976 4 1997 4
1977 6 1998 11
1978 5 1999 6
1979 6 2000 9
1980 5 2001 8
1981 3 2002 6
1982 5 2003 2
1983 11 2004 5
1984 5 2005 6
1985 3 2006 5
1986 5 2007 4
1987 4 2008 4
1988 4 2009 3
1989 9 2010 3
1990 6 2011 2
1991 9 2012 2
1992 6
Total 216
Table 3: List of number of sudden death events by year.
We further get Corporate Governance data by hand collecting those from SEC Def
9The data from Compustat was obtained by the author from American University of Beirut within
the scope of a research stay in 2013
31
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE DATA AND EVENT STUDY
RESULTS
14-A, 10-K (Annual Reports) as well as 20-F filings. Data on personal traits and
characteristic data of the managers are also obtained from those SEC filings but
also from LexisNexis newspaper articles and interviews as well as by simple Google
search and Bloomberg.10
As we are also interested in the investigation of the successors, we also collected the
same personal and characteristic data on the successor as we did for deceased as far
as it was available. Lastly, we also collect the financial data and corporate governance
data for those companies where the deceased holds an outside directorship.
10Data from Bloomberg was obtained from Bergische University of Wuppertal
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4 Efficient Market Hypothesis
4.1 Overview on the Efficient Market Hypothesis
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been the the dominant theory in finance
for over thirty years (Shleifer (2000)). Fama (1970), who received the Nobel Prize
in Economics in 2013 along with Robert Shiller and Lars Peter Hansen, was the
one who developed the theory in its details basing on existing approaches in which
he defines a market to be efficient if it ”fully reflects” all available information. In
his remarkable article, he revisits prior empirical and theoretical studies on efficient
markets. For his model, he differentiates between three types of efficiency following
a suggestion by Harry Roberts. Firstly, he introduces a weak form of efficiency in
which the relevant information simply consists of historical security prices. Secondly,
there is the semi-strong efficiency where all publicly available information is known
to the market participants and immediately incorporated into the stock price. Lastly,
the strong efficiency is concerned with information that is only monopolistically
accessible to certain market participants and Fama argues that in a strongly efficient
market even this information cannot be used to profit.
To present the theoretical basics of the EMH, we closely follow the approach of Fama
(1970) and for further explanations Shleifer (2000) and singular other sources. We
will first develop the several assumptions made for the EMH beside that the market
always fully reflect all information. Thereafter we will present the mathematical
underpinning of the EMH in form of the Fair Market, the Random Walk as well as
the Submartingal Model.
Fama’s theory is based on the assumption that investors are rational and therefore
value securities this way. Secondly, some investors may not be rational, but their
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investments are random and vanish in the whole market consideration. Lastly, it
is assumed that those irrational market participants are faced with arbitrageurs so
that their influence on the market is canceled out. (Shleifer (2000))
Rational investors value securities by the net present value of future cash flows.
Once they obtain new information regarding the markets and companies they invest
in, they adjust their portfolio by bidding up in case of ”good” information and
biding down respectively. This also means that security prices reflect all available
information and it gets immediately incorporated. (Shleifer (2000))
When news are released that may concern the value of a security the EMH requires
the market to adjust quickly and correctly whereas quickly means that someone
who obtains the information late from newspaper will not be able to profit from
the information. Correctly means that any market reaction should be rational and
neither an under- nor overreaction. In other words, in an efficient market there is no
way to make money from stale information. Therefore, the EMH also suggests that
markets never react to non-information. (Shleifer (2000))
For efficient markets, it is usually assumed that there are not transaction costs
for trading, information freely available and accessible and and agreement of all
participants on the ”implications of current information for future prices” as stated
by Fama (1970).
As already stated above, Fama (1965) introduced three types of stale informa-
tion expressed in three forms of efficiency. Firstly, weak efficiency which suggest
that there is no possibility to make money based on the information of historical
prices. If market participants are risk neutral, this efficiency form can be explained
entirely with the random walk hypothesis. It implies, that technical analysis of
security prices will not provide excess returns in the long run. Furthermore, future
prices depend entirely on information which is not contained in the historical price
movements. Fama (1965) finds that the random walk holds. The consequences
of these assumptions for the EMH are tremendous. In a fully efficient market, it
rules out the possibility to ”beat” the market consistently. It is further beneficial to
simply hold a portfolio than to actively do any money management based on current
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information (Shleifer (2000)).
The semi-strong form of efficiency suggests that market participants cannot profit
from any kind of publicly available information. In other words, once information
becomes public it is instantly accounted for into the security price. In consequence,
no investor can use information from the present to profit from it in the future.
The strong form efficient market suggests that even if (inside) information is only
available to few investors, it leaks out quickly to the market and the security price
adjusts instantly. Thus, even inside information cannot be used to make money in a
strongly efficient market.
Obviously the weak form is a subset of the semi-strong form which in turn is a
subset of the strong form of EMH. This means that weak form of efficient markets
alway implies a strong form. It also means that in the case that a investor cannot
make money out of knowledge of historical prices he can still profit from other inside
information. (Shleifer (2000))
When now introducing the methodological and mathematical underpinning of the
model, we follow closely Fama (1970)’s approach and also take over his notation. He
claims that the major role of a capital market is to shift and allocate ownership of
stock. Hence, the ideal market gives an investor the choice of different securities with
the assumption that the current security price reflects all available information fully.
He introduces three models that help him supporting the EMH. We start off with
the Expected Return or Fair Game Model. To put the full reflection of information
into the security price in mathematical language, all expected future returns can be
described as:
E(pˆj,t+1|Φt) = [1 + E(rˆj,t+1|Φt)]pj,t
E stands for the expected value and p for the price of the security j at some time t
in the present or t+ 1 in the future. r represents the percentage return and Φ the
set of all information so that the price fully reflects it. The hat is assigned to p and
x since they are random variables.
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Let {xj,t} and {zj,t} be fair games with respect to the information Φ so that
xj,t+1 = pj,t+1 − E(pj,t+1|Φt) (4.1)
zj,t+1 = rj,t+1 − E(rˆj,t+1|Φt) (4.2)
imply E(xˆj,t+1|Φt) = 0 and E(zˆj,t+1|Φt) = 0 respectively. Economically spoken, xj,t+1
represents the excess market value at time t+ 1 of firm j under the condition that Φt
was the available information at time t whereas zj,t+1 represents the expected return
of the equilibrium.
In a next step, the total excess market value V at t+ 1 can be computed as
Vt+1 =
n∑
j=1
αj(Φt)[rj,t+1 − E(rˆj,t+1|Φt)] (4.3)
where α(Φt) = [α1(Φt), ..., αn(Φt)] are the amounts of a fund that are available at
time t and can be invested into all n securities. Consequently using (4.2) together
with (4.3) leads to E(Vˆt+1|Φt) = 0. This shows, that with all information at t the
expected excess market value is zero. Hence, no prediction can be made with this
information as it is already fully incorporated.
However, we will now introduce two cases of a Fair Game Model. These are clearly
in line with the assumptions made for the EMH and often used as helper to test for
EMH. They are further both used to clarify the EMH theoretically. First we focus
on the Submartingal Model and then the Random Walk Model. Mathematically a
submartingal is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. A (discrete-time) submartingale
is a sequence of X1, X2, ... random variables which hold
E(Xn+1|X1, X2, ...., XN) ≥ Xn
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Precisely, this adapts for our case and we assume that
E(pˆj,t+1|Φt) ≥ pj,t
E(rˆj,t+1|Φ) ≥ 0
In other words we assume that the expected value of the security price at time t+ 1
is greater or equal to the current price at time t unter the condition that all available
information Φ is already incorporated correctly at time t. Fama claims the two
equations to imply that trading only based on the information at time t cannot cause
greater profits than the actual buy-and-hold return of this security.
The random walk hypothesis is a similarly working theory and also does not allow to
predict security prices. The random walk theory assumes the market to be efficient
in a way so that large numbers of rational investors compete with each other and all
try to predict future market values and important information is freely available and
easily accessible (Fama (1995)). He also explains that at any point the valuation of
a security always represents its intrinsic value. Mathematically, a random walk is
defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let (Z1, Z2, ..., Zn) be independent random variables with values in
Rd which are all distributed equally. Then
Xn = Xo +
n∑
j=1
Zj with n ∈ N0
the stochastic process (Xn)n∈N0 is a random walk in Rd (Durrett (2010)). Hence, it
is a discrete process of independent and stage increments.
Applied to our problem and pinned down, the assumption looks as follows.
f(rj,t+1|Φt) = f(rj,t+1)
where f is the density function of the underlying distribution. The above equation
reads that the probability of future excess returns conditional all available informa-
tion equals the probability of excess returns not having any information. Explicitly,
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it means that ”a series of price changes has no memory.” (Fama (1965)). To put
it differently, no memory of historical prices or knowledge of it does not make a
difference and makes predictions equally impossible.
We see that both the Submartingale Theory as well as the Random Walk Model
as special cases of Fair Game Models follow the requirements of the EMH strictly.
In particular, one can see, that both models require all available information to be
incorporated into the stock price and exclude the possibility of predictability.
The author also states that a complete independence of the current information
can most likely never be found in reality. Small degrees of dependencies must be
accepted. However, those small degrees can be considered irrelevant as long as an
investor cannot make profit out of this information.
4.2 Empirical Findings and Critics
In a next step, we will be summarizing the empirical foundations of the EMH and
the tests to challenge it. Those will give indication what our analysis might focus
upon. Fama (1970) states that the assumption the market to reflect all available
information is a very strict assumption and difficult to hold up. Consequently, one
cannot expect it to be true that strictly but rather to find out at which point the
EMH does not hold anymore.
The author explains that prior literature usually exploits Random Walks and Fair
Games to test the weak form efficiency. He uses the Martingale Models to test for
semi-strong efficiency, others such as Fama et al. (1969) and Scholes (1972) exploit
event study methodology to challenge the EMH empirically. We provide few examples
on supportive evidence of the EMH in the following.11 Thereafter, we present a few
studies with evidence against the EMH to clarify the conflict one might have when
accepting one model exclusively.
For instance, Mandelbrot (1966) proves the unpredictability of returns in a market
with rational risk-neutral participants and future prices as they follow random walks.
11One can find a thorough overview on the supportive literature of EMH in Fama (1970) and
Shleifer (2000).
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However, the first properly dealing with and setting the fundamentals of random
walks was Bachelier (1900) as Fama (1970) claims. Fama (1970) points out that
the evidence up until his article in 1970 evidence against and in favor of the weak
form efficiency are the most extensive. In his data, exploiting the fair game model
he finds a certain correlation of day-to-day price changes of stocks. In particular, he
finds that security price changes slightly depend on recent historical behavior of the
security price. However, these correlations turn out to be always positive but also
always close to zero. He concludes that his findings do not support a strict random
walk but also declares this dependency of historical data and current security prices
as not strong enough to rule against the EMH.
When testing for the semi-strong form, most approaches also challenge the as-
sumption that all information is fully incorporated in the security price (Fama
(1970)). To challenge semi-strong form of efficiency, Fama et al. (1969) being the
first to empirically support the semi-strong form suggest using event studies to check
whether security prices adjust correctly and quickly enough or whether it takes
several days. They deal with stock splits and claim that those are often linked to
new information on the specific company. Thus, they investigate the stock market
reaction subsequent to the announcement of stock splits and observe abnormal
behavior. They explain that such an announcement are a sign of firm confidence
to hold up with dividend payments even at this higher level. Consequently, they
suggest the large reaction to a split announcement to be caused by the confidence
rather than by the split itself. They further observe different reactions for different
companies planning on increasing or decreasing dividend payments after stock splits
and conclude that the market reacts completely unbiased to future implications
of splits and reflects all information fully. Thus, the authors provide supporting
evidence for the semi-strong efficiency form.
To deal with strong form efficiency, Fama (1970) admits that reality often may
not reflect this efficiency perfectly. This form implies that even monopolistic informa-
tion cannot be used to make money out of it. He also recalls, that a strict form cannot
be expected and in fact rather a threshold up to which this efficiency holds. He recalls
the theoretical framework of Jensen (1968) as well as Jensen (1969) and their findings
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regarding the strong form tests of market efficiency. They investigate whether fund
managers have monopolistic information and how they apparently exploit it and
respectively whether some funds are more likely to detect such information.
However, Jensen (1968) investigates mutual funds for a decade from 1955 onwards
and compares their returns with the return of the S&P 500 Index serving as market
proxy. To indicate whether funds have special insider knowledge to beat the mar-
ket, he challenges the theory on certain levels. He asks whether funds are able to
compensate costs that arise for managements, fees or other costs compared to the
nearly zero costs when simply investing in riskless assets or the market proxy. He
finds that this is not the case. In most of the cases funds’ returns are significantly
below the market return. It also implies that funds are not able to compensate their
costs. Overall Jensen (1968) and Jensen (1969) provide evidence in favor of the
strong market efficiency. (Fama (1970))
Scholes (1972) challenges the EMH by also using event studies and investigating the
market reaction to sellings of large stock amounts. He contributes to the EMH by
providing evidence for the prediction that non-information causes no reaction. In
particular, he argues that arbitrageurs balance out non-efficient markets. They sell
overpriced securities and buy similar securities that are underpriced. Thus, they
cancel out irrationalities by the market and drag it back to efficiency. The author
also does not find strong stockholder reactions to the sales of large blocks of stock.
He concludes that such ”small but adverse news” are not important and not relevant
information and therefore cause no reaction (Shleifer (2000)).
Shleifer (2000) claims that early studies supported the EMH empirically. Whenever
someone found evidence against EMH, it could be argued that a wrong model has
been chosen and an appropriate model would provide different results. However,
throughout the time, evidence against the EMH has been brought forward which we
briefly exemplify in the following.
The major theory held against the EMH is the Behavioral Finance/Economics
which mainly deals with the imperfection of the market and its participants. It
claims the existence of highly irrational market participants and the consequences
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of their behavior. In particular, it deals with overreaction/underreaction to new
information, irrational investors in groups as those observe and follow each other.
Recall that Mandelbrot (1966) investigates random walks under the assumption of
fully rational market participants. Later, researchers developed models assuming
investors with different risk levels. Shleifer (2000) states that rationality is not the
crucial issue to criticize about the EMH as due irrationality of certain investors
markets can still be efficient. However, it is worth to take a closer look on it. He
explains that arbitrage is an essential factor to rule out irrationality. When investors
bid up to good news irrational investors bid up excessively so that the security is
overvalued compared to the fundamental value. In that case arbitrageurs immediately
exploit the overvaluation and the market price is adjusted instantly. Furthermore, as
arbitrageurs are competing with each other, the market valuation of a security is
never far away from its actual value. However, Shleifer (2000) undertakes a huge
recap to point out the theoretical disadvantage of the EMH. He follows argumenta-
tions of prior studies and claims that individuals make different decisions not only
because they are irrational, but also since they have different perceptions of risk and
also because they are biased when evaluating a companies stock return in case this
company has a long history of good performance and high returns.
He continues that the EMH does not depend completely on the rationality assumption,
but in defense of the EMH, it assumes those irrational participants to act randomly
but in the whole their performance being canceled out. In this case, Shleifer (2000)
uses empirical evidence from psychology saying that such deviation from rationality
does not happen randomly, but it is even prone to happen in the same direction
among the investors. The problem becomes worse when those investors look at each
other follow each other on the same path (Shiller (1984)). Again, the position held
up against irrationality are arbitrageurs (Shleifer (2000)). The success of the EMH
correlates strongly with the precision of arbitrage traders to cancel out irrationality.
Shleifer (2000) claims that in reality arbitrage is only possible if investors can find
a closed substitute for the over- or underpriced security. However, this is not the
case for many securities and hence, a riskless investment does not exist and makes
arbitrage less likely, in particular if we assume that arbitrageurs are risk-averse. The
central argument of Behavioral Finance assumes arbitrage to be risky and thus,
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limited. There are several other reasons why arbitrage is not always possible cost-free
and can be reviewed in Shleifer (2000).
Shiller (1981) is one of the first to not only question the EMH but also to challenge
it properly. He finds strong stock market volatility, even higher as one would expect
to be acceptable that prices equal their net present value.
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are trying to attack the weak form efficiency and
therefore pick different companies classifying them into extreme winners and losers.
Thereafter they build portfolios consisting of extreme losers and winners and compare
their performance from the time of formation and obtain significantly high returns
for losers and losses for winners. They explain that the loser portfolios have become
too cheap over the time and then adjust and the winner portfolio vice versa. This is
strongly contradicting to the EMH claiming that the market has to react quickly
and correctly to new information. his was clearly not the case in their study. A
strong under- or overvaluation should have never taken place. After several more
studies provided evidence against the weak form, Fama himself admits and confirms
the partial predictability of stock returns from just past information. (Shleifer (2000))
Furthermore, the semi-strong form experienced a similar challenge. Thereby, Shleifer
(2000) summarizes several studies for instance finding much higher returns for smaller
stock on NYSE compared to larger stocks. He concludes that even though risk
measures do not assign smaller firms with higher risk but at the same time better
returns that markets do not follow the rules of semi-strong efficiency and rather react
to stale information.
Generally, in the time up until the 1980s, the EMH has been the dominant and
widely accepted market theory. Many researchers have dealt with the EMH and
tried to either provide supportive empirical evidence or contradicting.
Today, Behavioral Finance has become an equally valued theory. Furthermore,
current research widely agrees that weak-form efficiency cannot be assumed as even
Fama himself admitted. The same holds for strong form of market efficiency. Espe-
cially, when observing trading frauds by using insider information shows that one is
able to make money out of monopolistic information. Lastly, the semi-strong form of
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efficiency can be held up until today even though many studies provide contradicting
findings. The latter form is what we will deal with as presented in the following.
4.3 EMH and Sudden Death Analysis
In a next step, we will put the EMH into our context and link it to the sudden death
analyses. As stated in the prior chapter we use event studies to investigate the effect
of certain traits on the shareholder reaction to the sudden deaths of their managers.
Previously in this chapter, event studies as introduced by Fama et al. (1969) are
greatly suitable to test for efficient markets, particularly in their semi-strong form.
Recall, that the semi-strong form defines a market efficient if at present all publicly
available and accessible information is incorporated into the stock price and a possi-
bility to make money out of this stale information is not possible. The author himself
supported his theory empirically by exploiting event studies for the semi-strong
market efficiency.
In our case, we only deal with information that we collected from SEC filings,
Newspaper, Obituaries, Wikipedia Articles or simple Google Search. Consequently,
all our data and therefore all information stems from sources which are accessible
by everyone and thus, are publicly available. Therefore, we will follow Fama et al.
(1969)’s approach and use event studies to either support the semi-strong form
efficiency or provide evidence against it. However, note that some data has firstly
been released within the scope of the obituary and therefore might have been not
necessarily available to investors beforehand. We keep that in mind as potential
explanation.
The market reaction which we expect follows the argumentation of the EMH. First
if the market participants become aware of the their manager’s sudden death, they
should react significantly to this event and incorporate this new information into the
stock price instantly. If they do not react at all, one may claim that they already
have been aware of this information and thus it is already incorporated. Luckily, as
we saw in the previous chapter, the market does react to the released information of
sudden death and incorporates the new information quickly into the stock price.
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In this context, we introduce an argument that might be contradicting to the
semi-strong form of the EMH. In the previous chapter, we realize throughout our
computation of the event study that a significant reaction to sudden death does not
only take place on the day of the death release note but also a day after. This is an
interesting finding. The basic assumption for the EMH states that new information
has to be incorporated ”quickly” and ”correctly”. We focus on the ”quickly” part
and disregard the ”correctly” part for now. Quickly means in this context that the
market instantly after publishing the information has to react and Shleifer (2000)
further states that a market participant who learns about the manager’s death a
day or days later from the newspaper should not be able to make money out of this
information anymore.
On the other hand we argue in favor of the EMH that depending on when exactly the
announcement took place during the day it might have given the market participants
not enough time to react and they had to postpone their actions to the day after
the announcement. Thus, we consider the shareholder reaction quickly enough to
support the EMH.
However, not only do we want to indicate that the market reacts to the released
information of sudden death events but also the reaction to several personal and
managerial traits. The market incorporates its perception of the manager into the
stock price over the time with each released information. It does so by evaluating
every single trait by its perception. Hence, at the time of an executive’s death
all informations on his personal and managerial traits are incorporated into the
stock price. Consequently, at the time of death the market has to incorporate the
information by adjusting the stock price according to every attribute they are aware
of. To exemplify this, we assume a rather busy manager to die. While he has been
at the helm of a company, shareholders constantly adapt their perception of him
as a manager and in turn consider his busyness rather negatively. If this manager
passes away, the market reacts according to its perception of the deceased and likely
account a negative effect to his busyness.
Therefore, two distinct reactions to traits can be expected. Firstly, a significant
impact of single traits with their proxies can be observed. In other words, the
market reacts to new information and incorporates this information quickly and
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according to its perception. Alternatively, no significant reactions for certain proxies
are observable. One may argue that the information even though it is brand new
does not matter for the company and therefore no reaction is observable. The
latter might mean two things. Either it follows a requirement of EMH, namely that
no information causes no reaction and certain information is considered to be no
information. Similarly, we say ”no” information as some information on a manager
is useless since the market does not perceive certain attributes being sufficiently
important. Or it might mean that the market has not been aware of certain attributes
and information until the executive’s death or even beyond that. As we obtain all
of our data from public sources, one might also argue that the market does not
incorporate all available information which strongly contradicts the assumptions of
EMH. Lastly, a fourth explanation again follows the argumentation, which has been
used throughout the history of EMH to invalidate argumentations against it. In case,
one finds evidence from event studies against the validity of EMH, it has often been
argued that the wrong statistic model is chosen and a suitable other model would
provide the expected results in favor of the EMH.
Either way, we will not be able to fully rule out either one of the explanations in
case of a non-reaction to certain attributes. But we will keep them all in mind when
encountering a non-reaction.
We learn two things from this with regard to the EMH. In case of a significant
reaction, we may argue that the market incorporates information correctly and
readjusts the stock price after experiencing the new information. The semi-strong
form efficiency of the EMH holds and our investigations provide evidence in favor of
the EMH. However, in case of a non-significant reaction this might indicate to be
evidence against the EMH or it simply means that no (relevant) information causes
no reaction which in turn is a support for the EMH.
In summary, our research target is strongly suitable to challenge the EMH on
different levels. We provide optional and applicable explanations on certain findings
both supportive and contradicting to the EMH. We cannot completely rule in favor
of either of the explanations and hence, keep all explanations in mind.
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5.1 Hypotheses
Existing literature shows that personal characteristics and managerial traits impact
corporate decisions in many ways such as the firm policy, firm performance or its
profitability. Sometimes it provides evidence for value creating traits and sometimes
for value destroying traits. Recall, that so far and to the best of our knowledge, we
are one of the first to investigate the shareholders’ perception of traits.12
However, when setting the hypotheses or the research questions, we receive ori-
entation from prior studies and set them according to results found before. For
instance we propose that quality is a value enhancing asset a manager can have. Or
also we claim that disciplined managers with military background rather enhance
the firm value than destroy it. If there is no prior literature available or no clear
results we leave it open to investigation and simply expect any significant reaction of
this trait to shareholder value. We propose to obtain the same results not only for
the entire sample, but also in the subsample analysis.
Before actually introducing the hypotheses, we go through all traits and present our
expectations briefly. Starting with overconfidence, Campbell et al. (2011) expect
and find excessively overconfident as well as diffident managers to be value destroy-
ing whereas moderate forms of overconfidence are expected to be value enhancing.
Opposingly, Malmendier and Tate (2005) (also Kim (2013), Aktas et al. (2011) or
others) mostly focus on the value destroying forms of overconfidence. Therefore,
12Note that we mentioned few sudden death studies such as Salas (2010), who examines entrenchment
as well as Bennedsen et al. (2007) and Hayes and Schaefer (1999), who examine quality and the
perception of the market.
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we expect a value destroying effect for binary overconfidence measures, otherwise
we follow Campbell et al. (2011)’s suggestion and expect value enhancement for
moderately overconfident managers.
Similarly, narcissism/egotism is a trait, which is closely related to overconfidence
(Schmalhausen (2004)) and therefore value destroying effects are expected. Even
though parts of the literature (like Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007)) see value enhanc-
ing aspects of narcissism due to the target of narcissistic managers to gain extreme
outcomes, we still see value destroying aspects to outweigh all others (following
Ham et al. (2013) and Aktas et al. (2011)). For generosity, we will not provide any
prediction as prior literature used a different measure and also focused on an entirely
different issue in this matter. Resilience or the capability of bearing up lingering
sacrifices is considered to be a value enhancing issue. Bamber et al. (2010), Lin et al.
(2011) and also Malmendier and Nagel (2011) propose a more conservative behavior
for those executives that had to bear sacrifices throughout their lives. From their
findings, we deduce a value enhancing effect for resilient executives. It can similarly
be argued for openminded and disciplined managers. Bloningen and Wooster (2003)
find a higher diversity of investments for openminded CEOs and Benmelech and
Frydman (2013) obtain for a disciplined managers a lower likelihood to be sued.
Thus, we expect both traits to enhance the shareholder value. Lastly for sympathy,
we do not undertake any predictions, as previous findings do not suggest any specific
outcome.
When now dedicating ourselves to managerial traits, we do not make any pre-
dictions for power, as it can have both positive and negative welfare implications. On
the one hand Bebchuk et al. (2008) as well as Nanda et al. (2013) suggest strongly
negative impact of power whereas on the other hand Adams et al. (2005) may see
positive aspects of power. Thus, we leave it open to our investigation.
Reputation again is an issue that can be seen both ways (Jian and Lee (2011)).
However, we believe the positive implications to outweigh the negative ones and
therefore expect value enhancement.
Next, managerial busyness is an issue which is widely been accepted as value destroy-
ing issue (Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Falato et al. (2013)). Busy managers tend
to shift their focus away from their actual tasks and in consequence disregard them.
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Lastly, generalists and highly qualified managers are predicted to be seen positively
by the market. Custodio et al. (2012) (respectively Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005))
stress the importance of a highly qualified management and thus, we deduce a value
enhancement.
The above paragraphs show briefly, how different traits are seen by literature und
explain our deduction how we expect them to behave. Thorough explanations on
each trait and in particular on each proxy can be found throughout the introduction
of the measures in the next sections. An even clearer view on all issues are available
in our empirical analyses. Those will show and point out value destroying and
enhancing aspects of various traits. All this leads to the first two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Shareholders value personal characteristics of managers. Thus,
traits might have an impact on the firm value. This effect is greater or smaller when
investigating subsamples with chairman or CEOs only, powerful managers only etc.
Recall, the exact expectations on the reactions are:
a) Overconfidence is a value destroying personal trait, unless we consider varying
levels of confidence wherein moderate levels enhance the firm value and excessive
levels destroy firm value.
b) Narcissistic and egoistic managers impact the firm value negatively.
c) Generosity of managers shows a significant impact on firm value.
d) Resilient managers who have learnt to bear lingering sacrifices enhance the firm
value.
e) Tolerant and openminded managers have positive effects on firm value.
f) Disciplined managers with high level of authority are better leaders and impact the
firm value positively.
g) Sympathetic managers with good relationship to the remaining managers and to
the board show a significant effect on firm value.
Hypothesis 2. The above results from Hypothesis 1 also hold in subsamples restricted
to CEOs and chairmen only as well as for managerial traits as separator subsamples.13
13The latter means that the sample is restricted along certain managerial characteristics. In other
words samples with only powerful managers, entrenched managers, generalist managers. Based
on this, the value of personality is examined.
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Next, we set the equivalent hypothesis for managerial traits. We follow findings from
literature. Following the above intuition, shareholders have definite knowledge of
managerial traits and evaluate them.
Hypothesis 3. Shareholders value managerial characteristics of managers. Thus,
they have a significant impact on the firm value. In particular, it exhibits as follows:
a) Managerial power shows a significant impact.
b) Reputation of managers impact the firm value positively.
c) Busyness of a manager results in negative impact on firm value.
d) Generalist managers impact the firm value positively.
e) Highly qualified and experienced managers show positive effect on firm value.
Hypothesis 4. The above results from Hypothesis 3 also hold in subsamples restricted
to CEOs and chairmen only.
To put those hypotheses into our theoretical context, assuming the EMH to hold
we expect significant reactions to the several personal and managerial traits as
the information around the sudden executive death makes the market adjust the
stock price according to the value of the deceased. Hence, all information is being
incorporated and thus, an insignificant reaction to certain traits and proxies may
mean that we deal with no (relevant) information, the market has not been aware
of certain traits or it did incorporate public information. The first of the three
arguments is strongly in line with the EMH, which follows the basic assumption that
no information leads to no market reaction, whereas the latter would be evidential
against it as it means that the market does not incorporate information correctly.
In conclusion all above hypotheses can be summarized by using a simple hypothesis
assuming the EMH to be true. However, we will put the assumption around EMH
into a different hypothesis. As we challenge the EMH in its semi-strong form and
since the EMH is the theoretical underpinning we employ, we set our null hypothesis
that we obtain supportive evidence.
Hypothesis 5. The semi-strong form of the EMH as suggested by Fama (1970)
holds true.
In this chapter we dive deeper into details and present measures that we use through-
out our examinations. Most of the variables are provided by literature and adapted
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for our purposes. However, for some variables it becomes necessary to slightly change
their definition due to our sample size being not large or data availability being not
good enough. But whenever it was possible to construct an existing measure, we
did so and only made smallest changes possible. In addition, we construct some
measures ourselves.
However, some of the variables are used to measure more than one aspect of per-
sonal or managerial traits in the literature. We will provide both explanations and
interpretations but assign the measure to the one trait we see the biggest common
ground with. E.g. we will use the number of outside directorships as measure for
busyness. This is widely accepted, but literature partially considers this proxy to
measure managerial reputation better. As we ourselves see this variable to capture
busyness more accurately, we will use it as busyness proxy. However, we will also
discuss alternative interpretation approaches.
5.2 Proxies for Personal Characteristics
Overconfidence
To define overconfidence, we will use the terminology suggested by Ben-David et al.
(2013): optimism refers to an upward bias regarding the expected mean of a future
outcome, while miscalibration denotes a downward bias in the risk of a future outcome.
As mentioned before, overconfident CEOs act less risk averse because they per-
ceive risk to be smaller than it actually is. Overconfident CEOs undertake too
many and poor acquisitions, invest too much and choose too high debt levels. Goel
and Thakor (2008) find positive aspects of overconfidence in their model. They
theoretically propose that moderate levels of overconfidence may enhance the firm
value whereas excessive levels destroy firm value and from there provide evidence
that overconfidence impacts the firm value in an inverse U-shape.
Nonetheless, most studies examine the value destroying aspects of overconfidence.
We will deal with both by employing existing measures for both approaches. Many
proxies for overconfidence have been brought forward in the past. Most famously,
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Malmendier and Tate (2005) construct measures using the option exercising behavior
of managers to infer to their overconfidence. Alternatively, Kolasinski and Li (2013)
strongly criticize these measures as they only focus on the managers’ action but not
on the outcome of his action. Therefore, they develop their own measure using stock
purchases made by the CEO and investigate their abnormal return gained after half
a year.
Ben-David et al. (2013) use a survey from Duke university among 2000 to 3000 CFOs
between 2001 and 2010 to infer their level of miscalibration.
As we do not have access to the relevant data to construct the option based or
stock purchases based measure, we follow some other approaches brought forward by
Campbell et al. (2011), Malmendier and Tate (2008) (similarly Kim (2013), Ferris
et al. (2013)) and Aktas et al. (2011) (also Billet and Qian (2008)). We further
construct a new measure that has not been used in literature yet.
Investment based measure: Our first measure follows an approach made by
Campbell et al. (2011). They provide evidence of the theoretical approach by Goel
and Thakor (2008) distinguishing between excessive overconfidence, moderate over-
confidence and excessive diffidence. On the one hand, they modify Malmendier
and Tate (2005)’s option-based measure, but on the other hand they develop their
own measure exploiting the firm’s investment rate. The intuition to measure over-
confidence this way is as follows. Ben-David et al. (2013) find that overconfident
CFOs invest more. However, the CEO’s role puts him into the position to set a
general strategy for the firm but he also aligns this with the board that serves as
monitor and advisor for the CEO. While the CFO and all other executives only set a
direction for their projects and department, their direction must first be accepted by
the CEO. Hence, the CEO impacts the firm’s overall strategy advised and monitored
by the chairman. So the firm’s investment rate can be attached to the CEO, since
an overconfident CFO can only push his direction when the CEO and the chairman
are also overconfident. This line of reasoning is provided by Goel and Thakor (2008).
Therefore, for this measure we restrict our sample to the consideration of CEOs and
chairmen.
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Like Campbell et al. (2011), we classify a CEO or chairman as excessively diffi-
dent (excessively overconfident) if their firm is in the bottom quintile (top quintile)
of firms on industry-adjusted investment rates for two years in a row. He is called
moderately overconfident if the firm is in neither of the quintiles. Two years are
used because investment can be erratic between the years and so we avoid including
firms that invest a lot in a certain year but usually do not. Here, investment rate is
measured as capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by beginning of the year property,
plant and equipment (PPENT).14 Table 4 provides an overview of the distribution
of our sample.
Measure % of Managers
Excessive Overconfidence 11.33
Moderate Overconfidence 73.33
Excessive Diffidence 15.33
Table 4: % of overconfident Managers. This table shows the three defined overconfidence proxies
and the distribution in the sample.
Investment Based Measure over Q: We also use the above measure and stan-
dardize it by the performance measure Q. Thus, we compute the investment rate by
dividing the existing rate by Q.15
Hence, we classify a CEO or chairman excessively diffident (excessively overconfident)
if his firm is in the bottom quintile (top quintile) of firms on industry-adjusted
investment rates for two years in a row. He is called moderately overconfident if
the firm is in neither of the quintiles. Here, investment rate is measured as capital
expenditures (CAPX) divided by beginning of the year property, plant and equipment
14Industry adjusted means that the rate is adjusted by firms with the same 2-digit SIC code average
over the last two years preceding to death.
15We compute Q using Malmendier and Tate (2005)’s approach.
Q =
MarketV alueOfAssets
BookV alueOfAssets
=
TotalAssets+MarketEquity −BookEquity
BookV alueofAssets
=
AT + CSHO ∗ PRCC − (SEQ− PSTKL+ TXDITC)
AT
where AT are total assets, CSHO common shares outstanding, PRCC fiscal year closing price,
SEQ stockholder’s equity, PSTKL preferred stock liquidating value, TXDITC balance sheet
preferred taxes and investment credit.
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(PPENT) over Q.
Measure % of Managers
Excessive Overconfidence 31.78
Moderate Overconfidence 36.6
Excessive Diffidence 31.72
Table 5: % of overconfident Managers. This table shows the three defined overconfidence proxies
and the distribution in the sample.
Press Portrayal: Our next measure is based on press portrayals of the deceased
managers and analyzes the wording used by the deceased. This is a method that was
used by Malmendier and Tate (2008) (also Kim (2013) and Ferris et al. (2013)). We
follow their approach, but undertake some slight changes. The authors examine firms
that are listed at least four times in the Forbes Magazine among the largest U.S.
companies between 1984 and 1994. From those firms, they collect articles on their
CEOs from New York Times, Business Week, Financial Times, The Economist and
The Wall Street Journal using LexisNexis and Factiva.com for their search. Then
they count the number of articles on each CEO and count the number of words that
may imply overconfidence such as ‘optimistic’, ‘overconfident’ etc. within each article
against those that imply conservatism (e.g. ‘frugal’, ‘practical’ etc.).
The focuses of all articles are determined. They state whether the article mainly
deals with the CEO himself, with the firm in general or with the industry and in
detail classify the content of the article. In a next step they count the number of
all articles in which the CEO is classified overconfident and subtract the number of
articles in which the opposite is the case. If the sum is greater than zero, he is called
overconfident, otherwise he is not.
As our sample does not only consist of Forbes’ largest U.S. firms, but also rather
small firms, where information is only limitedly available we have to soften the
above definition for the press portrayal measure. That means that some of the
firms in our sample are also quite big and one can find press portrayals on the
firm and their managers. For those firms, where this kind of material is available,
we classify them as done by Malmendier and Tate (2008). Hence, we count the
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number of overconfidence indicating words, that describe the manager words such as
‘overconfident’, ‘confident’, ‘optimistic’, ‘optimism’ (ai) against words that imply the
opposite like ‘reliable’, ‘cautious’, ‘conservative’, ‘frugal’, ‘practical’, ‘steady’ or ‘not
confident’ and ‘not optimistic’ (bj). We then call a manager overconfident, if
Overconfidence =
{
1 if
∑
i ai >
∑
j bj
0 else
Hence, the above holds for all ‘bigger’ firms, where articles in the mentioned maga-
zines and journals exist. For smaller firms we do not find portrayals or estimations
from experts. What we mostly find are interviews with the deceased or at least a
bunch of statements related to the firm performance. Thus, for smaller firms and
their managers with only lower levels of information available we include interviews
and single statements of the manager on firm performance or the firm’s standing.
We therefore classify a manager overconfident if he calls his firm’s performance,
strategy or standing among peers to be ‘strong’, ‘high’, ‘good’ or any other positive
association along with a word of amplification such as ‘very’, ‘way’ or any other
adverb at least twice. We argue that a CEO who stresses the good performance
of his firm with an adverb and furthermore repeats this statement is overconfident
as he sees the performance of the firm better than others may see it and therefore
better than it actually may be, and wants his audience to realize his perception as well.
We use these two approaches and merge them to this one measure as they em-
ploy the same method of analysis. We are aware that the latter definition is weaker
than the first approach. However, they capture the same effect and we run this anal-
ysis because the lack of information regarding the overconfidence level of executive is
likely to persist in the market, too.
It turns out that 15% of all executives are classified overconfident.
Manager Hobbies: A next measure that we developed is not based on any prior
literature. Billet and Qian (2008) ask whether a CEO’s overconfidence is born or
made, in other words if it always exists or if it is made over the time due to good
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experience.
We propose that a manager’s overconfidence can also be related to a general level of
confidence. The intuition is as follows. An individual that is supposingly a ‘winner’
faces mainly good experiences. Given this, it leads to enhancement of the person’s
self esteem which in turn might motivate him to take more risk lightly on his actions
and decisions next time.
Therefore, we believe that an individual that exercises any risky and life threaten-
ing sport can be called overconfident as this person takes a higher risk completely
consciously and knowingly and thereby accepts the risky aspects of getting injured
or even worse. However, he believes that the likelihood for him to experience these
things is lower than for other people as the good experience throughout his life lets
him underestimate the actual risk.
Hence, if someone is successful and accepts high risk in many facets of his life, he
can be called overconfident and it can be assumed that he also possesses a corporate
overconfidence.
Therefore, we classify a manager overconfident if he exercises any known hobby
that in turn may be a threat for life (dummy value = 1). This for instance includes
hobbies such as piloting a plane or extreme sports. For instance, we find 4 examples
of managers suffering sudden death by crashing a plane they pilot themselves, or
another chairman who does base jumping. Those are managers that we consider to
be overconfident.
Our sample includes 23.89% overconfident executives.
M&A Deal over Tenure: Billet and Qian (2008) find evidence that especially
good experience leads a CEO to adjust his level of overconfidence. Their work also
implies that a CEO who experiences success in the firm’s M&A deals, the same CEO
is more likely to be overconfident about the next deal. That is managers with good
experience in a specific field may become overconfident in the same field. This study
and similarly Aktas et al. (2011) use M&A deals to investigate the overconfidence of
managers. As they want to know whether it is a trait that is born or made, they
distinguish between frequent and infrequent acquirers. The first group are those that
acquire two public firms in five years whereas the latter is a group only acquiring one
55
CHAPTER 5. HYPOTHESES AND MEASURES
public firm. Then, they compare the abnormal announcement returns of the first
deals of both groups before the second deal and thereafter. They propose that CEOs
that gain positive experience throughout their first deal are more likely to push for a
second deal and underestimate the risk or overestimate the outcome of the second deal.
We are not able to construct this measure since some of the managers in our
sample are not at the helm for five or more years as Billet and Qian (2008) require.
However, at the same time, we believe that the more deals a manager tries to push,
the less sensitive he is to the next deal. The executive will invest less in better
information because he perceives his information to be well enough. In turn, this
indicates overconfidence. We argue that more deals indicate higher overconfidence
basing our assumption on the the results of Billet and Qian (2008).
Thus, our first measure is defined as the ratio of M&A deals over the manager’s
tenure. We further define a dummy. We thereby classify a manager overconfident if
the number of M&A deals over the manager’s tenure is greater than the mean of all
managers in our sample (dummy value = 1). Thus, managers who have more deals
than the average manager standardized by tenure are called overconfident following
this argumentation. 25.31% of our sample are classified overconfident.16
Narcissism/Egotism
Readers of Walter Isaacson’s biography on Steve Jobs will infer that the Apple
founder was narcissistic. However, according to existing psychology and economic
literature he cannot be called narcissistic as he did not insist on being on press
releases constantly or being the center of attention. He also usually used ”we” instead
of ”I” when talking about Apple’s performance. All that indicates non-narcissistic
behavior as stated in Forbes Magazine by Jackson (2012).
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) who are the leading researchers of managerial nar-
cissism argue that more narcissistic CEOs spend more on research and development,
do more acquisitions and in general seek for more extreme outcomes which in turn
will provide them with the broad attention they desire. The latter develop several
measures to reveal the nature of CEOs and to detect their narcissism. Furthermore,
16Like the Investment Based Measure, this proxy does not only rely on one individual’s decisions
but can be attached to groups of executives.
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they highlight the fact that overconfidence and narcissism are closely related. They
argue that narcissistic CEOs are more confident about their quality for the firm and
about their abilities in general. Therefore, they pursue higher risk for more extreme
outcomes which in turn can be confused with overconfidence. Moreover, Schmal-
hausen (2004) identifies strong correlation of narcissism and egotism. Psychology
considers narcissism to be an aspect of egotism. Thus, we do not distinguish between
these issues.
There is a large variety of measures that study personal websites of managers, even
offices as well as bedrooms and many more measures as summarized and presented by
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). However, the authors themselves develop their own
measures. They base it on Emmons (1987)’s four aspects of narcissism: Arrogance,
entitlement, self-admiration and leadership/authority.
They develop five measures to capture those four aspects as well as possible. They
analyze the size of the CEO’s photograph compared to the other executives on an
annual report. Furthermore, they analyze press releases and consider the CEO’s
prominence and wording, whether he uses first person singular pronouns or whether
he usually uses ”we” when referring to the firm. Lastly, they investigate the CEOs’
salary over the second highest salary of the executives.17
Private Pictures Online: We undertake some slight changes to their approach.
We restrict ourselves to the picture measure. All other measures are hard to construct
for us as we use annual reports 10-K from SEC which are not always provided with
pictures and we did not discover any difference in size throughout those 10-K filings
that came along with pictures.
So, instead of using the prominence of pictures in 10-Ks, we focus on the existence
of pictures that show the manager in a private environment or situation.
Therefore, we define a manager to be narcissistic if there exist any non-business
pictures of the deceased (dummy value = 1) by Google search. The intuition for
that is that we believe that narcissistic managers are not interested in separating
their private life from their job and that they seek for further attention by publicly
17This measure by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) is constructible for us. However, already the
authors consider this measure as an important measure of the CEO’s dominance. Hence, we
will come back to it in a later context.
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presenting themselves. Since our sample reaches from 1972 to 2012 we restrict the
search to all managers passing away from 1998 onwards. Pictures before are barely
available and therefore omitted. 17.88% of the deceased executives can be found
pictures of. Furthermore, we keep in mind that the existence of private pictures
strongly depends on the size of the firm. Bigger firms attract more public attention
and in turn are more interested in private lives of the executives.
Firm Name=Founder Name: A second measure that we constructed is not
obtained from literature but is related to the logic of the Private Pictures Online
measure and also to the measure that counts the number of first person singular
pronouns. We define all founders in our sample that name their company after
themselves narcissistic (dummy value = 1). The logic follows closely the logic of the
Private Pictures Online proxy. A narcissistic person craves for attention which in
turn he automatically gets whenever his firm is mentioned. Our sample includes over
61 founders and this measure is restricted to them. 31.23% of all founders name
their company after themselves in any way.
# Marriages: The next measures we introduce have not been used in litera-
ture to our knowledge. Larcker et al. (2013) investigate the impact of a CEO divorce
on shareholder value. Wheatley et al. (1991) highlight several reasons what a divorce
may cause. Among other things, the authors see a loss of energy level and produc-
tivity as consequence for their divorce.
We do not look at a manager’s situation before and after his divorce but examine
the nature of it. When giving a confession of marriage, it is connected to dedication
to one person and to take care of this person. Splitting up a relationship is therefore
caused by problems between those two individuals. In case of managers this may be
caused by the busyness and the little time he spends with his wife and in general
by the focus he has. This may shift from family to work or to something else. The
behavior can be identified as egotism as the manager keeps focusing on his own
interests and does not take interests of his partner into consideration.18
Hence, we identify the number of marriages of a manager as proxy for his egoism or
18Recall that Schmalhausen (2004) sees a strong relationship between egoism and narcissism.
Therefore, this serves as our measure for both aspects.
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narcissism. Our executives are married 1.18 times on average.
# Marriages Dummy: Moreover, to put this into a dummy, we classify a manager
to be egotistic if he was married more than once at the time of his death (dummy
value = 1). 15.38% of the managers were married more than once.
Age Difference to Wife: A similar measure and of course highly correlated
with the number of marriages is the age difference to wife as such a measure. From a
psychological perspective, having a much younger wife is caused by the tendency of
pushing the interests over the interest of a equally competitive partner. Furthermore,
a younger wife might serve as an ”exhibit object” which is associated with the
executive and provides him with attention. Therefore, we identify the age difference
to the own wife as measure for his egotism or narcissism. The average age difference
is 6.7 years.
Age Difference to Wife Dummy: Again, to put this in dummy it reads as
follows. We classify a manager to be egoistic if the age difference is above ten years
(dummy value = 1). This holds for 14.4% of the executives.
Generosity
Having a big family requires various attitudes. First, a family asks for attention
of the manager and so does the company. Altruism or generosity, characteristics a
parent should bring along to be with the family and to raise children seems also
be necessary. However, Dahl et al. (2012) find evidence that children destroy a
manager’s generous behavior. In more detail, sons amplify this effect whereas the
birth of a daughter absorbs it. The authors analyze employees’ salary before and
after the birth of a child to highlight differences in behavior.
# of Kids: As the sudden death is our exogenous event and not the birth of
the manager’s children we investigate whether this effect of generosity or the lack of
generosity impacts the firm value. We do not differentiate between the sex of the
children, as this information is often not reliably available. Instead, we only focus on
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the number of children. This way, we also provide evidence whether the attitude of
calmness or generosity lasts over a long time and not only around the birth of the
children. Hence, we identify the number of kids as proxy for generosity.
# of Kids Dummy: We furthermore also run all investigations as dummy and
by simply using the plain number of kids. Therefore, we classify a manager non-
generous if he is parent of three or more kids (dummy value = 1). We set three kids
as threshold since the average number of kids in our sample is 2.92. Accordingly,
51% are classified generous.
Resilience/Capability of bearing up lingering sacrifices
”The capacity to modify responses to changing situational demands, especially frus-
trating or stressful encounters” (Tugade and Fredrickson (2004), p. 322) can mean
in other words that resilient individuals recover from bad emotions and negative
experience and are more likely to have positive emotions (Peterson et al. (2009)).
Furthermore, individuals that had to bear lingering sacrifices in their lives and recover
are also resilient. Different measures to fit this definition for corporate individuals
have been brought forward and capture its nature as well as possible.
Depression Baby: Malmendier and Nagel (2011) follow the question whether
shocks in early life affect people’s later life in any way. For resilient people, one
would find the capability to recover from such an experience. Like Malmendier and
Nagel (2011) we classify a manager to have borne sacrifices if he was born before
1921 (dummy value = 1). The authors emphasize that those individuals that were
teenager during the great depression at the end of the twenties and thirties are
particularly affected.
War Baby: Another shock is represented by the second world war. Bamber
et al. (2010) consider managers born before WWII show conservative patterns in
their style. Hence, again with the same argumentation we want to know whether
this has any impact on the firm value when the manager dies. Therefore, we clas-
sify a manager to have borne sacrifices if he was born before 1939 (dummy value = 1).
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War Participant: Lastly, in line with this is the participation in war. Many
articles such as Benmelech and Frydman (2013), Lin et al. (2011) or Bamber et al.
(2010) deal with CEOs that gained military experience in their past and investigate
how this impacts corporate decisions. They consider this proxy to measure discipline,
selflessness as well as authority.
Nonetheless, we will make a further differentiation. We isolate those managers that
did not only serve in military but also served in one of the big wars the U.S. was
participating which includes WWII, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. Hence, we classify a
manager to have borne lingering sacrifices if he participated in any of those wars as
non-civilian (dummy value = 1).
Age>67: A last measure that we constructed ourselves is a proxy that is based on
the manager’s age. Therefore, if a manager refuses to retire at retirement age, it can
be assumed that either he considers himself as irreplaceable or alternatively he is in
need of the attention he gets by continuing his job. Additionally, even if the board
wants him to stay with the company, only a narcissistic manager may feel motivated
to stay longer.
Again, the capability to withstand competitors and corporate as well as economic
downswings for a long time may be more important in this context and thereat serves
as resilience proxy. Either way, we define a manager resilient if he is older than 67
(dummy value = 1) at the time of his death or in case of the successor consideration
at the time of his announcement.
Measure % of Managers
Depression Baby 40.76
War Baby 67.28
War Participant 23.01
Age>67 24.47
Table 6: % of resilient Managers. This table shows the defined resilience proxies and the
distribution in the sample.
Note that all these measures are closely related to the executive’s age. Hence,
61
CHAPTER 5. HYPOTHESES AND MEASURES
whenever using the above proxies it might be an issue of multicollinearity with age.
An older manager also has a higher likelihood to suffer a sudden death. Age is always
a proxy for the entrenchment of a manager as this is related to his tenure in the
firm. Moreover, resilience is closely related to the issue of entrenchment but focuses
more on the resistance of his personality. We argue that it outweighs the effect of
entrenchment and predict a value enhancing effect of resilience.
Openmindedness/Tolerance
Bloningen and Wooster (2003) highlight that anecdotal evidence links enhancement
of the international business to CEOs with foreign background and provide relevant
evidence for this hypothesis. They assign internationality to managers with foreign
backgrounds. Not only can it be understood as internationality but also as open-
mindedness. Managers with foreign background are faced with various challenges
throughout their lives which their background brings along. In consequence, they
have to be openminded towards new situations and challenges and have to adapt to
new environment.
Foreign Background: Like the authors we define an openminded manager as
a manager who has a foreign background or alternatively studied abroad. Foreign
background means that he himself or both of his parents possess a foreign citizenship
(dummy value = 1). We further include people with Jewish background into the
sample and assign them the value = 1, too. We believe that Jewish people are also
faced with the necessity of adaption and openmindedness or tolerance since they are
always in the minority with their belief. Openmindedness leads to more diversified
investments and 17.23% of the executives have this foreign or Jewish background.
Discipline/Authority
The argumentation of resilience can also be adapted to the matter of discipline.
Predominant literature investigates how early or former life experiences impact a
manager’s behavior. Bamber et al. (2010), Benmelech and Frydman (2013) and Lin
et al. (2011) measure discipline with military background of the manager. They
argue that military CEOs are better organized due to their education in military, are
62
5.2. PROXIES FOR PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
used to authority and are required to show selfsacrifice (Benmelech and Frydman
(2013)). This argumentation leads automatically to the matter discipline as done by
Lin et al. (2011) and Bamber et al. (2010).
Military Manager: Thus, we take over their definition and classify a manager
disciplined if he gained any military experience besides compulsory military service
(dummy value = 1). According to their findings, companies with military execu-
tives are less often part of law suits and show more discipline. We classify 34.61%
executives to be disciplined.
Sympathy
How boards of directors and management work along with each other can be crucial
for the corporate success for many reasons. First of all, managers that work along
well benefit from each other as the team spirit is better and results are better aligned.
Additionally, the communication between counterparts is better.
Therefore, we investigate how boards see the deceased and whether they consider him
to have been a good colleague. We examine the wording in the obituary a company
releases after announcing his death.
Direct Speech: When boards publish the announcement of the manager’s sudden
death, they usually release some words of condolences as well as some words about
the manager himself. Certainly, the language used is never negative, but there are
slight differences. Very often firms quote other managers of the firm to describe the
loss and again others refrain from using any direct speech. Therefore, we propose
that the use of direct speech in the obituary is an indicator for a better relationship
and higher sympathy of the deceased.
We classify a manager to be sympathetic if there is direct speech in the obituary
released by the firm (dummy value = 1).
Personality Described: Also, it makes a big difference if the personality of the
deceased is described or just the professional nature of the manager. It indicates a
personal and deeper relationship if the former is the case. Therefore, we classify a
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manager to by sympathetic if his personality is described in the obituary (dummy
value = 1).
First Name Mentioned: The same intuition can be applied if the first name
is mentioned. If the relationship works on a first name basis it is less formal and
more personal. Hence, we classify a manager to by sympathetic if his first name is
mentioned in the obituary (dummy value = 1).
Measure % of Managers
Direct Speech 80.90
Personality Described 29.30
First Name Mentioned 64.22
Table 7: % of sympathetic Managers. This table shows the defined sympathy proxies and the
distribution in the sample.
Sympathy and good relations to the remaining executives can be beneficial but also
bad for the company. It is beneficial as the advisory of boards works better and the
communication does so as well. On the other hand, a close relationship might also
cause worse monitoring. Hence, better monitoring comes along with lower sympathy.
5.3 Proxies for Managerial Characteristics
Power
The Money Morning wondered in 2013 if JP Morgan Chase CEO and chairman
Jamie Dimon was too big to get fired (Gilani (2013)). In other words, the author
means that the power of Jamie Dimon is simply too big and his influence on the
board and the shareholders too strong to separate the position of CEO and chairman.
Gilani (2013) further moans about the ”Cult of the CEO” which is deeply entrenched
in American business but it is not necessarily beneficial for big companies. In most
cases the CEO holds the position of chairman, so he leads the board which he is
supposed to refer to. Second, he will be able to choose the board of directors himself.
Again, the board’s job is it to pick the CEO. So, this article highlights the negative
aspects power can bring along in a company. On the flip side, there might also be
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some positive aspects.
Adams et al. (2005) only see a possibility for a CEO to influence decisions of
the management or the firm in general if he is powerful. They specifically focus on
decision making power and its consequence for variability in performance. They find
what is stated above namely that powerful CEOs have significant impact on firm
performance.
Obviously, a powerful manager is able to push his own strategy against contradiction
by other executives or directors. Consequently, a CEO who enhances the firm’s value
and improves its performance through his ability and personality is free to even
better play out his strengths.
Several measures to actually capture the effect of power have been brought forward.
Adams et al. (2005) highlight four aspects of power that were identified by Finkelstein
(1992): Structural power as an accumulation and distribution of positions, ownership,
expertise and prestige.19 Adams et al. (2005) focus on the first aspect and propose
that the more individuals participate on corporate decision making processes the
less power a single individual has. They develop some measures to capture this
effect. Their first measure is the founder status of the manager, the second is the
only insider status of the CEO. We reconstructed the latter measure and had to drop
it as too few companies showed this characteristic. Furthermore, we use the founder
variable to measure a closely related issue, entrenchment. We follow Adams et al.
(2005)’s approach and further take the aspect of ownership into consideration.
Duality: As we already presented in the beginning, duality, meaning that the
CEO not only holds this position but additionally the position of the chairman, is our
first measure for power. Hence, we classify a manager to be powerful if he holds the
position of the CEO and chairman at the time of his death (dummy value = 1). For
successors, we assign the value = 1 if he inherits both positions from his predecessor
or adds a position so that he obtains both when being announced. This definition
clearly represents Finkelstein (1992)’s structural power aspect. This measure has
also been used by Nanda et al. (2013).
19Note that we develop a separate variable for prestige/reputation. However, we will return to the
relation between power and reputation later.
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The additional position as chairman allows the CEO to hold an important key role
within the company, as he leads the board which is supposed to answer to and also
because chairmen play an important role in the corporate decision making process
(Adams et al. (2005)).
Triality: Adams et al. (2005) (also Nanda et al. (2013)) do not only use the
dual role of a CEO but additionally require the CEO to also hold the position of
president within the company. In line with this, we classify a manager to be powerful
if he holds the position of CEO, chairman and president at the time of his death
(dummy value = 1). Analogously, this is defined for successors.
Chair President Duality: We also add two further forms of duality to our mea-
sures of power. First we classify a manager to be powerful if he holds the position of
chairman and president at the time of his death (dummy value = 1). We argue that
with the role of chairman, the manager is at the top of the board and is responded
to by the executives. On the other hand, in the role of the president he is involved
in the daily business of the company. This is analogously defined for successors.
CEO President Duality: Similarly, we classify a manager to be powerful if
he holds the role of CEO as well as of president at the time of his death (dummy
value = 1). This, again, is also in line with the structural power aspect that fewer
managers participating in the decision making process means more power for each
one of them. Analogously, this is defined for successors.
Additional Executive: Following the argumentation of the CEO President Duality
we also add another measure by requiring the manager to not only hold one executive
position but two. Thus, we classify a manager to be powerful if he holds more than
one senior executive position (dummy value = 1). In addition to the CEO position,
we define the COO, CFO and CIO to be senior executive positions. Analogously,
this is defined for successors.
Ownership: Another aspect Finkelstein (1992) highlights is ownership. Nanda
et al. (2013) argue that great CEO ownership leads him to act at more discretion as
66
5.3. PROXIES FOR MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS
consequence of the board lowering its influence. Thus, we use ownership as proxy for
power and assume that greater ownership means greater power.
Ownership>5%: Based on the ownership, we will define two dummy variables.
The first comprehends all those managers who are block owners, that is individuals
who own more than 5% of the outstanding stock. Nguyen and Nielsen (2013) use
this measure to investigate the impact of block holders on firm value. They do not
restrict themselves to managers only but compare how managerial block holders
have and impact on firm value compared to outside stockholders. Following this,
we classify a manager to be powerful if he is a blockholder at the time of his death
(dummy value = 1).
Ownership>10%: In addition, we require the manager to at least possess 10%
of the company’s stock. We set the 10% condition as it serves as an important
ownership threshold beyond which the owner has certain rights. Hence, we classify a
manager to be powerful if he has more than 10% of the company’s stock at the time
of his death (dummy value = 1)
Nominating Committee: The next measure mostly aims at the chairmen in
our sample. If a chairmen is CEO as well, he can only be powerful if is in control
of the board’s decisions. This is possible when he is controlling the other directors
or alternatively is surrounded by directors thinking alike. Therefore, a chairman
who is also member of the nominating committee is in control of choosing directors
for the board and consequently can choose directors acting in his favor. Thus, we
classify a manager (chairman) to be powerful if he is also member of the nominating
committee (dummy value = 1).
Committee Presence: Apart from being the nominating committee member,
the presence in any committee as an important factor to guarantee the own power.
As we see the nominating committee to be the most prestigious one we separated it
as an independent measure. However, we also consider the number of committees the
manager is a member of at the time of his death as a good indicator for his power
within the firm. This may also be an indicator for the manager’s busyness. However,
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we argue that the additional effort for committee meetings is manageable. Therefore,
power dominates busyness in this case. Thus, the committee presence index is the
number of committees the deceased is member of at the time of his death.
Measure % of Managers
Duality 43.57
Triality 17.43
Chair President Duality 21.55
CEO President Duality 33.94
Additional Executive 16.63
Ownership no dummy
Ownership>5% 45.55
Ownership>10% 32.22
Nominating Committee 51.61
Committeee Presence no dummy
Table 8: % of powerful Managers. This table shows the defined power proxies and the distribution
in the sample.
Reputation
Reputation is a determining issue for the credibility of information of a firm. Re-
search on managerial reputation finds evidence both beneficial and cost intensive
for the company (Jian and Lee (2011)). A good reputation is mostly a result of
a well-performing past and a good publicity. Furthermore, it reflects the public
perception of the manager. As mentioned before, Finkelstein (1992) identifies pres-
tige as an essential aspect of managerial power. As we consider reputation as an
important factor, we explicitly separate reputation from power. We keep in mind
that reputation may be understood as measure for power.
Malmendier and Tate (2009) highlight the performance of so called superstar CEOs,
that is those who received a price for their firm performance. This is certainly a
measure capturing the nature of reputation very precisely. We constructed this
measure, but only five managers in our sample actually received an award for their
performance. Moreover, Jian and Lee (2011) use the manager’s tenure or the fact
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whether he was appointed as outsider as their measures for reputation. Another
proxy they employ is the number of articles which come up when searching for the
manager’s name on LexisNexis. Francis et al. (2010) use a similar measure. Hence,
both aim at the public perception and media coverage of the manager.
Keeping this in mind we construct our own proxies for reputation. We expect reputa-
tion to react positively on firm value, hence, a negative sign for the regression analysis.
Wikipedia Article Exists: Instead of counting the number of articles on a man-
ager, we check whether there exists a wikipedia article on the deceased. Wikipedia is
a free internet encyclopedia where articles can be edited by the users of the platform.
As it is worldwide available and widely known, it is a good indicator for our intention.
Since everyone can participate in editing or creating articles on any arbitrary topic,
only publicly known managers will receive their own article. Here, we disregard the
fact that managers themselves would be able to create an article on themselves as we
believe that only a small number of people do so. Managers are known well when they
work in a big and widely known firm and perform well. Both are considered drivers
for the manager’s reputation. Therefore, we classify a manager highly reputable if
there exists a wikipedia article on the manager (dummy value = 1). Even though
the internet or wikipedia have not existed for huge parts of our sample at the time
of managers’ deaths, we still take those wikipedia articles into account that were
created posthumously. We can do so, because articles that were created after a
person’s death automatically mean a stronger popularity for this person at lifetimes.
The fact that he is known even after his death consequently means higher reputation.
12.33% of our executives have their own wikipedia article.
Mentioned in Wikipedia Article of Firm: Similar to the proxy above we
also consider the situation when a manager does not have his own article but is
mentioned in the article of the firm. It can be argued that only managers who are
important enough are mentioned on the firm’s article, particularly after their own
death. As he was important for the firm and because the firm is reputable enough to
have a wikipedia article, so is the manager. Thus, we classify a manager reputable if
his name is mentioned on the firm’s wikipedia article (dummy value = 1). This is
the case for 42.23% executives.
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Pictures Exist without Mentioning Firm: In the spirit of the above intu-
ition, we develop two further measures. Above we used the existence of wikipedia
articles as proxy for reputation, now we will use the existence of pictures on the
internet. We argue that if pictures of a manager can be found without mentioning of
the firm name, but the internet automatically assigns the firm name to the manager,
the manager himself is well-known and reputable without the help of his firm. Of
course, this is related to the firm size and may be driven by this, but it still captures
the intended effect.
Hence, we classify a manager to be reputable if pictures of the manager exist without
mentioning the firm name which in turn is assigned by the internet (dummy value
= 1). The argumentation for dead managers can be adapted from above. We only
include the sample down to the year 1996 as before pictures are too rare. Pictures
exist for 22.33% of the sample.
No Pictures Exist: We also classify a manager non-reputable if there does not
exist any picture of the deceased even when mentioning the firm name (dummy value
for non-reputable = 1). This holds for 67.23% of the sample.
Entrenchment
Having an entrenched manager in the company can have various consequences. For
example, Shleifer and Vishny (1989)’s evidence implies higher wages for the en-
trenchment managers. A huge body of literature dealing with this issue was brought
forward.
Entrenchment is widely seen as a negative trait one can have within a company
and companies try to avoid running with entrenched managers. Consequently, we
expect negative impact of entrenchment on firm value. However, if the manager was
highly talented and qualitative valuable, the effect should be positive (Salas (2010)).
Different measures are constructed.
Founder: Borokhovich et al. (2005) uses the founder status as a measure for
entrenchment as founders in companies are less likely to suffer a forced departure
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after bad performance. They further build up the company and participate in the
hiring actions and strengthen their network within the company. Often they are also
the face of the company.
Therefore, we define a manager to be entrenched if he is (co-)founder of the company
from which he passes away (dummy value = 1). Adams et al. (2005) exploits the
founder status as their proxy for power. This is reasonable for the same reasons
mentioned above. Even though we believe the entrenchment aspects to dominate
power aspects, it can be understood both ways.
Tenure: Yermack (2006) as well as Berger et al. (1997) use the CEO tenure as
their proxy for entrenchment.20 One may argue the same way as done for founders
that highly tenured managers could build their network over time which ensures
their position within the firm even though they perform badly. Therefore, we also
use Tenure as proxy for entrenchment. It can be considered to capture managerial
experience as well, but we see the negative effects to outweigh positive effects.
Tenure over Age: As already presented, we use the manager’s tenure as mea-
sure for his entrenchment in the firm, but have already claimed that tenure is a good
experience measure as well. We employ a further proxy to better capture the nature
of entrenchment and standardize tenure by the age of the deceased. Executives that
spent a quarter of their life in one company are highly entrenched no matter how
old they are and how many years they have exactly been working at the same firm.
Therefore we classify the proxy for managerial entrenchment as tenure over age.
Tenure over Age Dummy: Putting this in a dummy variable we define a manager
entrenched if his tenure in the company makes up more than a quarter of his life,
which is the mean of the sample (dummy value = 1).
Takeover Target: Salas (2010) introduces a last measure which he does not identify
as direct proxy of entrenchment, but it links to the same issue. He argues that firms
that suffered the death of a manager are more likely to become a takeover target as
20They also use age as measure for entrenchment. However, Salas (2010) already provides evidence
on this, showing that age does not have any effect on firm value.
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it lowers the barrier of takeovers. From that he derives another implication saying
that if a firm has been takeover target during the time the deceased manager held
his position the firm and also the deceased might have blocked a takeover attempt
successfully which enhances his position in the firm, i.e. it may provide higher
entrenchment.
We will use it anyway and classify a manager to be entrenched if the firm has been a
takeover target during the time the manager has been at the helm of the company.
Busyness/Distraction
There is a large body of literature dealing with the issue of busy boards and the
implications. Most literature such as Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Falato et al.
(2013) show value destroying aspects of busy directors. The latter employ sudden
death events to investigate the value of directors in busy boards. However, they do
not focus on the busyness of the deceased director and the implication for firm value
but for the remaining directors on the board when a director or the CEO of the firm
dies.
We instead focus on the busyness of managers and their impact on the firm value.
I.e. we investigate how busyness of a manager distracts him or shifts his focus from
doing what is supposed to be his primary task.
#Outside Directorships: A measure dominant in literature and widely accepted,
e.g. used by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) is the number of outside directorships. They
define a director to be busy if he holds three or more directorships. They argue that
managers acting on too many boards are no efficient monitors anymore.
On the other hand, outside directorships can also have positive implications as this
may be an indicator for the reputation of a director and his network. Directors acting
on many boards are integrated in a larger network and profit from the experience
gained from other boards. Moreover, it implies that the director has gained a certain
reputation within the business community. According to the literature, busyness
seems to outweigh the positive effects of outside directorships. Hence, we also use it
as measure for busyness and not for a strong network or reputation. We classify a
manager to be the busier the more directorships he holds.
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#Outside Directorhsips ≥2: We also use the dummy variable from Fich and
Shivdasani (2006) and classify a manager to be busy if he holds three or more
directorships (dummy value = 1). That means two outside directorship in addition
to the position he holds in his own company. Note that all managers in our sam-
ple are directors of the firm as well. That means they hold three directorships in total.
Outside Director Board Meetings: A next measure that has been brought
forward by Limbach and Scholz (2014) is a measure that can purely be used as proxy
for busyness. They argue that the number of directorships may be an indicator
for busyness but that effort and time investment for different directorships can be
diverse. Therefore, they use the number of board meetings as indicator and state
that board meetings among companies differ strongly. Consequently, they derive a
measure by the number of board meetings attended on all boards. Therefore, we
define the index by summing the number of the board meetings over the companies
i where the manager holds a directorship.
Busyness− Index =
∑
i
#Boardmeetingsi
Non-Profit Board Index: Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) introduce a proxy that
deals with non-profit board memberships of managers. They link the presence of
managers in non-profit boards to their publicity and state that being engaged with
a non-profit organization enhances the visibility for members outside the industry
or the direct business. They consider this as indicator for reputation. However, we
suggest a different intuition.
Peterburgsky (2012) rules out the hypothesis that non-profit experiences of managers
has no impact on his management of his later employment and instead confirms the
competing hypothesis that it enhances mismanagement due to bad corporate culture
of a non-profit organization. Those firms tend to restate their financials more often,
and announcement returns to class actions are more negative.
The work in non-profit boards is often very time consuming. Managers have to spend
a lot of time on the work in their own company but are distracted by extraordinary
work. The effect to build a network to provide better monitoring vanishes. However,
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we argue that a certain number of extraordinary activities will not damage the
performance, but enhance the reputation. Too much activity, in turn, will damage
the performance in the manager’s actual position.
Hence, we provide a Non-Profit Board Index to capture the above effect of busyness
properly. We assign a value of = 1 to any non-profit board membership. Furthermore,
we assign this value to any kind of voluntary work, chair of charity or own foundations.
We sum up the memberships thereafter.
Index =
∑
j
ChairofCharityj
+
∑
k
OwnFoundationk +
∑
l
V oluntaryWorkPositionl
Chair of Charity: Not only do we summarize the single parts of the sum, but
also consider them as separate measures. First, we classify a manager to be busy
if he holds the chair of any charity organization (dummy value = 1). Again, this
proxy indicates a good reputation as well. However, we argue that the busyness is a
stronger factor to impact the firm value.
Own Foundation: We use the same explanations for the next measure and classify
a manager to be busy if he is founder of his very own (non-profit) foundation (dummy
value = 1). This may be even more time consuming, but also promises to provide
even better publicity outside the business community. Again, it can be considered a
proxy for reputation as well. For the above reasons we see busyness as the dominant
effect captured.
Voluntary Work: Lastly, we classify a manager to be busy if he does any kind
of voluntary work (excluding chair of charity position and own foundation, dummy
value = 1). This is also in line with the former argumentation and can again be seen
as reputation proxy.
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Measure % of Managers
# Outside Directorships no dummy
# Outside Directorships ≥ 2 26.31
Outside Director Board Meetings no dummy
Non-Profit Board Index no dummy
Chair of Charity 29.31
Own Foundation 15.03
Voluntary Work 52.34
Table 9: % of busy Managers. This table shows the defined busyness proxies and the distribution
in the sample.
Generalist/Specialist
The education as well as the diversity of experiences is an important factor for the
firm performance and therefore for the value of a manager. Custodio et al. (2012)
and Custodio et al. (2013) find higher pay for CEOs who gained general experience
compared to those CEOs who gained a very firm or industry specific experience
during their career. They also found that firms with generalist CEOs produce more
patents as result of higher R&D expenses. Both studies clearly point out that general
skills are better compared to specific skills.
GAI Index: For their analysis of the general ability they employ a General Ability
Index (GAI) developed by Custodio et al. (2012). It includes factors regarding the
work experience a manager gained during his professional career. They define the
index as follows which we use for our investigations as well.
GAIi,t = 0.268X1i,t + 0.312X2i,t + 0.309X3i,t + 0.218X4i,t + 0.153X5i,t
X1 represents the number of different management positions the manager held
throughout his career, X2 the number of different firms, X3 the number of different
industries based on a 4-digit SIC code, X4 denotes whether the manager held the
same position before (Custodio et al. (2012) use it if the manager has been CEO
before as they focus on CEOs only in their studies. This is the only slight adaption
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made.) and X5 is a dummy whether firm is a multi-division company.
Obviously, the GAI is also a strong measure for the manager’s ability. We also seek
to make a distinction between generally educated and experienced managers and
specifically educated and experienced managers. Therefore, we list the GAI under
the generalist trait even though it can equally be considered a quality or ability
measure.
General Degree: Another measure that captures the nature of generalists and
specialists rather than focusing on the ability at the same time is the analysis of the
degree the manager earned at university. Almost all managers in our sample received
a degree from a university equal to a bachelor or higher. Only few exceptions turned
out to have no degree. We argue that the degree is a good indicator for the specialist
or generalist capabilities. E.g. physicians are specialists as by education. They are
not typical leaders of companies or, in other words, never learned the secrets of
business.
On the other hand, economic or business graduates study the business side and are
prepared to run a company. Running a company always requires business skills no
matter in which field companies act. Thus, we classify a manager to be a generalist
if he graduated in any major related to business, economics or law (dummy value
= 1). 56.30% hold such a degree.
Special Degree: Equivalently, we define a manager to be a specialist if he graduated
in any other major than one related to business, economic or law (dummy value
= 1). This holds for 45.20%. Note that some executives hold more than one degree
one in a general field and another one in a special field.
Quality/Experience
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) indicate that for venture capitalists the quality
of the management is absolutely crucial to determine the feasibility of a start-up.
Furthermore, the quality of the management affects parts of the IPO and also the
performance after IPO. The authors point out the importance of management quality.
Hence, at last we deal with the aspect of managerial quality and experience to provide
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evidence on its value. Quality and experience have both been object to a large strand
of literature. Several measures have been brought forward. Chemmanur and Paeglis
(2005) investigate the quality of the entire management while we focus only on the
role of one single manager who passes away.
We will first start to introduce a few measures we constructed ourselves, before we
go over to some existing measures we use.
First Manager Age: Li et al. (2011) investigate how CEO age impacts differ-
ent investment decisions and they find evidence that young CEOs work more actively
and have more investments on average. Hence, the authors highlight that there
is a link between age and firm performance even though using the age as variable
provides not evidence on this, as done by Salas (2010). We take up these thoughts
and develop a measure which is closely connected to the quality of the manager as
well.
A manager that gets into his position at a very early age has to be very well connected
(good network) and, most importantly, must be highly talented so that the board and
the management is willing to announce him. Hence, we argue that getting executive
at a young age is an excellent indicator for the manager’s talent or quality. We also
argue that, the younger the person holding the managerial position in which he dies,
the more talented he has to be, the higher his quality for the firm, and the more
experience he can gain over time until his death. This measure is very clean and
very useful for our purpose.
Thus, we define the first age at which the deceased gets the position in which he dies
as the first manager age, which in turn serves as our proxy for quality.
First Manager Age Mean: We classify a manager to be qualified if his First
Manager Age is below the mean of the sample which is 40 years (dummy value = 1).
Elite Uni: Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) also highlight three dimensions for
management quality. First, human and knowledge resources of the management,
second the management team structure. The third aspect focuses on the reputation
of the board and is therefore omitted by us. To reflect the first dimension we observe
the education a manager had. Bamber et al. (2010) state that most CEOs from
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Fortune 1000 Firms graduated from an elite university.
Being a graduate from such an institution is a quality measure in several ways. First,
it strengthens the network of the manager. He is part of a business elite among
other highly ranked managers and people important for politics. A good network, in
turn, is driver for the quality. Secondly, even though the costs to study at an elite
university are high, still only the most talented and capable individuals are granted
access to such an institution.
Therefore, we classify a manager to be highly qualified if he has a degree from
any elite university (dummy value = 1). Elite universities in the U.S. are all Ivy
League Members and additionally Stanford University, NYU, MIT, UC Berkeley and
University of Chicago.
MBA: Another proxy that is used by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) as well
as by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) is the MBA presence of the management members.
The same reasoning as for Elite Uni can be applied here. Therefore, we classify a
manager to be qualified if he has an MBA degree (dummy value = 1).
Compensation 2nd Highest: The last proxy we obtain is a measure used by
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) to actually capture the effect of dominance of a
manager over others. They generate the compensation of the CEO over the second
highest salary and argue that CEOs usually have great impact on determining their
own pay as well as the pay of others. This is a reasonable argumentation on the
one hand, but on the other, only highly qualified managers are paid high salaries
compared to the remaining executives. Managers receive high salaries to tie them to
the firm and to give them incentive to stay and to not leave. Nguyen and Nielsen
(2010b) find a positive sorting between a manager’s contribution to firm value and
his salary, namely, highly contributing managers earn significantly more than their
peers. Therefore, we classify a manager qualified if he earns 50% more in the year
prior to his death than the second highest salary in case he is CEO, if he earns more
than 90% of the CEO’s salary in case he is president and not CEO and if he earns
100% more than all other directors if he is chairman and not CEO (dummy value
= 1). Those thresholds are the means of our sample.
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Measure % of Managers
First Manager Age no dummy
First Manager Age Mean 28.75
Elite Uni 32.31
MBA 22.22
Compensation 2nd Highest 31.11
Table 10: % of qualified/experienced Managers. This table shows the defined quality/experience
proxies and the distribution in the sample.
5.4 Control Variables and Regression Model
Some questions arise and have to be answered before diving into empirical analyses.
What tests should be applied? Which control variables should be included into the
regression model?
To investigate the impact of traits on firm value, we run OLS regressions like
Nguyen and Nielsen (2010b) where the CAR of the interval [−1, 1] around death
announcement serves as our dependent variable and our proxy for firm value as it
does for most of the sudden death literature. We run all regressions for the interval
[0, 1] and [−1, 2], too, and find the same results. When we look at the pairwise
correlation of these proxies in table 11, we find highly significant correlation which
means that those variables capture the same effect.
Table 11: Cumulated Abnormal Return Correlation Factors. This table shows the pairwise
correlation between CARs of different intervals around the event date. *,**,*** denote significance
at 10%,5%, 1% level.
We use the standard OLS regression model as this is done by most of the sudden
death literature, which also investigates the impact of any issue on firm value, e.g.
Salas (2010), Nguyen and Nielsen (2010a) etc. It should capture the effects we seek
to obtain sufficiently well.
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To get an idea which proxies are related and to gain an insight into their na-
ture, we calculate the pairwise correlation between the variables. This way we get an
idea whether power variables are related with variables of reputation and many more.
We also learn whether some variables capture the same effect when the correlation is
too large. We get back to this issue in the next sections.
We include some control variables into our model to provide better understand-
ing of the shareholder reaction. When choosing the controls, we closely follow the
approaches of most sudden death literature such as Salas (2010) and Nguyen and
Nielsen (2010b).
As done in the latter study we include the manager’s age as manager characteristic
and a dummy for CEO to always see the difference between non-CEOs and CEOs in
the sample. We as well as Salas (2010) use the manager’s tenure as entrenchment
proxy. Therefore, it does not serve as control variable in our sample, but it will be
investigated in more detail. We would also include a gender dummy, but all our
observations are male and therefore there is no need for this.
A second set of variables comprehends corporate governance proxies. We use the
board size of the company and also the outsider ratio. As the board has two impor-
tant functions, advisory and monitoring, it is also important to reflect both within
the OLS. Lastly, we need to include some company characteristic controls. We use
the ROA industry adjusted by a two digit SIC code over the last three years before
death, Market Capitalization industry adjusted by a two digit SIC code in the year
preceding to death and the industry adjusted Market-To-Book ratio for the year
preceding to death .
ROA =
NI
AT
, MarketCap = PRCC ∗ CSHO
Market− To−Book = PRCC ∗ CSHO
AT − LT
whereas NI is net income, AT total assets, PRCC the stock close price at the end
of the year preceding to death, CSHO the common shares outstanding, and LT
total liabilities. In addition to all those variables we include a dummy, indicating
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when the successor was announced in less than three days after the sudden death
announcement. We propose that there may be a different shareholder reaction when
a successor is announced right away. We claim this two day window after death,
since we expect the sudden death reaction to be affected most likely.
Control Mean CEO Others
A. Executive Characteristics
CEO 0.61
Age 61.2 59.2 64.32
B. Firm Characteristics
ROA -0.087 -0.129 -0.029
Market Cap -583.77 -1782.17 1486.19
Market-To-Book Ratio -1.48 -3.58 -2.16
C. Corporate Governance
Boardsize 8.63 8.3 9.1
Outsider Ratio 0.405 0.422 0.377
Successor<3 days 0.559 0.591 0.355
Table 12: Overview of Control Variables. This table provides an overview of the control variables
used in later regression analyses and the means for the whole sample (column 1), the CEO only
subsample (column 2) and for the remaining observations (column 3). Age is the executive’s age at
the time of his death. ROA is the Return On Assets industry adjusted with two digit SIC code
averaged over the past three years preceding to death. Market Cap is also industry adjusted for
the year preceding to death. The same holds for Market To Book Ratio. Finally Succ<3days is a
dummy, which is one if the successor is announced within two days after the sudden death.
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6 Impact of Personal and Managerial
Traits on Firm Value
6.1 Whole Sample Analysis
6.1.1 Sample on Personal and Managerial Characteristics
In this section, we start on giving an insight of our variables by providing some
detailed descriptive statistics. Our sample consists of 216 sudden death events. But
as we hand collect most of the data, it is quite hard to find those details for every
single manager who passed away. Even when we get the data from Compustat, it does
not necessarily mean that it is entirely available. We obtain the data from either one
of the sources, but a lot has been obtained from SEC filings and simple Google search.
Some of our firms are quite small and it is not uncommon to see for those firms the
financial data to be lumpy. Table 14 gives a short overview of the data density we
obtain. We see that some of the measures are hard to get. Even though we softened
up the conditions of the press portrayal we could only obtain it for 96 managers.
Since the M&A data is only available for firms from 1996 onwards we only obtain 79
observations for our sample.
Another issue which needs to be discussed is that in particular personal characteristics
are prone to be affected by endogeneity. We talked about this in earlier chapters
but we want to recall this issue by focusing how this exposes in particular for single
attributes. Recall that endogeneity is predominant because the likelihood of being
terminated is related to personal traits. For example, an excessively overconfident
manager might suffer a higher likelihood of a forced departure.
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Personal Trait Variable # of Obs
Overconfidence/Hubris Excessive OC (Inv. based) 150
Moderate OC (Inv. based) 150
Excessive DD (Inv. based) 150
Excessive OC (Inv. over Q based) 145
Moderate OC (Inv. over Q based) 145
Excessive DD (Inv. over Q based) 145
Press Portrayal 96
Manager Hobbies 113
M&A Deals over Tenure 79
M&A Deals over Tenure Dummy 79
Narcissism/Egoism Private Pictures Online 73
Firm Name=Founder Name 61
# Marriages 106
# Marriages Dummy 106
Age Diff to Wife 90
Age Diff to Wife Dummy 90
Generosity # of Kids 118
# of Kids Dummy 118
Resilience Depression Baby 216
War Baby 216
War Participant 107
Age>67 216
Table 13: Overview of availability of personal trait variables and number of observations obtained
from different sources for each of the proxies. (1)
However, at the same time, if this exceedingly overconfident executive performs
very well, the likelihood of being terminated may be reduced. We cannot measure
the likelihood of termination, which is the driver of endogeneity. Overconfidence
correlates with this as an omitted variable in a regression model. This intuition
can also be applied to other personal traits. Narcissism/ Egoism clearly suffers
this as well due to the nature of it. Narcissistic managers prefer extreme outcomes.
Therefore, they take higher risks which again impacts the likelihood of a forced
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Personal Trait Variable # of Obs
Openmindedness/Tolerance Foreign Background 122
Discipline Military Experience 104
Sympathy Direct Speech 110
Personality Described 110
First Name Mentioned 109
Table 14: Overview of availability of personal trait variables and number of observations obtained
from different sources for each of the proxies. (2)
departure. The same line of reasoning can be applied for all other traits we work
with. For instance, openmindedness may enhance the performance of a manager
while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of being terminated. Similarly, disci-
plined managers can also lower their likelihood of a forced departure. For sympathy,
we cannot precisely predict whether there is a higher or lower likelihood of being fired.
Similarly, endogeneity can be observed with managerial traits. Undoubtably, power-
ful managers are less prone to be terminated as they tend to keep themselves away
from such options. Reputation works in a similar way, as does entrenchment and all
remaining variables. Despite the fact that not every single proxy we obtain is affected
by endogeneity, all issues are resolved by employing the sudden manager death and
even if a proxy does not suffer endogeneity, exploiting the shareholders’ reaction
seems right to investigate the value of a trait.21 Once more, we hand collected most
of the managerial trait proxies, particularly for older parts of the sample. The data
density which we obtain is shown in tables 15,16.
21Salas (2010) has thoroughly shown the value destroying effects of managerial entrenchment.
As we use the same sample and similar proxies, we obtain the same results. Hence, we use
entrenchment only for subsample analyses as well as for successor and outside director analysis.
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Managerial Trait Variable # of Obs
Power Duality 216
Triality 216
Chair President Duality 216
CEO President Duality 216
Additional Executive 146
Ownership 180
Ownership> 5% 180
Ownership> 10% 180
Nominating Committee 93
Committee Presence 95
Reputation Wikipedia Article Exists 195
Mentioned in Wikipedia Article of Firm 103
Pictures Exist without Mentioning Firm 103
No Pictures Exist 103
Entrenchment Founder 214
Tenure 204
Tenure over Age 205
Tenure over Age Dummy 205
Takeover Target 213
Busyness #Outside Directorships 114
#Outside Directorships>2 114
Outside Director Board Meeting 94
Non-Profit Board Index 129
Chair of Charity 133
Own Foundation 133
Voluntary Work 128
Generalist/Specialist GAI 169
General Degree 96
Special Degree 96
Table 15: Overview of availability of managerial trait variables (1) and number of observations
obtained from different sources for each of the proxies.
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Managerial Trait Variable # of Obs
Quality/Experience First Manager Age 160
First Manager Age Mean 160
Elite Uni 116
MBA 108
Comp over 2nd Highest 93
Table 16: Overview of availability of managerial trait variables (2) and number of observations
obtained from different sources for each of the proxies.
6.1.2 Empirical Analysis and Interpretation on Personal
Characteristics
We will start analyzing the regression results step by step. We refrain from presenting
every table, but instead put non-significant results into the Appendix. We only
present correlation tables if they show any interesting results.22
Overconfidence: Table 17 presents the results first from univariate analysis of
the overconfidence proxy proposed in prior sections using the sudden death sample
and then from multivariate results including all control variables to see the changes.
This table employs overconfidence defined by the investment rate as suggested by
Campbell et al. (2011). Even though the authors find evidence on turnover rates,
i.e. excessively overconfident and excessively diffident managers impact this rate
negatively whereas moderately overconfident managers impact the turnover rate
positively, our analysis does not back up these results. Instead, we do not find any
significant evidence. None of the suggested measures show any significant behavior.
These results are confirmed by the analysis on the investment rate proxy standardized
by Q. You can find these results in table 79 in the appendix.
Next, if we look at the results on the remaining overconfidence proxies in table
18, we neither find significant effects of the Malmendier and Tate (2008) proxy em-
ploying a press portrayal nor for the measure exploiting the hobbies of the manager.
22We do not put all correlation tables in the Appendix, but only present those that are necessary
to explain our results properly.
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Table 17: Results on Overconfidence (1). This table shows regression analysis of overconfidence
proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g.
(1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Only the proxy using the M&A Deals over Tenure adapted from Aktas et al. (2011)
show significant behavior as predicted. The evidence is obtained for both the
continuous as well as for the dummy. Those proxies indicate value destroying effects
of managerial overconfidence.23
23Recall that positive coefficient for variables stands for value destroying effects and a negative one
for value creating effects.
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Table 18: Results on Overconfidence (3). This table shows regression analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Press Portrayal, Manager
Hobbies, M&A Deals over Tenure as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are
defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The
second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided
in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (7) or (8))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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The result is significant at a 1% level for the dummy proxy (0.0501) and at a 10%
level for the M&A Deals over Tenure (0.008). Note that for the latter, the simple
regression does not show significance. This can be explained that there are underlying
effects coming along with this proxy. In other words, with the simple regression
this proxy measures more than simply value destroying overconfidence. It may
also capture value enhancing effects, so that both effects absorb each other. In the
multivariate regression those underlying effects vanish by interaction with any of the
control variables so that we obtain significant value destroying results.
Note that the Investment Rate Based proxies do not correlate strongly with any
other of the control variables in our regression model. Furthermore, they also do
not correlate with any other variable strongly. Table 19 tells us that overconfidence
Table 19: Pairwise Correlation of Overconfidence with other Traits and Controls. This table
shows the pairwise correlation between overconfidence proxies (horizontally) and other traits and
controls (vertically). *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level
proxies and narcissism proxies are strongly related (row 1 and 2). The same holds
for reputation proxies (row 3 and 4). It means, that our chosen measures might
also capture reputation or narcissism. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) clearly see
strong relation between overconfidence and narcissism and state that both effects
are hard to disentangle. By looking at the M&A Deals over Tenure proxy, one reads
that it correlates with the Firmsize measured in assets. This finding is entirely
understandable, since bigger firms tend to acquire more on average than smaller
firms, as there are more possible targets.
In summary, we state overconfidence barely affects the shareholder reaction to
sudden death. Only the M&A over Tenure proxy seems to be incorporated by the
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market. This latter is in line with the semi-strong form of market efficiency. It shows
that the market reacts quickly enough and correctly to relevant information and
incorporates it into the stock price.
In chapter 4 when presenting the EMH, we provide exclusive explanations for
why the market might not adjust the stock price to certain information releases or in
this case to the overconfidence level of the deceased and his traits in general. Recall,
that a basic assumption of EMH requires the market to incorporate new information
quickly and correctly whereas another assumption implies that the market should
not react to non-information.
Hence, our first explanation states that shareholders are not aware of their managers’
overconfidence level as this kind of information is not accessible or publicly available
and thus not reflected in the stock price. Shareholders may only observe corporate
decisions made by executives because they do not have a proper insight and not
enough information to infer on the executive’s personality. However, recall that
all information is collected from public sources even though some information is
released in obituaries and might not be publicly known beforehand. Therefore, a
ruling in relation to the EMH is impossible because the theory in its semi-strong
form deals with publicly known information. On the other hand, not incorporating
known information might go against the assumption of EMH that all information
has to be reflected quickly and correctly by the market participants.
Alternatively, the market is either not interested in the personality of the manager
or relevant information is simply ignored. This statement, in turn, argues strongly in
favor of the EMH whereupon no relevant information leads to no significant reaction.
Lastly, we add a third possible explanation that can explain the results. Existing
measures may not capture the effect of overconfidence sufficiently well, and instead
may suffer strong endogeneity. Since prior studies do not exploit sudden death
events to wipe out the endogeneity problem, those might suffer it. Consequently,
endogeneity might drive the results of existing studies and provide significant effects.
We instead provide direct evidence of existing literature’s proxies on firm value and
do not find significant impact. Our analysis is free of endogeneity and therefore,
should provide the proposed results.
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These explanations and also the interpretation for why markets react significantly to
certain traits can be applied to many more of our proxies as we will see and we will
refer to them in the following.
Narcissism/Egoism: Continuing and looking at narcissism and egotism, tables
20 as well as 80 (can be found with looking at in Appendix) provide no significant
impact on firm value for any of the proxies even though from prior studies a value
destroying effect can be expected. Only the Firm Name proxy indicates value de-
stroying behavior. By looking at table 19, we realize that this proxy correlates
significantly with the M&A Deals over Tenure, which holds significantly itself. Recall
further, that narcissism measures partially correlate with overconfidence proxies as
shown. However, also note for the Firm Name=Firm Value measure, that the sample
size is only 37 observations, therefore, the results are probably driven by this fact.
As for overconfidence it can be summarized that narcissism plays no significant
role for shareholders when evaluating their executives. Hence, the provided expla-
nations can easily applied again. Quickly recall that either the market ignores this
trait and therefore does not react to no information which confirms the semi-strong
form of EMH or does not have sufficient information to account for it. Alternatively,
it does not incorporate publicly available information, contradicting to EMH, or the
provided measures do not capture the effect precisely enough and is driven by other
controls in prior studies.
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Table 20: Results on Narcissism (1). This table shows regression analysis of narcissism proxied
by the Firm Name=Founder Name, Age Difference to Wife as well as its dummy and the stock
price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the narcissism proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the narcissism proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
Generosity, Sympathy, Resilience/Capability of Bearing Lingering Sacri-
fices: Table 81 (Appendix) provides evidence on generosity and again, generosity
seems to not have any significant impact on firm value. Moreover, it does not even
correlate strongly with any of the control variables. It can be inferred, that the
chosen variables and in turn the effect of generosity, do not have any impact on the
market reaction to sudden death.
92
6.1. WHOLE SAMPLE ANALYSIS
Table 83 (Appendix) further presents the results for sympathy which also does not
provide any significant evidence. Again, the proxies do not correlate with any other
control variable strongly. It can be concluded, that sympathy as well, does not play
any significant role.
The same can be seen for resilience or the capability to bear lingering sacrifices
in table 82 (Appendix). Although we obtain strong value destroying impact for
the proxies of resilience in the simple regression analysis, the results vanish in the
multivariate case. Proxies stem from Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and also Bamber
et al. (2010). There is however one mediating factor that all of these variables have
in common, the manager’s age. Being born before 1921 or 1939 and also to have
participated in a war requires a certain age. It is important to take into account, that
age is always a measure which can be used for various things but is not explicitly
restricted to measure resilience. Furthermore, age correlates strongly with tenure
which is a driver of entrenchment. Therefore, underlying effects and the strong
correlation with age as a control, suppress a significant reaction of the resilience
proxies or that which might drive the results in prior studies. The measures chosen
by prior studies probably do not capture well enough the intended nature. The above
results can again explained with the same intuition as before.
Discipline: Similar reasoning can be applied for Benmelech and Frydman (2013)’s
proxy of military managers for discipline. One expects value enhancing behavior
effects according to the findings of prior studies.
Table 21: Pairwise Correlation of Discipline with other Traits and Controls. This table shows the
pairwise correlation between discipline proxy (horizontally) and other traits and controls (vertically).
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level
We however, do not back up this prediction. Rather, our results show no significance
(table 84 in appendix). Reasons for this are various and are mentioned above before.
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Interestingly, the Military Background Proxy correlates strongly with the busyness
proxies (table 21). We can argue, that disciplined managers believe to likely work
more efficiently, thus get more work done than others. All other variables do not
correlate with this proxy strongly.
Openmindedness/Tolerance: Next, we investigate the regression results for open-
mindedness and tolerance. It turns out, that openmindedness, proxied by the Foreign
Background variable, holds significantly at a 10% level in the multivariate regression
(-0.0196), even though the effect does not hold significantly in the simple regression
(table 22).
According to reasons provided before, underlying effects lead to absorb value en-
hancement and then in the multivariate regression, value destroying effects vanish
and the intended positive effects dominate. We see, that openmindedness is reflected
by the market and enhances the firm value.
The result confirms our expectation of openminded managers, saying they are more
open to new situation and to better able to adapt to changes in the environment.
Shareholders also seem to realize this and consequently, positively reflect openmind-
edness in the stock price.
To briefly summarize our results, the findings suggest that personal traits do not play
a major role when the market evaluates a manager. The only traits which may be
involved in a shareholder evaluation is overconfidence when measured by the M&A
Deals over Tenure which shows a strong value destroying effect, as predicted, and
openmindedness which shows a value enhancing impact, as also predicted.
It seems that personality does not play a big role for the value of the manager.
We offered three explanations for this in the beginning of this section and linked
them to the EMH. The first explanation, the market ignores the personal traits
entirely and simply focuses on managerial traits and performance, those character-
istics that obviously have a direct association to the firm. This is in line with the
EMH which requires the market to only react to (relevant) information. Another
possible explanation, the market simply does not have access to certain information
as it is released e.g., with an obituary, or only insufficient information regarding
his personality and consequently does not account for traits. The market may only
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observe corporate decisions and infer to the personality, which might not be sufficient.
This is an argument against the EMH since not all public (and relevant) information
is incorporated into the stock price.
For few of the variables used, one may argue that prior studies suffered endogeneity
and therefore, those studies obtained effects in their regression which are driven
by omitted variables. This is likely the case for the resilience proxies which are all
related to age.
Table 22: Results on Openmindedness/Tolerance. This table shows regression analysis of
Openmindedness/Tolerance proxied by Foreign Background and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in
percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away.
The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All
control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables
of interest, that is the openmindedness/tolerance proxies. The second provides the predicted sign,
which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are
provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (1)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the
openmindedness/tolerance proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote
a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
Overall, we do not provide evidence for all parts of the first hypothesis but only
confirm part a) and e).24 Evidence for the remaining parts although they are expected
24Recall, it predicts value destroying effects for overconfidence and enhancement for openmindedness.
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results from prior research, cannot be found, and therefore, must be rejected.
6.1.3 Empirical Analysis and Interpretation on Managerial
Characteristics
Power: In this subsection we dedicate ourselves to the analysis of the effect of
managerial traits. Starting with power, table 23 power proxied by the standard
variable Duality shows significant negative impact (0.0450) on CAR at a 5% level.
Table 24 confirms this finding with Ownership as proxy, first simple ownership
(0.0918) at a 10% level, and secondly, the Ownership>10% (0.0305) at a 10% level as
well. The latter is in line with the findings of Nguyen and Nielsen (2013) indicating
value destroying effects for growing insider ownership. The other measures, also on
table 85 in the Appendix do not provide this significant impact. But the standard
measures for power such as Duality and Ownership hold significantly.
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Table 23: Results on Power (1). This table shows regression analysis of power proxied by Duality,Triality, Chair Preident Duality, CEO
President Duality and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all
control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the power proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model.
The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the power
proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1%
level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 24: Results on Power (3). This table shows regression analysis of power proxied by
Ownership as well as its two dummies and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that
is the power proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (8) or (9))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the power proxy. The second column assigned
with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables.
The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,***
behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor
variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Table 25: Pairwise Correlation of Power with other Traits and Controls. This table shows the
pairwise correlation between power proxies (vertically) and other traits and controls (horizontally).
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level
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Analyzing the correlations with other variables helps for a better understanding of
power. Table 25 shows clearly a strong positive and significant correlation between
power proxies and entrenchment in column 2-4. Salas (2010) and many others provide
evidence on the value destroying nature of entrenchment. Obviously, entrenchment
and power are often related issues. It is harder to remove a powerful manager from
the company which in turn means entrenchment. Thus, it can be argued similarly as
Founder is often also used as proxy for entrenchment. Tenure, as well as Tenure over
Age, capture the time the manager spent in the company. The more time, he spent
in this one company, the higher the likelihood to build up a strong network and to
gain a lot of power. It is hard to separate the effects. However, we recognize the
strong negative aspects of power.
In addition, there is a strong relationship between one of the reputation proxies and
power as it can be seen in column 5. This is in line with Finkelstein (1992) who
identifies prestige as an important aspect of power.
The last two columns of table 25 show the negative relation to board size and firm size
in assets. This indicates that the bigger the board, the less power for one executive,
and the bigger the company, the less power for the managers. Despite both being
reasonable relations, they do not explain the value destroying nature of power, what
they do indicate is where powerful managers are most likely to be found. Lastly, the
first column provides evidence that manager talent or quality is negatively correlated
with power.
In general, the results indicate that power is rather a value destroying asset in-
dependent of any performance. It can also be argued, that if a powerful manager
passes away, this gap has to be filled as a great vacancy is always a weakness and the
company may suffer poor performance. Filling a big gap is certainly more difficult
than filling a small gap. Hence, finding an appropriate successor with the same
capability is a threatening scenario for the market, so that it in turn reflects this
with a positive effect to sudden death. Furthermore, losing a huge stockholder can
cause the same problem, in that the heir may be unknown to shareholders and not
necessarily an insider anymore. Essentially, the loss of managers with a high degree
of responsibility, combined with the uncertainty of the future, will lead the market
to value the loss of a powerful manager as a bad outcome for the company.
99
CHAPTER 6. IMPACT OF PERSONAL AND MANAGERIAL TRAITS ON
FIRM VALUE
We did not predict any sign as one might expect both power to be a value enhancing
setting if the manager is also of high quality and value destroying effects if he is of
rather low quality. The results do however indicate that shareholders consider power
to be a negative attribute in general. Nevertheless, this finding is in line with the sug-
gestions of Bebchuk et al. (2008) and Nanda et al. (2013) and can be argued perfectly.
Reputation: Surprisingly, results for reputation in table 86 (Appendix) imply
no significant impact for any of the proxies. Note that the Wikipedia Article Exists
proxy’s significance level is p = 0.1062. One would expect, for particularly famous
managers, a significant negative reaction, or alternatively, due to the relation to
power, a positive reaction. This however is not the case and may be explained by
the reasons already provided for personal traits. As the reputation proxies are not
necessarily connected to the company, the market may ignore them because they
are not of further interest. Alternatively, the proxies are not perfectly suitable to
measure reputation.
Busyness: Now, we focus on the analysis on managerial busyness. Table 26
shows that the standard measure for busyness, the number of Outside Directorships,
has the predicted sign. The Outside Directorship dummy (0.0347) is significant at a
10% level. Table 27 confirms this result when looking at the chair of charity proxy
(0.0327). It also holds at a 10% level. All other variables do not have any significant
effect.
The correlation table 28 shows, that busyness measures strongly correlate with those
entrenchment proxies, that are related to the tenure. This finding is logical, as
older executives begin having more activity outside of the company, whereas younger
managers are more prone to being career-focussed. Additionally, executive busyness,
especially those managers with many outside directorships, are more likely to be
found in bigger and older firms (column 4 and 5). Executives from larger firms are
better known to other firms and therefore more likely to be asked to act as director
on outside companies. The same argument can be applied for older firms. The more
well known and established the company is, the more well known the managers are.
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Table 26: Results on Busyness (1). This table shows regression analysis of busyness proxied by
Number of Outside Directorships, its dummy, as well as the number of Board Meetings and the
stock price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the busyness proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the busyness proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
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Table 27: Results on Busyness (2). This table shows regression analysis of busyness proxied by Non Profit Board Index, Chair of
Charity, Own Foundation as well as Voluntary Work and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are
defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the busyness proxies. The second
provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a
simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the
results of a robust simple regression of the busyness proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate
regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 28: Pairwise Correlation of Busyness with other Traits and Controls. This table shows the
pairwise correlation between Busyness proxies (vertically) and other traits and controls (horizontally).
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level
Concluding this means that busyness affects the shareholder reaction positively when
using the common busyness proxies. It also means that busyness seems to be a crucial
factor for the market when evaluating their managers. These findings are rational.
Busy managers who must spread their focus amongst extra corporate activities,
unrelated to their own company, spend a great deal of time and energy on this. In
turn, the performance suffers, leading to the shareholders reaction by negatively
taking this into account in the stock price. Exactly alike argues prior literature and
suggests busyness to be a value killer which we confirm with our findings.
Generalist/Specialist: In a next step, we take a closer look on the generalist
and specialist effects. Table 29 provides significant evidence for the GAI proxy
(-0.0207) at a 10% level. All other variables do not show significant effects. However,
the finding is in line with Custodio et al. (2012) and Custodio et al. (2013). The two
studies imply that experienced managers with general education are beneficial for
companies. Literature also suggests that Generalist and Quality are difficult traits
to separate.
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Table 29: Results on Generalist/Specialist. This table shows regression analysis of general-
ist/specialist proxied by GAI, General Degree, Special Degree and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not
in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away.
The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression.
All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our
variables of interest, that is the generalist/specialist proxies. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of
the generalist/specialist proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
Therefore, table 30 shows the strong correlation between the GAI proxy as well as
the First Manager Age proxy for Quality. It is significant at a 1% level with a value
of 0.26. Also, the GAI is negatively correlates with entrenchment as it can be seen in
the first three columns. These findings are in line with literature as they show that
less qualified managers are likely to be entrenched and secure their position within
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the company (Salas (2010)).
Lastly, firms in rather risky industries have generalist managers as shown in the last
columns. These companies, that have higher R&D expenses, confirm the results
from Custodio et al. (2012), that generalist managers spur innovations and therefore
are more likely to be found in risky industries. They find more patents for managers
with generalist skills and more investment in R&D.
Table 30: Pairwise Correlation of Generalist/Specialist with other Traits and Controls. This table
shows the pairwise correlation between Generalist/Specialist proxy (vertically) and other traits and
controls (horizontally). *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level
Quality/Experience: Lastly, we investigate one of the most important issues, and
what the market is likely most interested in, whether or not it is the quality or
talent or simply the experience of a manager that is important. Evidently, we expect
a strong negative reaction to the sudden death of a manager, and this is exactly
what we find. Table 31 shows a significantly negative reaction (-0.0023) at a 1%
level for the First Manager Age proxy. Note, this measure does not correlate with
the manager’s age and therefore captures the effect of quality well, making this
the only measure which provides evidence. All others do not as it can be seen in
the table and also in table 87 (Appendix). The first manager age, measures the
experience very precisely and disregards the tenure within a company, therefore
ignoring entrenchment.
Additionally, we show in table 32, that the First Manager Age proxy is negatively
correlated with two entrenchment proxies in column 1 and 2. This also confirms,
that our measure is not positively related to the tenure or age of the executive and
therefore is an excellent proxy to capture the quality and experience. In addition,
we mentioned some of the relations before such as the strong negative correlation
with power, or the positive with Generalist.
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Table 31: Results on Quality/Experience (1). This table shows regression analysis of Qual-
ity/Experience proxied by First Manager Age as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not
in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away.
The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression.
All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our
variables of interest, that is the quality/experience proxies. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of
the quality/experience proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
Table 32: Pairwise Correlation of Quality/Experience with other Traits and Controls. This table
shows the pairwise correlation between Quality/Experience proxy (vertically) and other traits and
controls (horizontally). *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level
Overall, we can partially confirm our Hypothesis three and claim, that we found
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evidence on a significant level for power, a value destroying reaction for busyness, as
well as a value enhancement for generalist/specialist and quality. Reputation is the
only variable we cannot provide significant evidence for.
6.2 CEO und Chairmen Subsamples
6.2.1 Distinction and Expectations
We mention this up front. We refrain from presenting results that contain statistically
non-usable data, referring to too small samples or too few specifications for a dummy.
Although we include presidents within our sample we are particularly interested in the
value effects of CEOs and chairmen, as they play a key role in the companies. So far,
we investigated the sample as a whole but now we will look at CEOs and chairmen
separately. Note that even if we restrict the sample to CEOs only, observations in
this subsample can be chairman as well and vice versa. Otherwise subsamples would
become too small.
We eventually expect different results on certain traits for CEOs and chairmen. For
example, one may argue that busyness is a much bigger problem for CEOs, since if
they do not focus accurately on their work as CEO, the company as a whole suffers
more than a chairmen whose monitoring qualities suffer.
6.2.2 Empirical Results
Overconfidence: Again starting with overconfidence, tables 88-91 (Appendix) as
well as 33 on CEOs and table 34 on chairmen do not show any different effect from
prior investigations on the whole sample. To put this differently, for the M&A Deals
over Tenure Variable we again find a strong value destroying effect for both chairmen
and CEOs whereas the remainder of the variables show no significant impact. In
conclusion, this shows that one cannot expect different valuation of overconfidence
by the market for CEOs or chairmen.
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Table 33: Results on Overconfidence for CEOs (3). This table shows regression analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Press Portrayal,
Manager Hobbies, M&A Deals over Tenure as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the
sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1
and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of
interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From
the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (7) or (8)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns
respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance
for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 34: Results on Overconfidence for Chairmen (3). This table shows regression analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Press
Portrayal, Manager Hobbies, M&A Deals over Tenure as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting
the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for
days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the
intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our
variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (7) or (8)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other
columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level
significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Narcissism/Egoism, Generosity, Resilience, Discipline, Sympathy: Fur-
thermore, we obtain the same non-significant results as for the whole sample analysis
for narcissism/egoism (table 92-95 in Appendix), generosity, discipline, sympathy and
resilience for chairmen (table 96-102 in Appendix). Surprisingly, table 35 displays
significant impact for one of the resilience variables for only CEOs, in particular the
War Participant dummy. This dummy includes all those CEOs who have participated
in the war and additionally those with a general military experience. It is highly
value enhancing at a level of 5%. The beneficial effects of discipline can be examined
here in a sense that resilient managers who have previously recovered from bad
experiences in the past, already know and understand discipline and know how to
handle sacrifices. These results display that these types of managers as less likely
to become victims of lawsuits and are more accurate in their work, which in turn
enhances their value. This finding however holds for CEOs. It can be argued, that it
is even more essential for CEOs to follow disciplined rules to manage their job well
whereas for a chairmen this might not be as crucial.
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Table 35: Results on Resilience for CEOs. This table shows regression analysis of resilience proxied by the Depression Baby, War
Baby, War Participant as well as Age>67 and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where
t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that
is the resilience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the
same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the resilience proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the
regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Openmindedness/Tolerance: The whole sample analysis shows that executives
who are openminded and tolerant tend to have a positive impact on their firm value.
This result holds for CEOs as well as chairmen both at a 10% level. Openminded
CEOs (-0.0241) are more likely to be open towards new business models, investment
strategies or anything else. This in turn is evaluated positively by the market. Tables
36, 37 present our findings.
Table 36: Results on Openmindedness/Tolerance for CEOs. This table shows regression analysis of
openmindedness/tolerance proxied by Foreign Background and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part
of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the openmindedness/tolerance proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the
third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression
model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1)) shows the results of a
robust simple regression of the openmindedness/tolerance proxy. The second column assigned with
* always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. *,**,***
behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor
variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Openmindedness is a beneficial trait for chairmen to portray (-0.0206) as it can
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open up new perspectives for the executives and in turn lead to better advisory and
monitoring practices.
Table 37: Results on Openmindedness/Tolerance for Chairmen. This table shows regression
analysis of openmindedness/tolerance proxied by Foreign Background and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths by restricting the sample to Chairmen only. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t +
1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
openmindedness/tolerance proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g.
(1)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the openmindedness/tolerance proxy. The
second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including
all control variables. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for
each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
In short, apart from the measures that showed a significant effect on firm value in the
entire sample, there is only one additional significant variable for personality traits
that can be seen after the sample is split - the War Participant proxy for resilience.
All others show the same effect. These findings confirm either of the explanations
we have earlier provided for why personal traits are barely reflected bey the market.
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Quickly recall, either the market does not have access to the information regarding
personality of the executive, they do not incorporate this information although it
is available (the latter contradicts EMH), the market does not consider personal
traits to be relevant information for the firm as it only reflects affecting traits such
as managerial traits (in line with EMH), or the previous measures from literature do
not capture the intended effect accurately.
Power: Continuing with managerial traits, Table 38 provides the results on power
for CEOs only. One can realize that again duality as power proxy shows a significant
positive reaction (0.0473) at a 5% level. Surprisingly, this measure does not hold on
the chairmen only subsample (Table 103 Appendix). Duality in this case means, that
we restrict the sample in the first place to CEOs or chairmen only and then include
the duality measure. Due to the fact that this measure is applied on a different
sample, the results may differ.
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Table 38: Results on Power for CEOs (1). This table shows regression analysis of power proxied by Duality,Triality, Chair Preident
Duality, CEO President Duality and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent
variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the power proxies. The
second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided
in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows
the results of a robust simple regression of the power proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate
regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 39: Results on Power for CEOs (3). This table shows regression analysis of power proxied
by ownership as well as its two dummies and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by
restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the power proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (8) or (9)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the power proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
Table 39, 40 again provide the results on the ownership proxies for power and
they turn out to be the same as for the whole sample, meaning a significant value
destroying reaction for the continuous ownership measure for CEOs (0.1193) and
chairmen (0.1397) both at a 5% level. Furthermore, the Ownership>10% proxy
provides a significantly positive reaction for CEOs (0.0423) at a 10% level and for
chairmen (0.0471) at a 5% level. Again, the remaining proxies for power do not show
any effect (Table 104, 105 Appendix). Hence, managerial power is an issue for both
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CEOs and chairmen and provides value destroying aspects and it is in line with our
findings on the whole sample.
Table 40: Results on Power for Chairmen (3). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by ownership as well as its two dummies and the stock price reaction to executive deaths
by restricting the sample to Chairmen only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the power proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (8) or (9)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the power proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
Reputation: Tables 106, 107 in Appendix present the results of reputation on the
subsamples and provide no significant reaction, for neither CEOs nor chairmen. This
is obtained for whole sample as well and therefore, supports our findings.
Entrenchment: We will now discuss for the first time the topic of entrenchment.
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Tables 41, 42 show significantly negative effect to shareholder value on both the
Tenure as well as the Tenure over Age proxy for chairmen as well as CEOs. Simply
put, entrenchment is a problem for both CEOs and chairmen. (and is not an indi-
vidual problem for either). This is reasonable as entrenched executives can never
be considered beneficial on any position within a firm. Tables 108, 109 (Appendix)
provide further analyses on the remaining variables, however one does not obtain
significant results for this. Concluding, the results on entrenchment in this subsample
analysis back up Salas (2010)’s finding for entrenchment as a value killer in the whole
sample.
Table 41: Results on Entrenchement for CEOs (2). This table shows regression analysis of
entrenchment proxied by Tenure, Tenure over Age as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for
all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t
+ 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
entrenchment proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (3) or (4))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the entrenchment proxy. The second column
assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control
variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 42: Results on Entrenchement for Chairmen (2). This table shows regression analysis
of entrenchment proxied by Tenure, Tenure over Age as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
entrenchment proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (3) or (4))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the entrenchment proxy. The second column
assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control
variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Busyness: Interestingly, the results for busyness reveal that the number of director-
ships as proxy are only a significant value destroying issue for chairmen (0.0402) at
a 10% level as table 43 shows. Instead, for CEOs this does not seem to be an issue
that destroys value as shown in table 110 (Appendix).
Moreover, Chair of Charity as proxy for busyness provides significant negative
impact on firm value for both CEOs (0.0497) at a 10% level and chairmen (0.0451)
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at a 5% level as tables 44 and 45 suggest. Additionally, for the chairmen subsample
the Own Foundation proxy (0.0569) also hits significantly at a 5% level and also the
Non-Profit Board Index (0.0164) at a 10% level.
Table 43: Results on Busyness for Chairmen (1). This table shows regression analysis of busyness
proxied by Number of Outside Directorships, its dummy, as well as the number of Board Meetings
and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the busyness proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the busyness proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 44: Results on Busyness for CEOs (2). This table shows regression analysis of busyness proxied by Non Profit Board Index, Chair
of Charity, Own Foundation as well as Voluntary Work and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to
CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1,
where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of
the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that
is the busyness proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the
same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the busyness proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the
regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 45: Results on Busyness for Chairmen (2). This table shows regression analysis of busyness proxied by Non Profit Board Index,
Chair of Charity, Own Foundation as well as Voluntary Work and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample
to chairmen only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1
and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of
interest, that is the busyness proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third
column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted
with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the busyness proxy. The second column assigned
with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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In summary, busyness can be seen as a value destroying issue for both chairmen and
CEOs, however it seems to play a much more important role for chairmen. This
finding can be explained as follows, the daily business of a CEO requires quite of a
lot of his attention already. Although he is busy outside of his company, the work in
his own company and the strong dependence of other executives and employees of
his daily work, makes it indispensable for him to pay attention on his job properly.
On the other hand, chairmen are expected to monitor and advise executives and
only depend on certain duties such as board and committee meetings, essentially
they have more freedom within their arrangements. Consequently, it can be deferred
that a higher degree of busyness leads to more distraction from outside, steering the
attention away from their work as chairmen.
Generalist/Specialist: Our focus now turns to Generalists and Specialists pre-
sented in tables 46 and 47 and obtain the same findings as in the whole sample
case, namely a significant negative reaction for the GAI proxy for CEOS (-0.0310)
at a 5% level and for chairmen (-0.0214) at a 10% level. Similarly, the effect is
slightly stronger for the CEO subsample which implies that a general education and
experience plays a bigger role than a chairmen with these traits. Again, as for the
whole sample all other proxies do not hold significantly in the model.
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Table 46: Results on Generalist/Specialist for CEOs. This table shows regression analysis of
generalist/specialist proxied by GAI, General Degree, Special Degree and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions
is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t
represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including
the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The
upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the generalist/specialist proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the
third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression
model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results
of a robust simple regression of the generalist/specialist proxy. The second column assigned with
* always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 47: Results on Generalist/Specialist for Chairmen. This table shows regression analysis of
generalist/specialist proxied by GAI, General Degree, Special Degree and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1,
where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables
including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections.
The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the generalist/specialist
proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model.
From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust
regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows
the results of a robust simple regression of the generalist/specialist proxy. The second column
assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control
variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Quality/Experience: For highly qualified CEOs and chairmen, we obtain the
same results as in the whole sample. The First Manager Age impacts the firm value
positively for CEOs (-0.0029) and chairmen (-0.0030) significantly at a 1% level.
The remaining measures show no impact, that hold significantly (tables 111, 112 in
Appendix).
In our analysis, we provide evidence that personal and managerial traits behave
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similarly for CEOs and chairmen and there are only slight differences obtained
throughout. We find single proxies of variables to hold significantly for either of the
subsamples. However, both subsamples provide evidence for the same traits. Only
exception is a resilience proxy which holds for CEOs only subsamples.
Table 48: Results on Quality/Experience for CEOs (1). This table shows regression analysis
of quality/experience proxied by First Manager Age as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for
all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t
+ 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
quality/experience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the quality/experience proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 49: Results on Quality/Experience for Chairmen (1). This table shows regression analysis
of generalist/specialist proxied by First Manager Age as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
quality/experience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the quality/experience proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Furthermore, a general interpretation suggests that the control variables which we
choose play a significant smaller role for samples of only chairmen. When looking at
the presented tables above, the explanatory power of the regressions for chairmen is
much smaller and mostly around the Adj.R2 ≈ 10% level whereas for CEOs, it is
mostly around Adj.R2 ≈ 20%. A side effect of this is that we realize that the control
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variables are stronger related to CEOs than to chairmen. Consequently, fundamental
numbers of the firm seem to matter more for CEOs.
6.3 More Subsample Analyses
6.3.1 Managerial Traits as Separator and Empirical Results
As we have observed, personal traits do not really make a significant difference with
few exceptions, neither on the whole sample nor on chairmen or CEOs only samples.
What we did find however is that there are significant results for most managerial
traits. It is now interesting to observe whether or not personality traits play a role
when we use managerial traits as a separator. That is, we could e.g. investigate the
subsamples with duality managers (powerful) only and check whether discipline plays
any significant role now. The same question is analyzed for all personality traits.
Furthermore, we use a variety of other separating variables to observe any significant
behavior of personality traits aside from managerial power, such as the GAI as gener-
alist separator, ownership as a second power separator and founder as entrenchment
separator.
It is also important to mention that we cannot subsample our subsample again into
CEOs and chairmen as observation were too few, we do indicate that reactions are
basically similar and so therefore a separate consideration is not urgently needed.
To mention this upfront, we refrain from presenting any results that were obtained
with too few observations or statistically irrelevant.
The results however show, that even managerial trait subsamples indicate the same
results as the whole sample. That is, only the M&A Deal proxy for overconfidence
and openmindedness proxy provide significant results on firm value. This also means
that even in the case of powerful executives, shareholders do not account for their
personal characteristics much. These findings back out explanations that share-
holders ignore personal traits, as this kind of information is not relevant for the
company, they do not reflect the information correctly or they do not have access
to information to infer on the personality of their manager. The first argument
supports a semi-strong form of the EMH whereas the second is highly contradictory
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and the latter cannot be linked to the EMH directly. All results can be found in the
Appendix on tables 113 - 131. Note that one will find few differences to the whole
sample consideration. It appears, that excessive diffidence proxied by the Investment
Based Measure provides value destroying results for entrenched managers. However
it is also important to note, this occurs with 35 observations and therefore can be
disregarded. The remainder of the results are left looking similar, with the same
significance for each variable.
One might expect that every aspect of the CEO’s performance and other man-
agerial traits would impact his decisions which in turn effects the firm even more
strongly when this individual is very powerful, however this is not the case. The
market does not react to personal characteristics, even if the executive is powerful.
This results holds true and can be argued similarly for every other separator we
select. It again supports our interpretation and explanation, that shareholders do
not account for personality for different reasons.
Both the results from the chairmen and CEO samples as well as the managerial traits
used as distinguishing variables, back up the findings we obtain for the entire sample.
That is to say, hardly any significant impact for personality traits and proposed
effects for managerial attributes are observed. Hence, we infer a certain robustness
of our results.
As a consequence of these findings, we must reject the second hypothesis expecting
the same results as in the whole sample therefore, significance for personal traits.
Again, only few exceptions such as openmindedness and M&A Deals over Tenure as
proxy for overconfidence react differently.
6.3.2 Other Separators Subsample and Empirical Results
A further distinction that is interesting to observe, is to use company attributes as
separator. That is for example, we investigate high and low R&D firms as well as
big and small firms. One might expect a different reaction to be observed for certain
traits. For example, an overconfident executive in a low industry adjusted R&D firm
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might be beneficial as they take more risk than their rational peers since they perceive
the actual risk to be smaller. We use market adjusted R&D expenses, two digits SIC
code industry adjusted R&D expenses, firm size by assets, firm age by number of
years since inception and number of competitors by the number of firms with the
same two digits SIC code as separators. We have separated each variable so that if our
sample is below or above the median we are able to investigate how the traits behave.25
Overconfidence: Table 50 indicates a significantly negative reaction for exces-
sive diffidence (-0.0665) on R&D market adjusted expenses below median at a 10%
level. These findings are not intuitive because a manager in a firm who acts in a low
R&D industry should be benefiting because he takes more risk than others which in
turn would mean he is overconfident.
25Note that we only present those tables where we observe different results for either one of the
sides. All others can be provided upon request.
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Table 50: Results on Overconfidence in Subsamples. This table shows regression analysis of
overconfidence proxied by Excessive Diffidence and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We
subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above and below
sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number
of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents
the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the
intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second
provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns
are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
As a result, these findings also confirm one of the explanations we provided about
how this may happen. One can propose, that some of the measures do not really
capture what they are supposed to or in this case, the Investment Based measure
does not capture overconfidence and diffidence well enough. Having said this, there
might be underlying effects of the Investment Based measure, so that this result
comes up. Prior studies maybe obtain significant results due to their endogeneity
problems.
Openmindedness/Tolerance: Table 51 again shows that openminded managers
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in companies with only few competitors is a positive contribution whereas in com-
panies with many competitors it is not. One can argue, that firms in a highly
Table 51: Results on Openmindedness/Tolerance in Subsamples. This table shows regression
analysis of openmindedness/tolerance proxied by Foreign Background and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths. We subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis for the
sample above and below sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry
Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in
prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model.
From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The
first of two columns are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
competitive industry have lower search costs for a successor after the passing of their
last executive. On the other hand, firms with many competitors can revert to a large
pool of possible and qualified candidates with similar traits.
Sympathy: Surprisingly, our sympathy measures hold significantly in firm age
and competitor subsamples as table 52 provides. What can be observed is that for
older firms, sympathy of their executives and a good relation with the board are
beneficial for the firm value and seems to be reflected by the market.
132
6.3. MORE SUBSAMPLE ANALYSES
Table 52: Results on Sympathy in Subsamples. This table shows regression analysis of sympathy
proxied by Direct Speech in Obituary, Personality Described in Obituary and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths. We subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis
for the sample above and below sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D,
Industry Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent
variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1
and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in
prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model.
From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The
first of two columns are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
This is verified for both the Direct Speech proxy (-0.0889**) as well as the Personality
Described proxy (-0.0588*). This finding also seems a good contribution for highly
competitive firms where it is obtained by the Personality Described proxy as well
(-0.0431) at a 10% level.
These finding stand out as being the only subset, that provide significant and different
results from the whole sample consideration.
Power: Continuing on with the managerial traits, we obtained some important
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results. Tables 53, 54, 55 provide results on power. The tables display for low
market adjusted R&D firms stronger negative impact on firm value when firms have
a powerful manager that passes away. This result holds for the duality (0.0778**,
Table 53: Results on Power in Subsamples (1). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by Ownership and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We subsample in different
dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above and below sample median. These
dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors, Firm
Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate
regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns are regressions of the
dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a
10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
table 54), ownership (0.1561***, table 53), and Ownership>10% (0.0441**) measure
(table 55). Surprisingly, the Ownership measure (table 53) and Ownership>10%
(table 55) additionally provide value enhancement for high market adjusted R&D
firms. So far, we only obtain power to be value destroying.
However, the latter result can clearly be argued and does not seem irrational.
We claim in in an earlier chapter that power can be beneficial for firms depending on
the quality of the executive, however, we obtained value destroying results. Hence, it
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can be argued, that for those firms with high market adjusted R&D expenses power
it is beneficial, whereas for most other firms this is not the case.
Table 54: Results on Power in Subsamples (2). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by Duality and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We subsample in different
dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above and below sample median. These
dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors, Firm
Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate
regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns are regressions of the
dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a
10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
Furthermore, firms which invest more in R&D than the market can be considered
innovative firms in risky industries. These industries also require quick adaptation
to sudden changes within the industry as well as rapid development. Rapid changes
and quick adaption are possible with powerful managers more easily, because those
executives can make decisions more independently and have to refer to fewer individ-
uals within the company. Thus, they quickly adapt their strategy and this is the
reason why power is considered positively by the market.
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Table 55: Results on Power in Subsamples (3). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by Ownership>10% and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We subsample in
different dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above and below sample median.
These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors,
Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate
regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns are regressions of the
dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a
10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
However, the tables also show that for larger, relatively older, and highly competitive
firms, managerial power is a value destroying issue and provides significant results on
this. On the other hand, for younger, smaller and less competitive firms, power does
not seem to be an issue to be reflected by the market, as it does react significantly
on either of the proxies. A possible intuition is as follows. It could be said that
these firms are more prone to have a powerful executive, because smaller and less
competitive companies revert to smaller pools of possible candidates for succession.
The issue of power seems to be a problem for bigger firms instead.
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Entrenchment: Below, table 56 shows our results on entrenchment. It appears,
that entrenchment is closely tied with the stock price reaction for older as well as
bigger firms. Contrary to that, entrenched managers seem to not have any significant
impact on firm value for younger and smaller firms. The results hold on different
measures at 1% and 5% levels respectively. Obviously, younger firms are less likely to
have entrenched managers because entrenchment is associated with the tenure of an
executive. Highly tenured managers are rarely to be found in younger firms, because
they are young. Similarly can be argued for smaller firms. Entrenched managers are
more likely to be found in larger firms.
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Table 56: Results on Entrenchment in Subsamples. This table shows regression analysis of entrenchment proxied by Tenure, Tenure over
Age as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We subsample in different dimensions considering running the
analysis for the sample above and below sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number
of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in
percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the
predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs
of a dimension. The first of two columns are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not
show any significance.
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Busyness: For busyness, we obtain only value destroying impact on firm value in the
whole sample. This also holds in the subsample consideration. What we also observe
however is that busyness does not play a significant role for some subsamples (tables
57, 58, 59). It appears, that bigger firms as opposed to smaller firms show significant
value destroying impact (table 57). It can be argued that workload in bigger firms is
higher and that boards tend to be busier than in small firms as directors, on average,
hold more outside directorships. Similarly, busyness for smaller firms may mean that
executives gain better insight into processes of other firms and learn from this and
therefore positive effects outweigh negative ones. Tables 58, 59 indicate that for firms
Table 57: Results on Busyness in Subsamples (1). This table shows regression analysis of busyness
proxied by Number of Outside Directorships, its dummy as well as the Number of Board Meetings
and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We subsample in different dimensions considering
running the analysis for the sample above and below sample median. These dimensions are Market
Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs
of a dimension. The first of two columns are regressions of the dimension above median and the
second below median. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for
each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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with more competitors than the median, busyness is rather value destroying whereas
for smaller firms, no evidence can be found. The same argument for this findings as
before can be made here again in that highly competitive firms need to perform very
well to stand the strong competition, therefore, it can be determined that firms do
not work well with distracted managers. On the other hand, companies with less
competition do not have this problem and executives can afford to focus on other
non-firm related things.
Table 58: Results on Busyness in Subsamples (2). This table shows regression analysis of busyness
proxied by Non Profit Board Index as well as Own Foundation and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths. We subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis for the
sample above and below sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry
Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in
prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model.
From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The
first of two columns are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Lastly, the same tables provide value destroying results for busyness in older firms
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and no significant results for younger firms. The same holds for high market adjusted
R&D firms in table 59. The argument as mentioned before can also be applied here.
To stand the strong and quick changes of an risky industry, an executive has to
completely focus on his tasks and avoid any distraction that might arise.
Table 59: Results on Busyness in Subsamples (3). This table shows regression analysis of busyness
proxied by Chair of Charity and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We subsample in
different dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above and below sample median.
These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number of Competitors,
Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate
regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns are regressions of the
dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a
10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
Generalist/Specialist: Tables 60, 61 show that generalist executives proxied by
the GAI show different results on all separators that we set. That means that for
some firms the generalist trait seems to be more important than for other firms. This
holds significantly for low market adjusted R&D firms, high industry adjusted R&D
firms, big firms, old firms and highly competitive firms. For all opposite subsamples,
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no significant behavior can be observed.
Table 60: Results on Generalist/Specialist in Subsamples (1). This table shows regression analysis
of Generalist/Specialist proxied by GAI and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We
subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above and below
sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number
of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents
the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the
intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second
provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns
are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 61: Results on Generalist/Specialist in Subsamples (2). This table shows regression analysis
of Generalist/Specialist proxied by GAI and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. We
subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above and below
sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D, Number
of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents
the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the
intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second
provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns
are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Quality: At last, we look at differences in quality and experience measures. Even
though generalist proxies and the quality proxies are highly related, each show
different results. Again here, on all subsamples we obtain differences. We receive
significant value enhancing results for low market adjusted R&D firms (as for
generalist), low industry adjusted R&D firms, smaller sized firms, older firms and
less competitive firms. Especially, the latter is a reasonable result. Finding a highly
qualified manager in a low competitive firm is harder than in a firm that has a lot of
competitors and in turn a larger pool of possible candidates.
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Table 62: Results on Quality/Experience in Subsamples (1). This table shows regression analysis
of Quality/Experience proxied by First Manager Age and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths. We subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above
and below sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D,
Number of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is
the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents
the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the
intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second
provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns
are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 63: Results on Quality/Experience in Subsamples (2). This table shows regression analysis
of Quality/Experience proxied by First Manager Age and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths. We subsample in different dimensions considering running the analysis for the sample above
and below sample median. These dimensions are Market Adjusted R&D, Industry Adjusted R&D,
Number of Competitors, Firm Age, Firm Size in Assets. The dependent variable for all regressions is
the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents
the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the
intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second
provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, multivariate regressions are provided in pairs of a dimension. The first of two columns
are regressions of the dimension above median and the second below median. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
We find some very interesting differences throughout the subsamples and also obtain
information in regards to which attributes have a beneficial or negative impact on the
firm. Similar to before, we find barely any evidence for personality traits, supporting
once more our explanations we have provided.
6.4 Robustness Checks
We have to check not only that results are robust, but also that measures and results
are not driven by multicollinearity. Multicollinearity means that variance of a control
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variable can be driven by the correlation of two or more other control variables in
our model. For instance, indicators of multicollinearity are for instance if none of the
independent variables hold significantly in the model, but the model as a whole does
(F-value < 0.1). Furthermore, strong pairwise correlation or tremendous changes in
the coefficient among the models indicate multicollinearity. However, only analyzing
the pairwise correlation is not sufficient as a pairwise correlation can be small when
yet a dependence between more than just two variables exists. A way to test for
multicollinearity are variance inflation factors (VIF). Those represent an indicator
on how much variance is inflated due to multicollinearity.26
For this purpose, we compute all VIFs on every single model to check for mul-
ticollinearity. Table 64 shows that only Market to Book and Market Cap suffer
multicollinearity.
Table 64: Results on Variance Inflation Factors for Openmindedness. This table shows all used
control variables and its Variance Inflation Factors in the second column. VIFs above = 4 indicate
multicollinearity and values exceeding V IF >= 10 are evidential for serious multicollinearity.
This, however, is obvious as the enumerator of Market to Book is Market Cap. Hence,
those two controls are highly correlated but remaining variables are not. This table
also stands for all other results that we obtain on the VIFs. None of the variables are
greater than 2.5 in any of the other tables except Market to Book and Market Cap
26We refrain from presenting every single VIF table, as results are similar and do not bring up new
or different results. However, they can be provided upon request.
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which are always higher. Hence, in our models our variables of interest, in general,
do not suffer multicollinearity.
Next, we mentioned that existing measures may be driven by multicollinearity
as well as omitted variables, that is endogeneity. We apply a method to check
whether our results are driven by another control variable. We run a logit regression
in which the variable of interest - the personal or managerial traits (discrete proxies
only)- serves as our dependent variable and all controls as independent variable. The
logit regression on discrete variables predicts the probability of a certain outcome of
a variable.
We use this test to check whether we have chosen the right control variables and also to
confirm that they do not drive the results too much. It simply serves as an additional
control for the accuracy of our model. Thus, if we obtain that the model is not signif-
icant (Prob > chi2) < 0.1, it means that the probability is not driven significantly by
the predictor variables and also that the dependent variable, the traits, are not either.
Our results provide significance for the Investment Based proxies of overconfidence
as well as for the M&A based measure. This makes sense, as these measures strongly
correlate with other financials of the firm and depend on the firm and not on the
executive solely. Table 65 presents a selection of results where the model holds
significantly, meaning the traits explains the results of the model.
In case of the resilience proxy Age>67 the model even fully explains the data. But
of course, all our resilience measures are related to the executive’s age and therefore
correlate with it. This variable in particular correlates with Age strongly. The
Kids proxy is also related to a CEO’s age and therefore, this may drive the results.
Furthermore, we find significance for entrenchment proxies (Tenure and Tenure Over
Age) and power proxy (Ownership>10%) but when looking closer at those variables,
we identify that they all (except the ownership measure) are somehow related with
age. The power proxy is again strongly correlated to the board size.
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Table 65: Logit Regression Results on a selection of non-significant trait proxies. This table shows
Logit Regression result. On top of each column, a several personal traits are presented and serve
as dependent variable. The control variables are provided in the first column. *,**,*** denote
significance at 10% , 5%, 1% level.
Hence, to solve this and to prove the robustness of our model, we ran all OLS
regressions with significant Logit Regression results again without the drivers that
they are related with and of course obtain strong results if for example age is not
included in such analysis.
We refrain from presenting every regression in detail.27 However, to summarize
our results, it can be said that they are quite robust, do not suffer severe multi-
collinearity and the trait variables significantly can be held in our model.
6.5 Conclusion on Results of Sudden Death Analysis
In this chapter, we investigate how the different personal and managerial traits
impact the firm value by investigating the stock price reaction to the sudden death of
a CEO, chairman or president. Recall that personal characteristics are those which
are directly associated with the personality of a manager whereas managerial traits
are those that are associated with the company in any way. In our analysis we include
27All results can be provided upon request.
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for personal traits: Overconfidence, Narcissism, Generosity, Resilience, Openminded-
ness, Discipline and Sympathy. To the group of managerial traits belong: Power,
Reputation, Entrenchment, Busyness, Generalist/Specialist, Quality/Experience.28
In the first part of this chapter, we test for the effects of all traits, both personal
and managerial, on firm value. In the second part, we apply the same tests for
subsamples restricting the sample to only CEOs or chairmen. Thereafter, we use
managerial traits as sample separator and finally we run the same regressions with
company attributes as subsample separators. We provide a detailed description of
our findings below.
Firstly for the whole sample analysis, we find that in particular personal traits
barely impact the firm value directly. We do not find any significant effect of narcis-
sism, generosity, resilience, discipline or sympathy. Only openmindedness/tolerance
proxied by Foreign Background shows a significantly negative reaction as well as one
of the overconfidence proxies, M&A Deals over Tenure, shows a positive reaction.29
Opposingly, for managerial traits we observe quite significant effects. More precisely,
we find value destroying effects for managerial power and busyness whereas we obtain
value enhancing effects for managerial quality and generalists. These results are all
in line with our expectations as well as literature implications. However, reputation
does not show any significant effects.
Secondly, we did the same analysis separately for chairmen and CEOs only subsam-
ples and basically get the same results with few exceptions as we did for the whole
sample. In other words, the same proxies hit significantly both for chairmen and
CEOs. Slight differences between the chairmen and CEO reaction are observable.
For example, resilience proxied by War Participant holds for the CEOs only sub-
sample and provides value enhancing effects. These findings are also in line with
our predictions and the literature implications. All other traits behave similarly and
show the same behavior for both chairmen and CEOs subsamples. Furthermore, we
analyzed entrenchment at this point and also confirm what Salas (2010) indicated in
28Note that a variable and their proxies can be found in chapter 5 and also in the Appendix.
29Recall that a positive reaction means value destroying impact, whereas a negative reaction means,
that the deceased executive enhanced the firm value.
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the whole sample consideration, that is that there are mere positive (value destroying)
reactions to entrenched managers.
Thereafter, we divide our sample into some more subsamples and used manage-
rial traits as separators. We might argue that if an executive exposes certain
managerial traits, shareholders also start accounting for his personality. Hence, we
used managerial power, entrenchment, busyness as well as generalist as subsample
separators and investigated how personal attributes react. Note, we obtain the same
results as before and do not encounter differences. In other words, the personality
only holds significantly for the same proxies as before.
At last, we run the regressions for all attributes, both managerial and personal,
along company trait separators and investigate how traits react in subsamples,
dividing the sample along the median of R&D expenses, firm size, firm age and
competitors. In this case, we obtained a great insight on where traits really matter.
We sum up some of the results into where for instance, openmindedness only seems
to play role in low and not high competitive firms. Power is an important issue only
in larger, older or highly competitive firms. Entrenchment on the other hand plays a
role in older and bigger firms.
Generally, we obtain marginal significant impact for personal traits and highly
significant impact for managerial attributes. As underlying theory, we assumed the
semi-strong form of the EMH. Significant results for certain proxies and their traits
are a strong support for the correctness of it. Furthermore, we provide exclusive
explanations for why some of the proxies do not hold significantly in our analysis even
though all data was obtained from public sources. First of all, the market may not be
aware of personal traits of their executives as they do not have enough information
to judge on this. We obtain all information from public sources but it seems that
some information was released along with an obituary for the deceased and hence,
not available beforehand. Shareholders are able to observe corporate decisions made
by their managers but may not be able to infer on the personality precisely enough
to account for it. This is not necessarily contradicting the EMH but definitely no
argument in favor of it.It can alternatively be argued that public information was
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simply not incorporated by the market. The latter is a basic assumption of the EMH
requiring all available information to be incorporated quickly and correctly once they
become known.
Furthermore, the market might recognize a personal attribute, but ignores the facts as
it only accounts for direct impact on firm value which is not given for personal traits.
Those traits are directly connected to the person, but do not have any connection
to the company in any way. Hence, this information is available but ignored by the
market since the market only observes the executive’s corporate decisions and not
his personality directly. M&A Deals over Tenure as overconfidence proxy provide
a significant reaction, however this is a ratio directly associated to the company.
To put this into the language of the efficient market theory it means that investors
only react to information they consider to be relevant and in turn do not react to
non-information which again is an assumption of the EMH.
Basically, prior studies find evidence of personal attributes on corporate decisions.
We, however, find that the market does not adjust its perception of these personal
attributes.
Regardless, some of the used proxies for both, managerial and personal traits,
do not provide any significant impact on firm value and this may be caused by a
another reason why shareholders may not react significantly. Even though prior
studies showed significant behavior of some traits, we claim that those chosen proxies
eventually do not capture the intended effect well enough. Previous research, how-
ever, obtains significant results because their measures might suffer endogeneity and
omitted variables driving their results. In other words, these studies might not be
able to fully rule out endogeneity as a potential driver of their results and therefore
they obtain what is expected.
In a nutshell, one can conclude that due to our results which find personal traits to
barely impact the stock price reaction and therefore the firm value in consequence of
the executive’s sudden death, one of our provided explanations holds. In particular,
the results are obtained in all subsample analyses and therefore are quite robust
and it strongly amplifies our provided explanations. Furthermore, we obtain rather
significant results for managerial traits. They even show effects as one would expect
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and prior research implies. Overall, we are not able to fully support the EMH in
our analysis, neither are we able to rule it out. In the case of significant reactions
we tend accept the hypothesis. However, in case there is no significant reaction to
certain attributes both contradicting and supporting evidence might hold true.
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7 Impact of Personal and Managerial
Traits of Successors on Firm Value
7.1 Arising Problems and Lack in Literature
When investigating sudden death events existing literature usually ignores the an-
nouncement of a successor or it ignores the search costs for the successors. Some
of the existing literature such as Salas (2010) who uses a control variable for quick
replacements and whether the substitute of the deceased is an insider, and Nguyen
and Nielsen (2010a) as well as Hayes and Schaefer (1999), who consider the search
costs in their model but they refrain from investigating the replacement or from
integrating any control variable in their model. They mention and partially integrate
the successors into their investigations, but do not go into details and do not ana-
lyze the election of the successor. Only Borokhovich et al. (2006) run a thorough
investigation and examine replacement decisions after sudden death controlling for
ownership and various board characteristics.
In other words, existing sudden death literature widely disregards the fact that
the stock price reaction to sudden death might not be entirely accountable to the
deceased. However, there might also be an inherent valuation of the successor the
shareholders expect or do not expect.
By ignoring this, literature may not solve all endogeneity problems along with
sudden death. Hitherto, most of the literature accounts the entire effect to the
manager who dies suddenly but not to the successor who possesses an inherent
value. We already included a dummy for the successors as control variable into
all our regression models for the sudden death analysis. It appears that it never
holds significantly at any point. The dummy has the value = 1 if the successor was
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announced within two days after the sudden death announcement. One might expect
a different stock price reaction, as shareholders perceive the situation differently once
a new executive has been named. However, this does not seem to be the case and
we further investigate the choice of the successor.
We do not base our investigations on the sudden death solely, but also consider
traits of the successor to solve endogeneity. When a manager dies, the shareholders
have certain expectations who should come next. In case of a succession plan, the
reaction to the death is clean and can completely be accounted to the deceased
as the successor is known prior to the corporate shock. If no plan exists and the
successor cannot be anticipated entirely, shareholders will price in the uncertainty
and inherent expectations. Since shareholders hold a certain expectation towards
managerial traits, they expect the board and management to choose a successor who
inherits certain characteristics of the deceased. As some attributes develop over the
time and hence, are not observable from the beginning and while some others are
simply not replaceable, the shareholders will account for this uncertainty. Moreover,
if a company announces a successor, who was not previously known, shareholders will
reflect their perception of the new successor, his traits and ability into the stock price.
Within the scope of our theoretical framework, the EMH assumes the market always
to react correctly and quickly to new information. The uncertainty and also the
valuation of possible replacement candidates contributes to the market’s perception
and in turn to the correct valuation of the sudden death event and also of himself.
The value or the perception of the successor seems to be a crucial issue for the efficient
market hypothesis to hold and therefore tremendously important for us to investigate.
We conclude that with the implementation of our model we have to take those
traits into account that are going to be replaced by the successor and those that
are not. We want to know, is there a different shareholder reaction to the sudden
death? Does the reaction differ from the successor’s announcement if both have
the same characteristics? E.g. is there a different shareholder reaction when the
deceased was excessively overconfident and the successor is not? There might also be
an underlying explanation to the stock price reaction. If an overconfident managers
is replaced by another overconfident manager, shareholders might not price in the
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deceased’s degree of overconfidence. Lastly, how do boards replace the deceased
when the shareholder reaction was positive (bad manager)?
All the above questions and problems arise when investigating the problems and
issues around sudden death and need to be answered to understand the psychology
of the market’s reaction to sudden death events.
7.2 Hypotheses
Existing sudden death literature widely ignores the choice of the succession. To the
best of our knowledge, we are one of the first to investigate the choice of successors
thoroughly.30 As shown in the beginning of this chapter, investigating the successors
is essential for a full understanding of the shareholders’ reaction. Their reaction to
the sudden death is partially driven by their inherent expectation of a replacement.
If shareholders consider him a good fit as successor of an approved manager, their
reaction will be less negative or even positive. If the deceased was a value destroying
manager and his replacement is a high quality manager, his succession will enhance
the positive reaction of the shareholders to the sudden death. The remaining reac-
tions work analogously.
Taking all these thoughts into consideration, one recognizes the importance to
investigate the choice of the successors when employing sudden death events.
Lacking prior studies we make assumptions and implications from our results on the
whole sudden death sample. In that sample we obtained no significance for most of
the personal traits. Because the information is either not available or not of further
interest to the shareholders, we propose that if the information is insignificant for
the sudden death reaction, it is going to be so for the successor as well.
Hypothesis 6. Personal traits of successors do not play any role for the announce-
ment effect of the successor. In other words, the character of the successor does not
matter.
Now, when considering managerial traits, results on sudden death events look quite
different. We find strong evidence on many traits and relevant impact on firm value.
30Borokhovich et al. (2006) properly analyze the choice of the replacement.
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Information on these traits is widely available for the market, even information on
the replacement. We argue that, first, shareholders react to the announcement of
the replacement and his managerial traits and second, that they react differently if
certain traits are (not) replaced. E.g. if managerial power, which turned out to be a
value destroying trait, is replaced by a manager with small power, it should cause a
positive reaction and vice versa.
Hypothesis 7. Managerial traits impact the shareholders’ reaction to the successor
announcement. It further strongly depends on which traits are replaced and which
are not.
Furthermore, since we could neither reject nor accept the the semi-strong form of
market efficiency to be true for the whole sample consideration, we refrain from
putting this into a hypothesis. However, we expect important and relevant infor-
mation to cause a significant reaction when being released. Previously, we still find
strong evidence in favor of it but also potential evidence against it.
7.3 Data, Descriptive Statistics and Empirical
Analysis
We collect as many successors as possible and collected as much information as there
is available at the time of the study. Bear in mind, that our sample dates events
back to 1972. Information on those managers that died is hardly available and even
more difficult to find data on the successor. The most reliable data comes from data
collected by the SEC starting in 1994, but we find singular points before this. For a
total of 140 companies we identify the successor’s announcement day but could not
collect details on him. Information is available for 143 successors belonging to 86
companies in regards to personality and managerial traits.
We identify more than one successor per company, since some companies with
powerful executives replace the deceased with more than one new person and split
duality or triality. Furthermore, a few companies establish an interim executive to
search for an appropriate successor. Table 66 gives an overview of the transition
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Control % of Successors
Succ<3 days 47.12
Powersplit 45.64
Insider 45.64
Director before 64.33
Last Position Low 56.39
Position Add 56.39
Interim 29.32
Table 66: Overview on Successors
between deceased and his successor. It shows that 47.12% of all successors are
announced within 2 days after the announcement of the sudden death. At the same
time 29.32% of all companies announce an interim executive first before searching
for a proper replacement and of course all interims are announced in less than 3 days
after the sudden death announcement. Most of the the replacements, used to act
as directors in the company before and 56.39% hold a position lower than the new one.
As our next step, we analyze how managerial and personal traits affect the shareholder
reaction to the announcement of the successor. We see in the main sample analysis
that the company announcing the successor within 2 days after the sudden death
does not play a significant role for the shareholders’ reaction. One can observe the
Successor<3 days variable to verify this 31. Hence, it is now important to differentiate
in the personality and managerial traits of the new executive. First we prepare
our sample as follows. If a company splits the power of the deceased among two
or more persons, they always separate the CEO from the chairman position. As
mentioned above we collected as many variables as possible to obtain the same traits
for successors as we did for the deceased. Obviously, some variables could not be
reconstructed as some data is not available. This includes e.g. the Investment Based
overconfidence measures, the sympathy measures and others. Again, for some other
proxies the information was simply not available in any source, such as Lexis Nexis,
Google or SEC. It also includes details that are often mentioned in obituaries such
as the number of kids or others.
31When one looks at the results which we obtained throughout the previous chapter it can be
verified that there is no significance for this control variable
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This also backs up an explanation that we provided before. The market is simply not
aware of certain circumstances in an executive’s life and therefore does not account
for it. Much data is revealed in obituaries and in consequence of a manager’s death
and not beforehand. Hence, shareholders might not know before. Thus, a proper
application of EMH for this argumentation is not possible. However, it might mean
that the market does not react because it does not incorporate the information
correctly which is a basic assumption of the EMH and thus contradictory. Lastly,
one might argue in favor of the theory that this kind of information was not relevant
and therefore causes no significant reaction which is also an assumption of the EMH.
We execute this analysis in three ways for the data which is available. Firstly,
we consider all relevant successors with the same control variables as before and also
include the LastPosition variable which is 1 if the last position is low and the new
is higher and 0 otherwise. Then, we observe how the market reflects the traits in the
regression.
In a second analysis, we practically do the same but exclude all those announcements
that happened within 2 days after the sudden death announcement. This guarantees
us that the announcement effect of successor is not driven by the announcement
of the sudden death and can be separated entirely from this effect. Note further,
that those announcements may also suffer endogeneity as announcements do not
necessarily appear unexpectedly. The market anticipates certain candidates and the
longer it takes the higher the expectation in such an announcement. Due to the
rather exogenous and unexpected nature of the announcements we argue that the
possibility of endogeneity is small.
In the third analysis, we construct transition variables. One is not only inter-
ested in how managerial traits affect the firm value but also whether there is an
effect on how companies replace certain traits and if companies replace those traits
knowingly. In other words, for example we investigate the impact of replacing an
(non-)overconfident manager with a (non-)overconfident on the firm’s value. For this
purpose, we compare all dummy variables that we constructed for successor as well
as deceased. Then, we compare those values and construct transition variables. If
158
7.3. DATA, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
the dummy value for the deceased is the same as for the successor, which means
a certain trait was inherited, the transition variable receives the value = 0. If the
deceased dummy value is = 0 (= 1 respectively) and the successors value is = 1 (= 0
respectively), we assign = 1 (= −1 respectively) to the transition variable. This
way, we make sure to test whether the market accounts for differences in personal or
managerial traits.
We thus seek to find a system on how companies replace certain traits. One expects
to replace value enhancing traits and to not replace value destroying traits. If
companies do not follow this, one may argue that either hiring mechanisms fail to
work effectively, companies are not aware of value destroying traits or they simply
ignore it.
Note, we mentioned before that often managers hold the position of CEO and chair-
man at the time of their death and they are replaced by more than one successor
while one is assigned to the position of CEO and another manager is assigned to be
chairman. In those cases, we only consider the announcement return to the CEO
position so that for each company we only consider one announcement effect, or two
announcement effects if they establish an interim executive.
Before diving into the regression analysis, note that companies match prior ex-
isting traits in 61% of all cases independently whether traits are value destroying or
enhancing. Also, they match them even then if the reaction to the sudden death
was positive (value destroying). In particular, the latter should be a warning for
the company to look for a different executive. Nevertheless, companies seem to
ignore this fact. This again backs up our provided explanations why the market
ignores personal traits. They are either not aware of this or corporate governance
mechanisms do not work effectively.
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Table 67: Results on Overconfidence for Successors. This table shows regression analysis of Over-
confidence proxied by Press Portrayal and the stock price reaction to the successor announcement.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is announced. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided
three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are regressions include all
successors. The second exclude those, that are announced within two days after the sudden death
of the predecessor. The third column provides employs transition variables, which defined before.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Now, after presenting the analysis methods, we dedicate to it. We simply omit all
variables that were not constructible as information was not available or when we
obtain too few observations. Table 67 provides the results on the one overconfidence
variable that we constructed for the successors. It shows that the market does not
account for the replacement’s overconfidence and also ignores if the trait was replaced.
We could also construct the openmindedness proxy for successors as well. For
all other personal traits information was not available. Therefore, table 68 provides
the results on this trait and we obtain the same outcome as for overconfidence.
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Table 68: Results on Openmindedness/Tolerance for Successors. This table shows regression
analysis of openmindedness/tolerance proxied by Foreign Background and the stock price reaction to
the successor announcement. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is
announced. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate
regressions are provided three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are
regressions include all successors. The second exclude those, that are announced within two days
after the sudden death of the predecessor. The third column provides employs transition variables,
which defined before. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for
each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
Surprisingly, the situation for managerial traits looks similar. Table 132-139 (Ap-
pendix) indicate that not even managerial traits play any significant role for the
valuation of the successor. Only the new manager’s quality react significantly in the
transition at a 5% level as we see in table 69. The isolated variable does not have
an impact, but the variable compared to the preceding manager does which makes
sense. Shareholders reflect the successor’s quality compared to his predecessor into
the stock price. If the new executive is better, they react positively.32
32A positive reaction for successors means value enhancement unlike for sudden death events.
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Table 69: Results on Quality/Experience for Successors (1). This table shows regression analysis
of Quality/Experience proxied by First Manager Age as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to the successor announcement. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the successor is announced. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
multivariate regressions are provided three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three
columns are regressions include all successors. The second exclude those, that are announced
within two days after the sudden death of the predecessor. The third column provides employs
transition variables, which defined before. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1%
level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not
show any significance.
We also provide results on how shareholders react to power splits, interim executives
and insiders. One can verify that not even this is being accounted for by the
shareholders as one can verify with table 70
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Table 70: Results on Successors. This table shows regression analysis of other variables proxied by
Powersplit, Interim as well as Insider and the stock price reaction to the successor announcement.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is announced. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided
in pairs. The first of two columns are regressions include all successors. The second exclude those,
that are announced within two days after the sudden death of the predecessor. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
The question arises why none of the managerial or personal traits (except managerial
quality) impact the shareholder reaction to the announcement of the replacement
significantly and why at the same time the average reaction to this event is 2.12%.
There are various reasons that might explain this.
First of all, the result is driven endogenously. We already mentioned,that the suc-
cessor announcement is not entirely unexpected. The exact date can be considered
unexpected but after the death - the more time goes by after the death- shareholders
expect an announcement with every passing day. Rumors on the exact candidate
leads the market to evaluate the candidate before the actual announcement. Further-
more, we can assume that a firm with a vacancy is considered worse by the market.
Therefore, the market reacts to the announcement as it ”wants” any executive filling
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the vacancy instead of having none.
Lastly, the market reacts to the quality of the manager as this is the only aspect they
are able to evaluate or the only one they evaluate. They simply do not assess traits
separately but react to the manager as a whole since they are not able to differentiate.
This means that we can confirm the sixth hypothesis but have to reject the seventh.33
Furthermore, similar to the whole sample consideration we can neither reject nor
can we accept the EMH in all its facets. We apply the same arguments against and
in favor of it. We recall that since we do not obtain any significant effects it might
mean that the market does not react because all information on the successors is not
relevant. This follows the EMH. Strongly evidential against the EMH, one might
argue that market participant do not react correctly to the new information of a
successor announcement or simply the information was not available to the market.
Obviously, taking the different explanations into account one cannot clear rule for
either rejection of acceptance.
7.4 Quick Replacements
Lastly, we look on the replacement time, i.e. the time a company needs to replace
their deceased. We do not only check for firm characteristics but also for certain
traits. One expects a highly qualified manager to be replaced quickly as a lack of
good performance is not affordable. For this purpose, the Successor<3days dummy
serves as our independent variable and the characteristics as dependent variable in a
simple regression.
We will not present the results in great detail but discuss some important results.
Firms do not replace executives with specific personal traits quickly. In other words,
none of the personal trait variables have positive impact on the replacement time.
This is not surprising since the same argumentation as before can be applied here.
Not even the company itself accounts for the manager’s personality and consequently,
does not choose their executives because of certain personality patterns. Note that
33Recall that we claimed in the first hypothesis that the stock price reaction to the successor’s
announcement does not account for his personality. In the second hypothesis, we proposed
significant valuation of managerial traits.
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all resilience proxies indicate significantly quicker replacement. Recall that all mea-
sures are strongly related to the executive’s age. This makes perfect sense as older
managers have a higher likelihood to suffer death and therefore, companies are better
prepared to replace him.
Continuing on managerial traits, it results that firms with busy managers, gen-
eralists and highly qualified and experienced executives show no significance. Neither
does reputation. Powerful managers are replaced quickly. This is completely in line
with our prior argumentation. A vacancy in the position is always considered bad by
the market. Therefore, the more powerful an executive, the quicker he is replaced.
Also, entrenched managers are replaced slowly. This is a logical result from the
nature of entrenchment and also makes sense.
Lastly, we take a closer look on firm characteristics. We find that firms with
larger boards tend to take more time to replace the deceased. It can be argued that
larger boards suffer from trouble in finding an agreeable successor and hence, need
more time.
Also bigger companies need significantly more time on replacing their deceased. Note
that this result is likely to be driven by interims. Even though we exclude interim
consideration from the regressions, we have in mind that big companies in particular
establish interim executives to have sufficiently much time to search for a new one.
Hence, on average, in will take those firms longer.
Innovative firms with high R&D expenses show no particular replacement time effect.
At last, highly competitive firms replace quickly. This is, firstly, because firms in
a competitive environment choose from a larger pool of possible successors as well
as there is a necessity for the firm in such a industry to replace quickly as the
performance should never suffer.
7.5 Conclusion on Results of Successor Analysis
To find the value of successors that come to power in consequence of an executive’s
sudden death we investigate the stock price reaction to the announcement of them
in three different ways. First, by simply analyzing all available traits on the reaction,
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second, by excluding those successors who are announced within two days after the
sudden death of the predecessor to make sure the announcement effect is not driven
by the sudden death, and lastly, by comparing certain traits with each other and
implementing transition variables to identify whether the market reacts to a change
in traits.
To summarize our findings, we obtain partially similar results to the sudden death
sample. It appears as if personal attributes are not reflected by the market. None
of the personal trait proxies holds significantly in our analysis. Interestingly, we
were only able to construct two of our variables. Most are not constructible since
information was not sufficiently available. This backs up our explanations saying that
the market is not informed enough to account for an executive’s personality but only
considers a manager’s corporate decisions due to a lack of information availability on
the personality. Alternatively, it can be stated that the market does not incorporate
the new information correctly. Lastly, one might argue that information on the
personality is not relevant and therefore causes no reaction. As before we put these
possible explanations into the context of the underlying theory and claim, that the
second argument contradicts the EMH in its semi-strong form as it requires informa-
tion to be correctly incorporated into the stock price. The latter argument supports
the EMH assuming that no relevant information causes no significant reaction.
For managerial trait we do not find any evidence for a significant effect either. Only
managerial quality provides a positive effect on firm value since shareholders react
positively to an increase in managerial quality. All other traits have no significant
effect. The same arguments regarding the EMH can be applied again which makes a
unique ruling puzzling.
Due to the fact that neither personal nor managerial attributes impact the share-
holder reaction to the successor announcement significantly, we can infer that results
for the sudden death sample are not driven by the inherent valuation of the successor.
Furthermore, companies replace personal and managerial attributes in 60% of all
cases, no matter if those traits are value enhancing or destroying. Consequently, a
certain replacing pattern of companies cannot be identified.
We keep in mind that results may be driven by endogeneity due to a lack of sud-
denness of the successor’s announcement. Certainly, a quick replacement of the
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deceased lowers potential endogeneity. However, it can still be a driver of the results
as consequence of the sudden death’ inherent expectations and assumptions made
by the market. Hence, the announcement of a successor does not entirely appear
unexpectedly and exogenously.
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8 Impact of Personal and Managerial
Traits of Outside Directors on
Firm Value
8.1 Open Questions and Literature Review
In Boston Business Journal, Hadzima deals with the questions whether outside
directors matter and why companies might need them and names different reasons.
He claims the necessity of outside directors because insiders, especially in young
start-ups, are busy with the day to day business and do not provide any outside
perspective.
Companies often wonder what an outside director’s contribution looks like. Not only
them, but a large body of literature deals with this issue.
Boards usually hold two roles within a company. They first serve as advisor of the
management and secondly as its monitor. However, independent boards are more
likely to be stronger and also tougher monitors which might lead the CEO to not
reveal his information. Therefore, boards being friendly with the management should
be ideal. Adams and Almeida (2007) develop a model and analyze theoretically
the role of the board with a CEO also acting as chairman of the board. They find
when the CEO/chairman discloses his information to the board, he in turn will get
better advice and more intensive advice. The authors further derive implications for
company policies.
This is consistent with the findings of de Andre´s and Rodr´ıguez (2011). They
use a sample of European firms in high-tech industries to provide evidence on the
board’s effect on performance and corporate governance by investigating the two
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roles of boards, advisory and monitoring. Their findings indicate stronger effect of
the advisory role of the board than of the monitoring role. They further find better
governance and performance for bigger and less independent boards. Independent
boards are those that consist in majority of independent directors.
Analyzing corporate spin-offs, Denis et al. (2012) find major differences in the
board structure of the new unit and the parent company. They state that the two
boards do not show any connection and that directors of either one of the boards are
specifically suitable for their board due to their expertise. It is in line that both units
can compose their boards independently according to their needs. They also provide
evidence that the CEO has a strong effect on both boards and their composition.
Boards of directors play an important role for the firm, as advisor of the man-
agement and also as its monitor. Furthermore, companies should be interested on
how the board might be structured to work more efficiently along with the man-
agement. The latter should align their director nominations and rather focus on
choosing new directors accurately.
As already presented, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010b) investigate the the sudden death
of inside and outside directors and observe a significant positive valuation of outside
directors whereas inside directors absorb this effect. Falato et al. (2013) also use
sudden death events to also investigate the value of independent directors and relate
such an exogenous shock to the busyness of the remaining board.
To the best of our knowledge, these two latter studies are the only to investigate the
value of directors employing sudden death.
Hence, the question on the value of a director arises. It is interesting to know
when directors have a positive effect on firm value and when they have a negative ef-
fect. Thus, we ask the questions, which we already asked and examined for managers
in the role of CEO, president or chairman. That means we want to know how personal
and managerial characteristics impact the firm and whether they show any effect at all.
The role and value of outside directors has been investigated thoroughly and many
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aspects were analyzed. However, like the value of executive traits have hardly been
analyzed, neither have traits of outside directors.
8.2 Hypotheses
Obviously, taking the last results from the sender firms regarding sudden executive
deaths into account and since there is a lack of prior research, we base the hypotheses
on our prior findings of the whole sample consideration. So we do not expect any
significant impact of personal traits on the firm value. This is again the case for
the same reasons. Either the information is not available, not for the market, not
incorporated or not important. The latter seems to be even more compelling as
personal traits of an individual in a leading position seems to be rather significant
than the traits of a director.
Hypothesis 8. Personal traits do not play a significant role for the announcement
effect of an outside director’s sudden death. In other words, the character of outside
directors does not play any role.
Considering managerial traits of outside directors the situation looks a little different.
As governance structures impact the value of busy directors, we instead examine
whether managerial traits of the deceased within the sender firm have impact on
the shareholder reaction. We investigate the impact of measures, that are closely
connected to the sender firm, such as the duality variable as proxy for power. Hence,
does power in the sender firm impacts the shareholder reaction in the firm where the
manager holds an outside directorship? One may argue that a powerful manager can
provide better advisory, since due to his various positions he gains better experience.
But not only this, but also measures, that are less depending on the sender firm such
as the existence of a wikipedia article as proxy for reputation, will be examined by
us.
One can simply assume any significant shareholder reaction to the death of an
outside director on managerial traits, but giving any precise predictions seems too
puzzling.
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Hypothesis 9. Managerial traits play a significant (but not predicable) role for the
announcement effect of an outside director’s sudden death.
As before, a clear prediction that rules in favor of the EMH cannot be made. Neither
can a ruling against it. Hence, we refrain from putting the EMH into a hypothesis of
this thesis but simply keep in mind to apply the EMH as underlying theory.
8.3 Empirical Analysis and Conclusion
Identifying outside directorships, can be puzzling. Some firms provide extensive
description on their managers’ career path and also current employments in the 10-K
annual report filings on SEC. But describing the outside directorships in this detail is
rare. Therefore, to obtain information on this can be a large effort on finding this by
hand on the internet or Lexis Nexis. However, we identify 88 outside directorships of
56 executives ranging from 1993 to 2012. Directors are usually replaced at the next
annual meeting. Thus, in opposite to CEOs, presidents and chairmen replacing them
takes much more time. Also, companies with larger boards (more than 10 directors)
tend to not replace their directors at all. This also indicates the lower importance of
an outside director to the firm. On the one hand the company appreciates and uses
his advisory and monitoring but on the other hand it does not rely on one individual
and his advisory and monitoring expertise.
Therefore, a director does have a certain value for the board and company from a
company’s perception but he seems to be not essential.34 Certainly, this result also
holds for the market perception.
To obtain evidence on the same questions as the ones for the sender firm, we
now run the same analysis for the firm where the executive holds an outside di-
rectorship.35 Hence, all our control variables now describe the new company and
not the sender anymore. We run the same OLS regression again and as we already
34Nguyen and Nielsen (2010a) investigated the value of directors, and in particular the value of
outside directors. For a thorough analysis of the value and the difference between inside and
outside directorships and their value effects, we highly recommend this study
35Note that we do not provide any empirical evidence here or in the appendix, but it can be
provided upon request. As we simply do not obtain any significant results, it does not seem
necessary.
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collected relevant data, we have all the personal and managerial trait information
available. However, when investigating the results on the sender company, expecting
a significant impact of personal traits on the reaction for outside directors would be
cocky. The positions of an executive such as president, CEO or chairman have more
influence on the performance of firm than a standard outside director. Obtaining
almost no significant results on personal traits in the whole sample regression will
most likely provide no evidence on outside directors.
In the regression analysis, none of our existing personal trait variables show any
significant effect on the shareholders’ reaction to the sudden death of the outside
director. Our provided explanations hold even stronger. Either the market com-
pletely ignores personal traits as this information is not relevant or it is not aware
and therefore does not incorporate relevant information correctly. In particular, an
outside director is one of many and hence, his value is smaller and so is the interest
in this person. Furthermore, as the value is smaller, also is his impact on the firm
and therefore his personality even less valuable. In terms of efficient markets, the
non-reaction to non-information is clearly in line with the assumptions of the EMH
that we introduced whereas the other explanation contradicts.
Next, when regressing the CAR on the managerial traits and control variables,
we do not even obtain any significant impact of any managerial trait. In fact, we
check for power, which the deceased holds within the sender company and check
for power in the receiver firm by investigating the ownership as power proxy.36 We
use the common reputation proxies, as well as entrenchment of sender and receiver,
generalist and quality. And neither of the traits show any significant reaction.
It can analogously be argued with the two explanations above. But how come
there is a reaction after all? The market is sensitive to any kind of information
and simply accounts for the death of an outside director in general. It does not
make up a detailed estimation of the deceased’s personality and managerial traits
but simply reacts to an overall perception of him. Therefore, we can conclude that
36Recall that the sender firm is the company where the deceased holds an executive position.
Respectively, the receiver firm is the one where he holds the outside directorship, that is the
target firm in this analysis.
172
8.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
shareholders evaluate the outside director as a whole and his advisory but do not
evaluate his personality and managerial traits. Hence, the market reacts to the death
announcement. However, it goes against our expectations for the hypotheses we
set. Even though, we confirm the first one, again as for successors, managerial traits
barely play role.
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9.1 Summary
Prior research provides evidence that an executive’s personality and his managerial
attributes can influence corporate decisions such as firm policies, innovations, cash-
flow investment sensitivity and many others.
We, instead, focus on how the market perceives managers and their personality
and if the market realize (sub-)optimal attributes and accounts for them into stock
price. In other words, we analyze an approach to evaluate personal and managerial
attributes. To examine the value of personal and managerial traits and to further
circumvent potential endogeneity issues we analyze the stock price reaction of 216
sudden deaths of CEOs, chairmen and presidents of public companies between 1972
and 2012.
To gain a full understanding of the shareholders’ perception of a manager, we,
firstly, analyze how a manager’s personality and his managerial traits affect the
shareholder’s reaction to his death. Secondly, we run various subsample analyses
answering the same questions on firms and managers with certain attributes. There-
after, we investigate how successors play a role for the market’s reaction and what
the results mean for our analysis. Finally, we focus on the value of personal and
managerial attributes for outside directors. We discuss our results briefly below.
Our findings suggest that the personality of an executive plays a rather small
role. In particular, we find that personal traits barely have a significant effect on
shareholder value. It leads to the assumption that the market does not reflect the
personality into the stock price. However, few exceptions are obtained, such as
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significant value enhancing results for openminded and tolerant executives proxied
by Foreign Background and value destroying effects for overconfidence proxied by
M&A Deals over Tenure.
We further analyze the same questions around the value of an executive’s personality
for some subsamples and thus, instead of investigating the entire sample and to even-
tually obtain different results we restrict it to CEOs and chairmen death events only.
We further examine subsamples restricted to managerial traits. In other words, we
run the same analysis on personal attributes for companies with powerful, entrenched,
busy or generalist executives separately. For all of these personal attributes and
subsamples we obtain similar results compared to the entire sample with marginal
impact on firm value.
Opposingly, the same analyses on managerial traits for the whole sample as well
as for the CEOs and chairmen only subsamples indicate that managerial attributes
have a significant impact on firm value. Traits react always as expected and prior
literature implies. That is in detail that power, entrenchment and busyness are value
destroying whereas quality and generalist are value enhancing attributes.
Thereafter, we run the same regressions on subsamples restricting the sample to
companies with certain attributes: large/small by assets, old/young by firm age,
many/few competitors, high/low market adjusted R&D expenses, and high/low
industry adjusted R&D expenses. This grants us proper insight and provides an
indication in which companies certain traits are beneficial and where they do not
play an important role. For instance, we obtain that openmindedness is only sig-
nificant in firms with few competitors or entrenchment only in large firms. Overall,
we thoroughly summarize those subsamples which let us better understand when
shareholders adjust their different perceptions.
From all these results, one can infer that the market only adapts its valuation
of an executive for traits that directly have an observable impact on the firm as a
whole. Even though personal attributes may impact corporate decisions, this does
not necessarily mean that shareholders realize it. Hence, we argue that information
on an executive’s personality is barely accessible to the market. We also argue
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that shareholders observe corporate decisions of their executives but do not infer
on their personality. Alternatively, it can be stated that shareholders simply ignore
their executives’ personality as they do not associate it with the company directly.
Lastly, we provide an explanation arguing that some of the proxies might have shown
significant results in previous studies because those suffer endogeneity and the results
are driven by omitted variables in their regression models.
As theoretical underpinning of our investigations, we introduced the efficient market
theory, in particular its semi-strong form after Fama (1970). With the help of the
hypothesis we explain our empirical results and either claim that our results rule
out efficient markets as potential theory or that we provide supportive evidence.
In case of the proxies where we obtain significant reactions, we clearly rule in fa-
vor of the EMH applying the the assumption that new (relevant) information is
reflected. In those cases where proxies for traits do not reveal a significant reaction
we provide several explanations. A relevant information which is not identified by
market participants as such is an argument against the EMH assuming that all new
information is incorporated quickly and correctly into the stock price. The second line
of argumentation, we introduce states that the market ignores certain information,
in particular on an executive’s personality as it considers this information irrelevant.
Opposingly, this is strongly supportive for the EMH claiming that the market should
never react to non-information.
In summary, we find explanation for both against and in favor of efficient markets
and therefore, cannot clearly rule for either of the sides.
In the next step, to fully rule out endogeneity as a potential driver of our find-
ings, we examine the announcements of successors in consequence of the sudden
death. In detail, within the scope of the whole sample sudden death analysis, we
constantly include a dummy for successors, indicating whether a replacement has
been announced within two days after sudden death, to check if our results are
affected by this. It turns out, the dummy does not hold significantly at any time.
We further analyze successors separately and check whether certain traits show
any effect on the shareholder’s announcement and also if there is an impact when
attributes, both personal and managerial are inherited. Interestingly, the market
176
9.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
does not react at all to any traits, neither personal nor managerial, in consequence
of the announcement. Only an increase of quality compared to the predecessor leads
to a significant positive announcement reaction.
Hence, it backs up our indication that our results on sudden death events are
not driven by endogeneity as we see that the reaction to the various traits of the
deceased is not driven by the successor in any way. Endogeneity predominantly
appears as traits are related to the likelihood of an executive’s termination. However,
this issue is solved by employing sudden death events because we get around to
measure the likelihood of termination. In addition, the shareholder reaction to
sudden deaths may be also driven by the choice of a successor. Our analysis shows
that this is most likely not the case either. Consequently, we can probably rule out
endogeneity as potential driver of the results.
Finally we focus on the same questions around the value of personal and man-
agerial attributes as before by examining the stock price reaction to the sudden
death of those firms where an executive held an outside directorship. We find that
neither personal nor managerial characteristics show any significant impact on the
shareholders reaction to his sudden death. This strongly supports our argument
that the market perceives the personality of a manager or director as not important
either because of a lack of information or because of simple indifference.
9.2 Implications for Corporate Governance
All of our results provide an extensive contribution to corporate governance and be-
havioral finance research. We, now, fully understand questions that arose throughout
a large body of literature and employ a method to circumvent and solve important
statistical problems prior studies had to deal with. We also gain a better understand-
ing of shareholder’s reaction to sudden death events.
Our findings might give some better insights into corporate governance, too. We
provide evidence on the general market perception of certain traits and also show
which attributes are particularly important for different companies. Additionally, we
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show that firms tend to fail in detecting what can be beneficial for them and what can
be destructive. It can be inferred that corporate governance mechanisms fail in firing
inefficient executives and hiring value enhancing managers and more importantly
to only assign them with value enhancing traits. In other words, companies do not
realize and detect the value destroying aspects of managerial attributes, and also do
not change their perception. They also accept the same traits, value enhancing or
destroying, for the successor.
These findings along with prior research should be reason for boards and man-
agement to reconsider their selection processes and also their monitoring. Moreover,
they imply that companies should spend stronger focus on whom they choose into
certain positions (e.g. highly qualified and generalist managers) and how to assign the
executives with certain managerial attributes (e.g. power) and in which companies
they do so. Our results can be helpful to optimize the selection process. Moreover,
the understanding of the market and its perception of executives can be improved
and in turn adaptions be made.
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Appendix
Variable Definition
Investment Rate is measured as capital expenditures (CAPX)
divided by beginning of the year property, plant
and equipment (PPENT) CAPX
PPENT
over two years
preceding to death.
Inv. Based A CEO or chairman is classified excessively
Execessive Overconfidence overconfident if their firm is in the top
(Overconfidence) quintile of firms on industry adjusted (same
2 digit SIC code) investment rates over two years
preceding to death.
Inv. Based A CEO or chairman is classified excessively
Execessive Diffidence overconfident if their firm is in the bottom
(Overconfidence) quintile of firms on industry adjusted (same
2 digit SIC code) investment rates over two years
preceding to death.
Inv. Based A CEO or chairman is classified moderately
Moderate Overconfidence overconfident if they are in neither excessively
(Overconfidence) overconfident nor diffident.
Q Q=MarketV alueOfAssets
BookV alueOfAssets
= TotalAssets+MarketEquity−BookEquity
BookV alueofAssets
= AT+CSHO∗PRCC−(SEQ−PSTKL+TXDITC)
AT
whereas SEQ
is the stockholder equity, PSTKL is the preferred stock
liquidating value and TXDITC is the balance sheet
preferred taxes and investment credit.
Table 71: Variable Definition (1). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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Inv. Based over Q A CEO or chairman is classified excessively
Execessive Overconfidence overconfident if their firm is in the top quintile
(Overconfidence) of firms on industry adjusted (same 2 digit SIC
code) investment rates (over Q) over two years
preceding to death.
Inv. Based over Q A CEO or chairman is classified excessively
Execessive Diffidence overconfident if their firm is in the bottom quintile
(Overconfidence) of firms on industry adjusted (same 2 digit SIC
code) investment rates (over Q) over two years
preceding to death.
Inv. Based over Q A CEO or chairman is classified moderately
Moderate Overconfidence overconfident if they are in neither excessively
(Overconfidence) overconfident nor diffident.
Press Portrayal A manager is classified overconfident if in press
(Overconfidence) portrayal more words classify him overconfident than
conservative (a detailed description can be found in
chapter 5.2).
Manager Hobbies A manager is classified overconfident if he
(Overconfidence) exercises any known hobby which in turn may
be a threat for his life.
Private Pictures Online A manager is classified narcissistic if there
(Narcissism) exist non-business pictures of him online.
Firm Name=Founder Name A founder in the sample is classified narcissistic
(Narcissism) if he names the company after himself.
#Marriages The number of marriages serves as proxy
(Narcissism) for narcissism.
#Marriages Dummy A manager is classified egotistical/narcissistic
(Narcissism) if he was married more than once.
Age Difference to Wife The age difference between manager and his last
(Narcissism) wife serves as proxy for narcissism.
Table 72: Variable Definition (2). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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Variable Definition
Age Difference to Wife A manager is classified egotistical/narcissistic
Dummy if the age difference to his last wife is more than
(Narcissism) 10 years.
# of Kids The number of a manager’s kids serves as proxy
(Generosity) for generosity.
# of Kids Dummy A manager is classified non-generous if he is
(Generosity) parent to more than two kids.
Depression Baby A manager is classified resilient if he was born
(Resilience) before 1921.
War Baby A manager is classified resilient if he was born before
(Resilience) 1939.
War Participant A manager is classified resilient if participated in a
(Resilience) war as non-civilian.
Age>67 A manager is classified resilient if is older than
(Resilience) 67 years.
Foreign Background A manager is classified openminded if he or his
(Openmindedness) parents are non-U.S. citizens.
Military Manager A manager is classified disciplined if he gained any
(Discipline/Authority) military experience besides compulsory military service.
Direct Speech A manager is classified sympathetic if there is
(Sympathy) direct speech on the obituary released by the firm.
Personality Described A manager is classified sympathetic if his personality
(Sympathy) is described in the obituary.
First Name Mentioned A manager is classified sympathetic if his first name
(Sympathy) is mentioned in the obituary.
Duality A manager is classified powerful, if he holds the position
(Power) of CEO and chairman.
Triality A manager is classified powerful, if he holds the position
(Power) of CEO, chairman and president.
Chair President Duality A manager is classified powerful, if he holds the position
(Power) of chairman and president.
Table 73: Variable Definition (3). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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CEO President Duality A manager is classified powerful, if he holds the
(Power) position of CEO and president.
Additional Executive A manager is classified powerful, if he holds another
(Power) executive position aside from his usual. Those can be
CFO,COO or CIO.
Ownership Ratio of ownership of outstanding shares held by
(Power) the deceased serves as proxy for power.
Ownership>5% A manager is classified powerful, if owns more than
(Power) 5% of the outstanding firm stock.
Ownership>10% A manager is classified powerful, if owns more than
(Power) 10% of the outstanding firm stock.
Nominating Committee A manager is classified powerful, if he is member
(Power) of the nominating committee.
Committee Presence The number of all committee memberships serves
(Power) as power proxy.
Wikipedia Article A manager is classified highly reputable, if there
Exists (Reputation) exists a Wikipedia article on him.
Mentioned in Wikipedia A manager is classified highly reputable, if he is
Article of Firm mentioned on the firm’s Wikipedia article.
(Reputation)
Pictures Exist Without A manager is classified highly reputable, if there
Mentioning Firm exist pictures without mentioning the firm name.
(Reputation)
No Pictures Exist A manager is classified highly reputable, if there
(Reputation) do not exist any pictures.
Founder A manager is classified entrenched, if he is
(Entrenchment) a (co-)founder of the company.
Tenure Tenure serves as proxy for entrenchment
(Entrenchment)
Tenure over Age Tenure over Age serves as proxy for entrenchment.
(Entrenchment)
Table 74: Variable Definition (4). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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Variable Definition
Tenure over Age A manager is classified entrenched, if the ratio
Dummy (Entrenchment) of tenure over age is greater than 0.25.
Takeover Target A manager is classified entrenched, if the firm has
(Entrenchment) been takeover target during his tenure.
# Outside Directorships The number of outside directorships an executive
(Busyness) holds serves as busyness proxy.
# Outside Directorships≥2 A manager is classified entrenched, if he holds
(Busyness) two or more outside directorships
Outside Director Board The number of board meetings in all companies,
Meetings (Busyness) where the executive holds directorships serves as
proxy for busyness.
Non-Profit Board Index The Non-Profit Board Index serves as proxy for
(Busyness) busyness. It is defined as the sum of all extra corporate
activity consisting of Own Foundation, the sum
of all Voluntary positions as well as Chair of Charity.
Chair of Charity A manager is classified busy, if he holds the chair
(Busyness) of a charity organization.
Own Foundation A manager is classified busy, if he has his own
(Busyness) foundation.
Voluntary Work A manager is classified busy, if he does any kind
(Busyness) of voluntary work aside from a Chair of Charity.
GAI The General Ability Index is defined as follows:
(Generalist/Specialist) GAIi, t = 0.268X1i,t + 0.312X2i,t + 0.309X3i,t+
0.218X4i,t + 0.153X5i,t where X1 represents the
number of different management positions the
manager held throughout his career, X2 the number
of different firms, X3 the number of different
industries based on a 4-digit SIC code, X4 whether
the manager held the same position before and X5 is a
dummy whether firm is a multi-division company.
It serves as proxy for Generalists.
Table 75: Variable Definition (5). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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General Degree A manager is classified to be a generalist, if he graduated
(Generalist/Specialist) in any major related to business, economics or law.
Special Degree A manager is classified to be a specialist, if he graduated
(Generalist/Specialist) in any other major than business, economic or law related.
First Manager Age The age, at which an executive gets into the position,
(Experience/Quality) where he dies, serves as proxy for his quality/experience.
First Manager Age A manager is classified to be a qualified/experienced,
Mean (Experience/Quality) if his First Manager Age is below the mean,
which is 40 years.
Elite Uni A manager is classified to be qualified/experienced if
(Experience/Quality) he has a degree from any elite university. Those are all
members of the Ivy League and additionally Stanford
University, NYU, MIT, UC Berkeley and University of
Chicago.
MBA A manager is classified to be qualified/experienced, if he
(Experience/Quality) has an MBA degree.
Compensation 2nd Highest A manager is classified to be a qualified/experienced, if
(Experience/Quality) he earns 50% more in the year prior to death than the
second highest salary in case he is CEO, if he earns more
than 90% salary in case he is president and not CEO
and if he earns 100% more of the CEO’s than all
other directors if he is chairman and not CEO.
CEO A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is defined as the highest
ranking executive in a company whose main responsibilities
include developing and implementing high-level strategies,
making major corporate decisions, managing the overall
operations and resources of a company, and acting as the
main point of communication between the board of directors
and the corporate operations (http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/c/ceo.asp).
Table 76: Variable Definition (6). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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Variable Definition
Chairman A Chairman is defined as an executive elected by a
company’s board of directors that is responsible for
presiding over board or committee meetings (http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/c/chairman.asp). Amongst the
most important tasks of chairmen are hiring and firing the
CEO as well as monitoring and advisory of his activities
(Florou (2005)).
President A President is often considered to be the leader of a company
but subordinated to the CEO position and overseeing the
various Vice Presidents.
Industry Adjusted ROA is defined as NI
AT
whereas NI is the net income
and AT the total assets. We use ROA industry
and adjusted by firms with the same 2-digit
SIC code average it over the last three years
preceding to death.
Market Cap is defined as the product of stock close price at
the end of the year preceding to death (PRCC)
and the common shares outstanding (CSHO). We
compute the market gap for the end of the year
preceding to death.
Market To Book Ratio is defined as PRCC∗CSHO
AT−LT whereas LT are the
total liabilities. We compute the market gap for
the end of the year preceding to death.
Boardsize is defined as the number of member on the board
of directors at the time of the death.
Outsider Ratio is the ratio of directors, who are not employed by the
firm in any other capacity over the number of all
directors at the time of death.
Firmsize is defined as AT, total assets, in the year
preceding to sudden death
Table 77: Variable Definition (7). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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Firmage is defined as the number of years since foundation
until the year of death
Competitors the number of competitors is the number of
firms with the same 2-digit SIC code.
Market Adjusted R&D are defined as the research and development expenses
of the firm adjusted by the market’s average R&D
expenses averaged over three years preceding to death.
Industry Adjusted R&D are defined as the research and development expenses
of the firm adjusted by by firms with the same 2-digit
SIC code average it over the last three years preceding
to death.
Table 78: Variable Definition (8). This table provides an overview of all variables. Most are
defined thoroughly in prior sections.
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Table 79: Results on Overconfidence (2). This table shows regression analysis of overconfidence
proxied by the Investment Rate over Q Quintiles and the stock price reaction to executive deaths.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of
interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple
and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same
number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 80: Results on Narcissism (2). This table shows regression analysis of narcissism proxied
by the Private Pictures Online, Number of Marriages as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column
shows our variables of interest, that is the narcissism proxies. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of
the narcissism proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate
regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression
results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level
significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show
any significance.
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Table 81: Results on Generosity. This table shows regression analysis of generosity proxied by
the Number of Kids as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the Generosity proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the generosity proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 82: Results on Resilience. This table shows regression analysis of resilience proxied by the Depression Baby, War Baby, War
Participant as well as Age>67 and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The
upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the resilience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which
we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust
regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression
of the resilience proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients
denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any
significance.
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Table 83: Results on Sympathy. This table shows regression analysis of sympathy proxied by the
Direct Speech in Obituary, Personality Described as well as First Name Mentioned and the stock
price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the sympathy proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the sympathy proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
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Table 84: Results on Discipline. This table shows regression analysis of discipline proxied by the
Military Background and the stock price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
discipline proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1)) shows
the results of a robust simple regression of the discipline proxy. The second column assigned with
* always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 85: Results on Power (2). This table shows regression analysis of power proxied by
Additional Executive, Nominating Committee, Committee Presence and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not
in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away.
The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression.
All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our
variables of interest, that is the power proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we
expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a
simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the
same number (e.g. (5) or (6)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the power proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 86: Results on Reputation. This table shows regression analysis of power proxied by Wikipedia Article Exists, Mentioned in
Firm’s Wikipedia Article, Picture Exists without Mentioning Firm, Not Pictures Exist and the stock price reaction to executive deaths.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where
t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is
the reputation proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the
same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the reputation proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the
regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 87: Results on Quality/Experience (2). This table shows regression analysis of general-
ist/specialist proxied by Elite Uni, MBA, Compensation over 2nd Highest Compensation and the
stock price reaction to executive deaths. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part
of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the generalist/specialist proxies. The
second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third
column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model.
The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of
a robust simple regression of the quality/experience proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 88: Results on Overconfidence for CEOs (1). This table shows regression analysis of
overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively
show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%,
5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with
this, do not show any significance.
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Table 89: Results on Overconfidence for Chairmen (1). This table shows regression analysis of
overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively
show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%,
5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with
this, do not show any significance.
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Table 90: Results on Overconfidence for CEOs (2). This table shows regression analysis of
overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate over Q Quintiles and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions
is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t
represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including
the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The
upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the
third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression
model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results
of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 91: Results on Overconfidence for Chairmen (2). This table shows regression analysis of
overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate over Q Quintiles and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions
is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t
represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including
the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The
upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the
third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression
model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results
of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 92: Results on Narcissism for CEOs (1). This table shows regression analysis of narcissism
proxied by Age Difference to Wife as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the narcissism proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the narcissism proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
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Table 93: Results on Narcissism for Chairmen (1). This table shows regression analysis of
narcissism proxied by Age Difference to Wife as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1,
where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables
including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections.
The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the narcissism proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the
third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression
model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results
of a robust simple regression of the narcissism proxy. The second column assigned with * always
represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other
columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 94: Results on Narcissism for CEOs (2). This table shows regression analysis of narcissism
proxied by Private Pictures Online, Number of Marriages as well as its dummy and the stock
price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
narcissism proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the narcissism proxy. The second column assigned
with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables.
The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,***
behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor
variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 95: Results on Narcissism for Chairmen (2). This table shows regression analysis of
narcissism proxied by Private Pictures Online, Number of Marriages as well as its dummy and the
stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to Chairmen only. The dependent
variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days
t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows
all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are
defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is
the narcissism proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the narcissism proxy. The second column assigned
with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables.
The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,***
behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor
variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 96: Results on Generosity for CEOs. This table shows regression analysis of generosity
proxied by the Number of Kids as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the generosity proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the generosity proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
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Table 97: Results on Generosity for Chairmen. This table shows regression analysis of generosity
proxied by the Number of Kids as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the generosity proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the generosity proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
216
Table 98: Results on Resilience for Chairmen. This table shows regression analysis of resilience proxied by the Depression Baby, War
Baby, War Participant as well as Age>67 and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where
t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that
is the resilience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column
onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the
same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the resilience proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the
regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 99: Results on Discipline for CEOs. This table shows regression analysis of discipline
proxied by the Military Background and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting
the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column
shows our variables of interest, that is the discipline proxies. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (1)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the
discipline proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate
regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression
results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level
significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show
any significance.
218
Table 100: Results on Discipline for CEOs. This table shows regression analysis of discipline
proxied by the Military Background and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting
the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column
shows our variables of interest, that is the discipline proxies. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (1)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the
discipline proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate
regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression
results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level
significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show
any significance.
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Table 101: Results on Sympathy for Chairmen. This table shows regression analysis of sympathy
proxied by the Direct Speech in Obituary, Personality Described as well as First Name Mentioned
and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the sympathy proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the sympathy proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 102: Results on Sympathy for Chairmen. This table shows regression analysis of sympathy
proxied by the Direct Speech in Obituary, Personality Described as well as First Name Mentioned
and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the sympathy proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the sympathy proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 103: Results on Power for Chairmen (1). This table shows regression analysis of power proxied by Duality,Triality, Chair Preident
Duality, CEO President Duality and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to Chairmen only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t
represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is
the power proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same
number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the power proxy. The second column assigned with * always
represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression
results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor
variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 104: Results on Power for CEOs (2). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by Additional Executive, Nominating Committee, Committee Presence and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for
all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t
+ 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
power proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model.
From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust
regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (5) or (6)) shows
the results of a robust simple regression of the power proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 105: Results on Power for Chairmen (2). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by Additional Executive, Nominating Committee, Committee Presence and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
power proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model.
From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust
regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (5) or (6)) shows
the results of a robust simple regression of the power proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 106: Results on Reputation for CEOs. This table shows regression analysis of reputation proxied by Wikipedia Article Exists,
Mentioned in Firm’s Wikipedia Article, Picture Exists without Mentioning Firm, Not Pictures Exist and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return
(not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the reputation proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model.
The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the reputation
proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1%
level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 107: Results on Reputation for Chairmen. This table shows regression analysis of power proxied by Wikipedia Article Exists,
Mentioned in Firm’s Wikipedia Article, Picture Exists without Mentioning Firm, Not Pictures Exist and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return
(not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the reputation proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model.
The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the reputation
proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1%
level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 108: Results on Entrenchement for CEOs (1). This table shows regression analysis of
entrenchment proxied by Founder as well as Takeover Target and the stock price reaction to
executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent variable for all regressions
is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t
represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including
the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The
upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the entrenchment proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third
column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model.
The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a
robust simple regression of the entrenchment proxy. The second column assigned with * always
represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other
columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 109: Results on Entrenchement for Chairmen (1). This table shows regression analysis
of entrenchment proxied by Founder as well as Takeover Target and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1,
where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables
including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections.
The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the entrenchment proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third
column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model.
The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a
robust simple regression of the entrenchment proxy. The second column assigned with * always
represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other
columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 110: Results on Busyness for CEOs (1). This table shows regression analysis of busyness
proxied by Number of Outside Directorships, its dummy as well as Number of Board Meetings
and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the busyness proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the busyness proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 111: Results on Quality/Experience for CEOs (2). This table shows regression analysis of
quality/experience proxied by Elite Uni, MBA, Compensation over 2nd Highest Compensation and
the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to CEOs only. The dependent
variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days
t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows
all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are
defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that
is the quality/experience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in
a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the quality/experience proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
230
Table 112: Results on Quality/Experience for Chairmen (2). This table shows regression analysis
of quality/experience proxied by Elite Uni, MBA, Compensation over 2nd Highest Compensation
and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to chairmen only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that
is the quality/experience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in
a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the quality/experience proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 113: Results on Overconfidence for Powerful (Duality) Managers (1). This table shows
regression analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to executives, that held the position CEO
and chairman at the time of death only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively
show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%,
5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with
this, do not show any significance.
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Table 114: Results on Overconfidence for Powerful (Duality) Managers (2). This table shows
regression analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate over Q Quintiles and the stock
price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to executives, that held the position
CEO and chairman at the time of death only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively
show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%,
5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with
this, do not show any significance.
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Table 115: Results on Overconfidence for Powerful (Duality) Managers (3). This table shows regression analysis of overconfidence
proxied by the Press Portrayal, Manager Hobbies, M&A Deals over Tenure as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive
deaths by restricting the sample to executives, that held the position CEO and chairman at the time of death only. The dependent
variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence
proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (7)
or (8)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents
the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for
the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 116: Results on Generosity for Powerful (Duality) Managers. This table shows regression
analysis of generosity proxied by the Number of Kids as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to executives, that held the position CEO
and chairman at the time of death only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of
the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the generosity proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the generosity proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show
the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%,
1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do
not show any significance.
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Table 117: Results on resilience for Powerful (Duality) Managers. This table shows regression analysis of resilience proxied by the
Depression Baby, War Baby, War Participant as well as Age>67 as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by
restricting the sample to executives, that held the position CEO and chairman at the time of death only. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are
defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the resilience proxies. The second
provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a
simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the
results of a robust simple regression of the resilience proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate
regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 118: Results on Openmindedness/Tolerance for Powerful (Duality) Managers. This table
shows regression analysis of openmindedness/tolerance proxied by Foreign Background and the stock
price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to executives, that held the position
CEO and chairman at the time of death only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part
of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the openmindedness/tolerance proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the
third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression
model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1)) shows the results of a
robust simple regression of the openmindedness/tolerance proxy. The second column assigned with
* always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. *,**,***
behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor
variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 119: Results on Discipline for Powerful (Duality) Managers. This table shows regression
analysis of discipline proxied by the Direct Speech in Obituary, Personality Described as well as
First Name Mentioned and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to
executives, that held the position CEO and chairman at the time of death only. The dependent
variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days
t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows
all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are
defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is
the discipline proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the discipline proxy. The second column assigned
with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables.
The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,***
behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor
variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 120: Results on Overconfidence for Powerful (Ownership) Managers (1). This table shows
regression analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to executives, that own more than 10% of the
outstanding company shares at the time of death. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively
show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%,
5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with
this, do not show any significance.
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Table 121: Results on Overconfidence for Powerful (Ownership) Managers (2). This table shows
regression analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to executives, that own more than 10% of the
outstanding company shares at the time of death. The dependent variable for all regressions is the
cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the
day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the
first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of
two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple
regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively
show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%,
5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with
this, do not show any significance.
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Table 122: Results on resilience for Powerful (Ownership) Managers. This table shows regression analysis of resilience proxied by the
Depression Baby, War Baby, War Participant as well as Age>67 as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by
restricting the sample to executives, that own more than 10% of the outstanding company shares at the time of death. The dependent
variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the resilience proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are
provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or
(5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the resilience proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the
robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 123: Results on Overconfidence for Entrenched Managers (1). This table shows regression
analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths by restricting the sample to founders only. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1,
where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control variables
including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections.
The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the overconfidence proxies.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the
third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression
model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (1) or (2)) shows the results
of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column assigned with *
always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control variables. The
other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind
the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables,
which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 124: Results on Overconfidence for Entrenched Managers (2). This table shows regression
analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate over Q Quintiles and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to founders only. The dependent variable
for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and
t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column shows all control
variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined
in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest, that is the
overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression
model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a multivariate
robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5))
shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second column
assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all control
variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining proxies.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 125: Results on Resilience for Entrenched Managers. This table shows regression analysis
of resilience proxied by the Depression Baby, War Baby as well as Age>67 as well as its dummy
and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to founders only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the resilience proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the resilience proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 126: Results on Overconfidence for Generalist Managers (1). This table shows regression
analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate Quintiles and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths by restricting the sample to managers with a GAI above mean only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from
the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number (e.g.
(1) or (2)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 127: Results on Overconfidence for Generalist Managers (2). This table shows regression
analysis of overconfidence proxied by the Investment Rate over Q Quintiles and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to managers with a GAI above mean only.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of
interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple
and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same
number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 128: Results on Overconfidence for Generalist Managers (3). This table shows regression
analysis of overconfidence proxied by M&A Deals over Tenure as well as its dummy and the stock
price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to managers with a GAI above mean
only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of
interest, that is the overconfidence proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple
and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same
number (e.g. (7) or (8)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the overconfidence proxy.
The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results
including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the
remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 129: Results on Generosity for Generalist Managers. This table shows regression analysis
of generosity proxied by the Number of Kids as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction
to executive deaths by restricting the sample to managers with a GAI above mean only. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables of interest,
that is the generosity proxies. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions are provided in a simple and in a
multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns denoted with the same number
(e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the generosity proxy. The second
column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate regression results including all
control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression results for the remaining
proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable.
All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 130: Results on Resilience for Generalist/Specialist Managers. This table shows regression
analysis of resilience proxied by the Depression Baby, War Baby as well as Age>67 as well as its
dummy and the stock price reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to managers with
a GAI above mean only. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive
passed away. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column
shows our variables of interest, that is the resilience proxies. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (4) or (5)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of
the resilience proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust multivariate
regression results including all control variables. The other columns respectively show the regression
results for the remaining proxies. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level
significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show
any significance.
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Table 131: Results on Openmindedness/Tolerance for Generalist Managers. This table shows
regression analysis of openmindedness/tolerance proxied by Foreign Background and the stock price
reaction to executive deaths by restricting the sample to managers with a GAI above mean only.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the executive passed away. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The upper part of the first column shows our variables
of interest, that is the openmindedness/tolerance proxies. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, regressions
are provided in a simple and in a multivariate robust regression model. The first of two columns
denoted with the same number (e.g. (1)) shows the results of a robust simple regression of the
openmindedness/tolerance proxy. The second column assigned with * always represents the robust
multivariate regression results including all control variables. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote
a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned
with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 132: Results on Power for Successors (1). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by Nominating Committee and the stock price reaction to the successor announcement.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is announced. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided
three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are regressions include all
successors. The second exclude those, that are announced within two days after the sudden death
of the predecessor. The third column provides employs transition variables, which defined before.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 133: Results on Power for Successors (2). This table shows regression analysis of power
proxied by Ownership as well as Ownership>10% and the stock price reaction to the successor
announcement. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not
in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is announced.
The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression.
All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which
we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions
are provided three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are regressions
include all successors. The second exclude those, that are announced within two days after the
sudden death of the predecessor. The third column provides employs transition variables, which
defined before. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each
variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 134: Results on Reputation for Successors. This table shows regression analysis of reputation
proxied by Wikipedia Article Exists and the stock price reaction to the successor announcement.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is announced. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided
three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are regressions include all
successors. The second exclude those, that are announced within two days after the sudden death
of the predecessor. The third column provides employs transition variables, which defined before.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 135: Results on Entrenchment for Successors (1). This table shows regression analysis of
entrenchment proxied by Tenure and the stock price reaction to the successor announcement. The
dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms)
for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is announced. The first column
shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables
are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the
regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided three ways
if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are regressions include all successors. The
second exclude those, that are announced within two days after the sudden death of the predecessor.
The third column provides employs transition variables, which defined before. *,**,*** behind the
coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which
are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 136: Results on Entrenchment for Successors (2). This table shows regression analysis of
entrenchment proxied by Tenure over Age as well as its dummy and the stock price reaction to the
successor announcement. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal
return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is
announced. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the
regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted
sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate
regressions are provided three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are
regressions include all successors. The second exclude those, that are announced within two days
after the sudden death of the predecessor. The third column provides employs transition variables,
which defined before. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for
each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 137: Results on Busyness for Successors (1). This table shows regression analysis of
Busyness proxied by Number of Outside Directorships as well as its dummy and the stock price
reaction to the successor announcement. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative
abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day,
the successor is announced. The first column shows all control variables including the intercept
(constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides
the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third column onwards,
multivariate regressions are provided three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three
columns are regressions include all successors. The second exclude those, that are announced
within two days after the sudden death of the predecessor. The third column provides employs
transition variables, which defined before. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1%
level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not
show any significance.
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Table 138: Results on Busyness for Successors (2). This table shows regression analysis of
Busyness proxied by Chair of Charity and the stock price reaction to the successor announcement.
The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage
terms) for days t-1 and t + 1, where t represents the day, the successor is announced. The first
column shows all control variables including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control
variables are defined in prior sections. The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect
from the regression model. From the third column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided
three ways if data is sufficiently available. The first of three columns are regressions include all
successors. The second exclude those, that are announced within two days after the sudden death
of the predecessor. The third column provides employs transition variables, which defined before.
*,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%, 5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All
predictor variables, which are not assigned with this, do not show any significance.
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Table 139: Results on Quality/Experience for Successors (2). This table shows regression analysis
of Quality/Experience proxied by Compensation over 2nd Highest Compensation as well as Elite
Uni and the stock price reaction to the successor announcement. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (not in percentage terms) for days t-1 and t + 1,
where t represents the day, the successor is announced. The first column shows all control variables
including the intercept (constant) of the regression. All control variables are defined in prior sections.
The second provides the predicted sign, which we expect from the regression model. From the third
column onwards, multivariate regressions are provided three ways if data is sufficiently available.
The first of three columns are regressions include all successors. The second exclude those, that are
announced within two days after the sudden death of the predecessor. The third column provides
employs transition variables, which defined before. *,**,*** behind the coefficients denote a 10%,
5%, 1% level significance for each variable. All predictor variables, which are not assigned with
this, do not show any significance.
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